|
on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Torsten Persson; Gerard Roland; Guido Tabellini |
| Date: | 2007–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000880&r=pol |
| By: | Canegrati, Emanuele |
| Abstract: | In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model, where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates, which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max- imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces- sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income, we have dramatic distorting effect on the labour supply. The prob- lem is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government set taxes in order to favour the most in‡uencing social group. As a consequence, effective marginal tax rates are differentiated amongst social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne. |
| Keywords: | public debt; single-mindedness; intergenerational redistribution |
| JEL: | J20 H63 D31 J26 H21 H55 D78 J18 D63 J22 H11 J14 D64 H60 D71 D72 H23 |
| Date: | 2007–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:2254&r=pol |
| By: | Dessein, Wouter |
| Abstract: | I develop a model of group decision-making, in which a committee generates proposals and holds open discussions, but the ultimate decision is either taken by a leader (decision by authority) or by majority vote. Optimal communication processes are studied that combine both cheap talk statements (proposals) and costly state verification (discussions). I show that by favouring one particular agent — the leader — authoritative decision-making reduces rent-seeking discussions and often results in a higher decision-quality relative to majority decision-making. Institutions which guarantee a "right to voice" by separating the roles of decision maker and discussion leader may further improve efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Authority; Committees; Debate; Group decision-making; Leadership; Majority rule |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6168&r=pol |
| By: | Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini |
| Date: | 2007–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000875&r=pol |
| By: | Alberto Alesina; Guido Tabellini |
| Date: | 2007–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:321307000000000870&r=pol |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Mikhail Golosov; Aleh Tsyvinski |
| Date: | 2007–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000886&r=pol |
| By: | John W. Maxwell (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business); Rafael Reuveny (School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University); Jefferson Davis (Stat-Math, Indiana University) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a model of dynamic conflict featuring probabilistic winner- take-all outcomes and compares its behavior to a model in which combatants emerge with a share of the conflict spoils. While these two models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, we find that in a repeated conflict setting the winner-take-all model generates richer dynamics than the dynamics generated by the share model. Differences include outcomes that illustrate the rise and fall of great powers, the endogenous extinction of combatants, and frequent changes in the relative dominance of combatants. The model's behavior is compared to real world military, business and political conflict outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Anarchy, Fog of War, Paradox of Power, Winner-take-all conflict |
| JEL: | D74 Q20 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2007-12&r=pol |