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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Casey B. Mulligan; Kevin K. Tsui |
| Abstract: | Political competitiveness – which many interpret as the degree of democracy – can be modeled as a monopolistic competition. All regimes are constrained by the threat of "entry," and thereby seek some combination of popular support and political entry barriers. This simple model predicts that many public policies are unrelated to political competitiveness, and that even unchallenged nondemocratic regimes should tax far short of their Laffer curve maximum. Economic sanctions, odious debt repudiation, and other policies designed to punish dictators can have the unintended consequences of increasing oppression and discouraging competition. Since entry barriers are a form of increasing returns, democratic countries (defined according to low entry barriers) are more likely to subdivide and nondemocratic countries are more likely to merge. These and other predictions are consistent with previous empirical findings on comparative public finance, election contests, international conflict, the size of nations, and the Lipset hypothesis. As in the private sector, the number of competitors is not necessarily a good indicator of public sector competitiveness. |
| JEL: | H11 L12 P16 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12653&r=pol |
| By: | Fali Huang (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University) |
| Abstract: | This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different production factors, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation. |
| Keywords: | Economic Development, Political Development, Class Structure, Land, Physical Capital, Human Capital, Monarchy, Suffrage Extension. |
| JEL: | O10 O40 P16 N10 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:22-2006&r=pol |
| By: | Woll, Cornelia |
| Keywords: | lobbying; interest representation; European Commission; political economy; trade policy; international trade; protectionism; liberalization; agriculture policy; telecommunication policy |
| Date: | 2006–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:mpifgx:p0071&r=pol |
| By: | Lars P. Feld; Justina A.V. Fischer; Gebhard Kirchgässner |
| Abstract: | There is an intensive dispute in political economics about the impact of institutions on income redistribution. While the main focus is on comparison between different forms of representative democracy, the influence of direct democracy on redistribution has attracted much less attention. According to theoretical arguments and previous empirical results, government policies of income redistribution are expected to be more in line with median voter preferences in direct than in representative democracies. In this paper, we find that institutions of direct democracy are associated with lower public spending and revenue, particularly lower welfare spending and broad-based income and property (wealth) tax revenue. Moreover, we estimate a model which explains the determinants of redistribution using panel data provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Office from 1981 to 1997 and a cross section of (representative) individual data from 1992. While our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income and actual redistribution is lower, inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution. This finding might well indicate the presence of efficiency gains in redistribution policies. |
| Keywords: | income redistribution, direct democracy, referenda, initiatives |
| JEL: | D70 D78 H11 I30 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1837&r=pol |
| By: | Gottfried Haber; Reinhard Neck |
| Abstract: | Sustainablity of Austrian public debt is investigated in the context of political objectives such as stabilizing the business cycle, increasing chances for being re-elected and implementing the ideologies of political parties. Several tests indicate that Austrian fiscal policies were sustainable in the period 1960–1974, while from 1975 on, public debt grew much more rapidly. The development of public debt in Austria seems to be driven not primarily by ideology, but by structural causes and a shift in the budgetary policy paradigm. We find some empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated by one party run higher deficits than coalition governments. There are no indications of a political business cycle. |
| Keywords: | fiscal policy, sustainability, time series, political economy |
| JEL: | E60 H60 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1816&r=pol |
| By: | Topi Miettinen; Panu Poutvaara |
| Abstract: | We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of non-ideological political nominations. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in nominations made by politicians. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians, thereby becoming potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties. |
| Keywords: | Political parties, Two-sided Platforms, Political Nominations, Rent-seeking, Network Formation |
| JEL: | D72 D85 L14 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:discus:2006-28&r=pol |
| By: | Matthews, Kent (Cardiff Business School); Minford, Patrick (Cardiff Business School); Naraidoo, Ruthira |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a political economy model of multiple unemployment equilibria to provide a theory of an endogenous natural rate of unemployment. This model is applied to the UK and the US interwar period which is remembered as the decade of mass unemployment. The theory here sees the natural rate and the associated path of unemployment as a reaction to shocks (mainly demand in nature) and the institutional structure of the economy. The channel through which these two forces feed on each other is a political economy process whereby voters with limited information on the natural rate react to shocks by demanding more or less social protection. The reduced form results obtained confirm a pattern of unemployment behaviour in which unemployment moves between high and low equilibria in response to shocks. |
| Keywords: | Equilibrium unemployment; political economy; 'vicious' and 'virtuous' circles; bootstrapping |
| JEL: | E24 E27 P16 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2006/25&r=pol |
| By: | Daniel J. Benjamin; Jesse M. Shapiro |
| Abstract: | We showed 10-second, silent video clips of unfamiliar gubernatorial debates to a group of experimental participants and asked them to predict the election outcomes. The participants' predictions explain more than 20 percent of the variation in the actual two-party vote share across the 58 elections in our study, and their importance survives a range of controls, including state fixed effects. In a horse race of alternative forecasting models, participants' visual forecasts significantly outperform economic variables in predicting vote shares, and are comparable in predictive power to a measure of incumbency status. Adding policy information to the video clips by turning on the sound tends, if anything, to worsen participants' accuracy, suggesting that naïveté may be an asset in some forecasting tasks. |
| JEL: | D72 J45 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12660&r=pol |
| By: | Hazama, Yasushi |
| Abstract: | Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not always adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. Under such circumstances, retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage voting in determining electoral outcomes. For studies of retrospective voting, the choice between macro and micro level as the independent variable is a major methodological issue. Using individual-level data on Turkey, this paper addresses two major questions: (1) Are voters' decisions based on household economic conditions or national economic conditions? Do sociopolitical conditions also count? (2) Does the future evaluation of the economy affect voting decisions apart from past evaluation? Logit models are used in this research to answer these questions. |
| Keywords: | Retrospective voting, Elections, Turkey |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper46&r=pol |
| By: | Georgy Egorov (Center for Economic and Financial Research); Konstantin Sonin (New Economic School, Center for Economic and Financial Research) |
| Abstract: | The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most dictators throughout history. Better informed viziers are also better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the dictator. To avoid this, dictators, especially those which are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. However, any use of incentive schemes by a dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator’s own survival, and a dictator is typically unable to commit to the optimal (i.e., less than capital) punishment for those who unsuccessfully plotted against him. We endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal-agent game between a dictator and his (probably, few) viziers in both static and dynamic settings. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face. |
| Keywords: | Dictatorship, Loyalty and Competence, Positive Political Theory, Principal-Agent, Non-democratic Succession |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ads:wpaper:0053&r=pol |
| By: | Theocharis N. Grigoriadis; Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the legislative choices of Russian Duma deputies on energy regulation between 1994 and 2003. We apply Poole’s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered probit model to explain energy law reform in the first decade of Russia’s democratic transition. Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of home energy on deputies’ behavior, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic parameters. We observe that energy resource factors have a considerable effect on deputies’ voting behavior. On the other hand, we concurrently find that regional economic preferences are constrained by the public policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-Soviet Russia. |
| Keywords: | energy regulation; energy roll law reform; energy resources; roll call votes; legislative politics; State Duma; Russia |
| JEL: | Q40 D72 K23 P27 P37 P31 R11 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-25&r=pol |
| By: | Vincent Vicard |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of the different forms taken by regional integration in different parts of the world. This raises the issue of the relationship between economic and political integration. The theoretical model shows that, in an insecure world, the interplays between security and economic forces shape the decision to form a regional trading agreement (RTA) and its institutional design. Empirical results confirm that regionalism should be understood as a regulation mechanism: countries experiencing more interstate disputes are more likely to create a deep RTA, such as custom union or common market, whereas international insecurity deters the formation of preferential and free trade agreements. |
| Keywords: | conflict, trade, regionalism, political integration |
| JEL: | D74 F02 F15 H56 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1839&r=pol |
| By: | Matias Vernengo |
| Abstract: | The paper provides a critical analysis of the literature on monetary policy institutions. It presents a critique of the dominant notion of central bank independence, based on the literature on time-inconsistency of monetary policy. An alternative view that emphasizes the role of distributive conflict in establishing monetary policy regimes is developed and used to analyze the Brazilian inflation targeting regime implemented in 1999. The analysis suggests that financial or rentier’s interests benefit from the current monetary regime, while manufacturing and worker’s interests bear the costs. |
| Keywords: | Inflation Targeting, Central Bank Behavior, Distributive Conflict |
| JEL: | E52 E58 F59 |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uta:papers:2006_05&r=pol |
| By: | Kóczy László Á. (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour. |
| Keywords: | Economics (Jel: A) |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006049&r=pol |
| By: | Dieter M. Urban |
| Abstract: | This study provides a theoretical explanation, first, as to why some less-developed countries (LDCs) have complained about the OECD negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement (MAI) in 1998 although they were free to join or opt out. Second, it explains why we observe instead an explosion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The explanation rests on an FDI model with three distortions: there is a time-inconsistency problem of extracting rents from FDI, there is an underprovision of public goods in LDCs, and there is a lobbying distortion in political decision making that is initially unobservable to foreign investors which causes political risk. The negotiation of MAI by a club exerts a negative information externality on non-members. A regime of BITs undermines the club agreement and unravels the information-asymmetry problem. However, an appropriately designed MAI is world-welfare superior compared to a regime of BITs by alleviating the lobbying distortion. |
| Keywords: | foreign direct investment, multilateral agreements, adverse selection, bilateral investment treaties |
| JEL: | F13 F23 O19 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1830&r=pol |
| By: | Peter Calcagno (Department of Economics, College of Charleston); Monica Escaleras (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University) |
| Abstract: | The literature on U.S. state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal performance, state government, party alternation |
| JEL: | D72 H72 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fal:wpaper:06006&r=pol |
| By: | Li Gan; Lixin Colin Xu; Yang Yao |
| Abstract: | Using a sample of households in 48 Chinese villages for the period 1986-2002, this paper studies the dynamic effects of major health shocks on household income and the role played by village elections in mitigating these effects. Our results show that in the first 15 years after a shock, a shock-hit household on average falls short of its normal income trajectory by 11.8% and its recovery would take 19 years. Based on the premise that shock-hit families impose negative externalities on richer families by borrowing from them, our political economy model predicts that the outcome of village elections would differ from that of a standard median voter model in that the elected village leaders tend to adopt pro-poor policies. Our empirical study finds that villages are more likely to establish a healthcare plan after the election is introduced. In addition, village elections reduce the probability of a household to borrow by 16.7% when one of its working adults is seriously sick. As a result, they reduce more than half of the negative effect of a health shock on household income. |
| JEL: | I12 O15 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12686&r=pol |
| By: | Elisabetta Strazzera (DRES and Crenos, University of Cagliari, Italy); Margarita Genius (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece); Riccardo Scarpa (Department of Environment, University of York, U.K.); George Hutchinson (Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, Queens University, U.K.) |
| Abstract: | Contingent Valuation studies are often characterized by a considerable amount of protest responses, which may have an important effect on the final estimates if the protest responses are not randomly distributed across the sample. If the standard procedure of censoring protest responses is adopted, the estimates may be biased. Sample selection models can detect and –if necessary- correct selectivity bias. We apply a sample selection model to data on valuation of forest resources for recreational use, where WTP responses are obtained through a mixed dichotomous choice-open ended elicitation method. Dealing with continuous data for WTP allows us to apply the Heckman 2-steps method, and compare it to the full ML estimator. Either method has its own drawback: computational complexity for the ML method, susceptibility to collinearity problems for the 2-steps method. The latter is observed in our model. The results show that censoring protest responses in this study would lead to overestimates of the willingness to pay. |
| Keywords: | Contingent Valuation; Protest responses; Sample selection; MLE; Two-steps method. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crt:wpaper:0106&r=pol |
| By: | Bas van Groezen; Hannah Kiiver; Brigitte Unger |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the underlying factors which explain the diversity in public opinion of EU citizens on the preferred way of financing pensions and the implications for international policy coordination. We find that preferences are mainly determined by the current pension provision and unspecified nation-specific effects, while personal characteristics only play a minor role. Furthermore, some countries have substantial regional differences, others have rather homogeneous regions. Overall, our results suggest that policy making on pension financing at the EU level is not feasible, the more so when taking regional differences into account. Policy coordination within several subgroups of countries whose citizens share similar opinions would be a more realistic option. |
| Keywords: | international policy coordination, opinion, pensions |
| JEL: | C25 F42 H55 |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0608&r=pol |
| By: | Nejat Anbarci (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Monica Escaleras (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University); Charles Register (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University) |
| Abstract: | A country’s levels of collective action in the provision of socially desirable goods and services are primarily determined by its level of development, important natural attributes, and its unique institutional characteristics. In general, one can expect that, given a particular set of natural attributes and institutions, the greater a county’s per capita GDP, the more extensive will be its commitment to the provision of goods and services that require collective action. The primary contention of this paper is that one of the most important aspects of institutions that affect socially desirable collective action is the extent of public sector corruption. More specifically, we first develop a theoretical model which explicitly shows the relations between per capita GDP, corruption, and collective action in the form of the provision of improved drinking water and appropriate sanitation facilities. We test our model by analyzing a sample of 77 countries, annually, between 1982 and 2001, for a total sample of 1,519 observations. Relying on a two-way fixed effects estimation strategy, we find that corruption does in fact lead to lower levels of both access to improved drinking water and appropriate sanitation than a given country’s level of per capita GDP and other institutions alone would predict. |
| Keywords: | Collective Action, corruption, institutional variables |
| JEL: | D31 H41 P16 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fal:wpaper:06003&r=pol |
| By: | Kóczy Lászlo Á. (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | Brams (2003) presents three paradoxes for power indices: some rather counter-intuitive behaviour that is exhibited by both the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices. We show that the proportional index is free from such paradoxical behaviour. This result suggests that our intuition may be based on the proportional index and as such its use in evaluating power measures is limited. |
| Keywords: | Economics (Jel: A) |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006048&r=pol |
| By: | Gemma Mateo González |
| Abstract: | How can the decision of ten member states to subject the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union (EU) to a referendum be explained? Recently, some scholars have considered the need to give legitimacy to the decisions of the EU as one of the principal motivations for holding referendums. An empirical analysis of the motivations behind the decisions in favour of referendums uncovers a completely different reality, however. Political actors used the possibility to hold referendums about European matters in a strategic way to strengthen their positions in the domestic context rather than to correct the democratic deficit of the EU. The analysis of a database with the positions of all the political parties represented in the national parliaments of the twenty-five member states confirms this point. |
| Keywords: | referendum; legitimacy; political parties; Constitution for Europe |
| Date: | 2006–10–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0177&r=pol |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey; Alois Stutzer |
| Abstract: | Cross-disciplinary ‘happiness research’ has made big progress in the measurement of individual welfare. This development makes it tempting to pursue the old dream of maximizing aggregate happiness as a social welfare function. However, we postulate that the appropriate approach is not to maximize aggregate happiness in seeking to improve outcomes by direct policy interventions. The goal of happiness research should rather be to improve the nature of the processes through which individuals can express their preferences. Individuals should become better able to advance their idea of the good life, both individually and collectively. |
| Keywords: | Economic policy; happiness; life satisfaction; political economy; social welfare; utility |
| JEL: | D60 D70 H11 I31 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-26&r=pol |
| By: | Monica Escaleras (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University); Nejat Anbarci (Department of Economics, Florida International University); Charles Register (Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University) |
| Abstract: | A number of recent studies have, separately, addressed the effects of public sector corruption and natural disasters. In this paper, we intersect these lines of research to assess whether corruption in the public sector plays a role in the havoc wrought by large scale natural disasters, using major earthquakes as the example. We first develop a brief theoretical model of the relation between these two variables and then empirically test the proposition by analyzing 344 major quakes occurring in 42 countries during the 1975 through 2003 period. We use a Negative Binomial estimation strategy that takes into account the endogenous nature of corruption and controls for a number of other factors such as earthquake frequency, magnitude, distance from population centers, and a country’s level of development which have been shown to influence a quake’s destructiveness. The results provide strong evidence that public sector corruption is both positively and significantly related to the death toll a given earthquake takes on a population. |
| Keywords: | Earthquake fatalities, corruption, institutional variables |
| JEL: | D31 H41 P16 |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fal:wpaper:06005&r=pol |
| By: | Wolfgang J. Luhan (University of Innsbruck); Martin G. Kocher (Universiteit van Amsterdam); Matthias Sutter (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed. |
| Keywords: | experiment; dictator game; team behavior; social preferences |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D70 |
| Date: | 2006–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060099&r=pol |
| By: | Morten Blekesaune (Institute for Social and Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Can changing economic conditions predict changes in public attitudes toward welfare state policies? More specifically, does public support for governmental provision and economic redistribution increase in periods of economic strain and low employment? This has been a popular hypothesis among political commentators but has been subject of limited empirical scrutiny. The hypothesis is tested using data from three waves of the World Value Survey and fixed effects models at country level following cross-sectional analyses at the level of respondents which control for individual characteristics. The hypothesis is supported by three out of four effects being tested. These effects are largely contextual as individual level compositional effects can only explain a minor part. The results also indicate that the formation of public opinions towards welfare state policies is predictable and rational. |
| Keywords: | attitudes, income redistribution, social protection |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ese:iserwp:2006-45&r=pol |
| By: | Pao-Li Chang (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University); Myoung-jae Lee (Korea University, Seoul, Korea) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monop-olistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monop- olistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect compe- tition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model. |
| Keywords: | endogenous trade policy; campaign contribution; monopolistic competition; intrain- dustry trade; import penetration |
| JEL: | F12 F13 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:siu:wpaper:18-2006&r=pol |
| By: | Roberto Serrano (Department of Economics, Brown University); Rajiv Vohra (Department of Economics, Brown University) |
| Abstract: | A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting. |
| Keywords: | Core, Incomplete Information, Coalitional Voting, Resilience, Mediation |
| JEL: | C71 C72 D51 D82 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ads:wpaper:0050&r=pol |