nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2005‒08‒28
two papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu
University of Calgary

  1. Public Governance. A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government By Rodolfo Apreda
  2. Design and Implementation Issues in Swedish Individual Pension Accounts By R. Kent Weaver

  1. By: Rodolfo Apreda
    Abstract: This paper sets forth a comprehensive viewpoint about how Public Governance should be assessed and worked-out, by making three contributions to the subject matter. Firstly, it provides the semantics by which this field of learning and practice may become operational in Political Science. Next, a four-tiered framework of analysis is laid bare, which deals with architecture, covenants and safeguards, collective action, and deviant behavior. Afterwards, and focusing on conflict systems, we give heed to the underlying logic of Public Governance, which stems from a network built up around the mechanisms of participation, contest and safeguarding.
    Keywords: governance, public governance, conflict systems, institutional safeguards
    JEL: H1 H11 D70 D73
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cem:doctra:297&r=pol
  2. By: R. Kent Weaver (The Brookings Institution)
    Abstract: Sweden's new multi-pillar pension system includes a system of mandatory fully-funded individual accounts. The Swedish system tries to keep administrative costs down through centralized management of the collection of contributions, switching among fund options, and record-keeping and communication with account holders. The Swedish system offers contributors more than 600 fund options. However, in the most recent rounds of fund choice, more than 90 percent of new labor market entrants have not made an active choice of funds, and thus have ended up in a government-sponsored default fund. The Swedish system of individual accounts offers a number of lessons for countries considering adoption of a mandatory individual account tier. First, centralized administration of record-keeping, communication and trading functions can help to keep administrative costs down. Second, the lead time needed to set up such a system is considerable. Third, if entry barriers for funds are low, a very large number of fund options are likely to be offered. Fourth, engaging new labor market entrants in fund choice is likely to be difficult, and these barriers are likely to be particularly high for some groups-notably those with limited incomes and low English language skills. Fifth, in the absence of entry barriers for funds, a significant percentage of those making an active fund choice may choose funds that are very specialized and risky. Finally, the likelihood of limited active fund choice means that special care must be devoted both to the design of a default fund and to communicating to potential participants what asset allocation and risk-return trade-offs the default fund is likely to make.
    Keywords: Sweden, pension system, mandatory
    JEL: H55
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crr:crrwps:2005-05&r=pol

This nep-pol issue is ©2005 by Eugene Beaulieu. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.