nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2006‒03‒05
eight papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu
University of Calgary

  1. Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth By Laura Marsiliani; Thomas I Renstrom
  2. The Political Economy of Financial Liberalisation By Anja Shortland; Sourafel Girma
  3. Political Institutions and Economic Growth By Thomas Renstrom; Laura Marsiliani
  4. The Evolution of International Political Risk 1956-2001 By Radu Tunaru; Ephraim Clark
  5. Chief Executives' Term Limits and Fiscal Policy Choices: International Evidence By Chiara Dalla Nogare; Roberto Ricciuti
  6. European parliament electoral turnout in Post-Communist Europe. By Christine Fauvelle-Aymar; Mary Stegmaier
  7. Estimating the Impact of State Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data By Jeffrey Milyo; David M. Primo; Matthew L. Jacobsmeier
  8. Bank Ownership and Performance Does Politics Matter? By Micco, Alejandro; Panizza, Ugo; Yañez, Monica

  1. By: Laura Marsiliani (University of Durham); Thomas I Renstrom (University of Durham and CEPR)
    Date: 2005–09–03
  2. By: Anja Shortland (University of Leicester); Sourafel Girma (University of Nottingham)
    Date: 2005–09–03
  3. By: Thomas Renstrom (University of Durham and CEPR); Laura Marsiliani (University of Durham)
    Date: 2005–09–03
  4. By: Radu Tunaru (Cass Business School, City University London); Ephraim Clark (Middlesex Business School)
    Date: 2005–09–03
  5. By: Chiara Dalla Nogare; Roberto Ricciuti
    Abstract: According to reputational models of Political Economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 59 countries over the period 1975-1997, using government spending, revenue, surplus and social and welfare spending as policy choice variables. We use both cluster analysis and panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term limited chief executives with respect to those who are not. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results on US states and international data.
  6. By: Christine Fauvelle-Aymar (LAEP); Mary Stegmaier (Department of Economics, University of Virginia)
    Abstract: The relatively low voter turnout rates in the June 2004 European Parliamentary elections in many of the post-communist states surprised observers. While the average turnout rate for these new-EU member states barely surpassed 30%, turnout exhibited much variance at the national and sub-national levels. In this article, we study the determinants of European Parliamentary election voter turnout rates in the post-communist countries at the regional level. Our central hypothesis is that regional turnout rates may be related to regional economic conditions and that in areas experiencing economic hardship, turnout will be lower. We also assess the extent that EU attitudes matter for turnout. A unique data set, compiled at the NUTS-3 statistical region level, is employed to test these hypotheses.
    Keywords: Economics of voting, participation, European Parliamentary election, post-communist countries.
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2006–01
  7. By: Jeffrey Milyo (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia); David M. Primo; Matthew L. Jacobsmeier
    Abstract: Researchers often seek to understand the effects of state policies or institutions on individual behavior or other outcomes in sub-state-level observational units (e.g., election results in state legislative districts). However, standard estimation methods applied to such models do not properly account for the clustering of observations within states and may lead researchers to overstate the statistical significance of state-level factors. We discuss the theory behind two approaches to dealing with clustering—clustered standard errors and multilevel modeling. We then demonstrate the relevance of this topic by replicating a recent study of the effects of state post-registration laws on voter turnout (Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin 2005). While we view clustered standard errors as a more straightforward, feasible approach, especially when working with large datasets or many cross-level interactions, our purpose in this Practical Researcher piece is to draw attention to the issue of clustering in state and local politics research.
    Keywords: mixed-level data, voter turnout
    JEL: C10 D79 H79
    Date: 2006–02–22
  8. By: Micco, Alejandro; Panizza, Ugo; Yañez, Monica
    Abstract: This paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance, providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries. It finds that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts, and that the opposite is true for foreign-owned banks. The paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Next, in order to test whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations, the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years; it finds strong support for this hypothesis.
    Keywords: Banking; Privatization; Ownership; Performance
    JEL: G21 D21
    Date: 2006–02

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