nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2005‒09‒02
two papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu
University of Calgary
  1. Commercial Television and Voter Information By Andrea Prat; David Strömberg
  2. Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting By Hummel, Patrick
  1. By: Andrea Prat; David Strömberg
    Date: 2005–08–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000363&r=pol
  2. By: Hummel, Patrick
    Keywords: perfect information games, extensive games, backward induction, weakly dominated strategies, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, binary voting agendas, sequential voting
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1236&r=pol
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