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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Gebhard Kirchgässner; Tobias Schulz |
| Abstract: | Using data of Swiss referenda from 1981 to 1999, this paper presents new empirical results which allow us to discriminate better between the decision and mobilisation hypotheses of electoral participation. First, theoretical considerations which lead to these hypotheses are presented as well as the theory of expressive voting, and a survey of the available empirical evidence is given. Then, we describe the empirical approach before we come to its results. Those are much in line with the mobilisation but do not support the decision hypothesis. They are, however, also only partly compatible with the theory of expressive voting. |
| Keywords: | expected closeness, expressive voting, campaign expenditure, turnout, direct democracy |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1387&r=pol |
| By: | C. Mónica Capra; Tomomi Tanaka; Colin Camerer; Lauren Munyan; Veronica Sovero; Lisa Wang; Charles Noussair |
| Abstract: | The existence of multiple equilibria is one explanation for why some countries are rich while others are poor. This explanation also allows the possibility that changes in political and economic institutions might help poor countries "jump" from a bad economic equilibrium into a better one, permanently increasing their output and income. Experiments can be used to study complex processes like the effect of institutions on economic growth. The control that experiments afford allows structural parameters to be changed, policies to be added and subtracted, and economic outcomes to be precisely measured. In this paper, we study a simple experimental economy in which agents produce output in each period, and can allocate the output between consumption and investment (the experiment builds on the design of Lei and Noussair, 2002, 2003). Capital productivity is higher if total investment is above a threshold. Because of the threshold externality, there are two equilibria—a suboptimal “poverty trap” and an optimal “rich country” equilibrium—which differ by a factor of approximately three in the agent income they create. In baseline sessions, in which agents make independent decisions in a decentralized economy, the economies typically sink into the poverty trap and the optimal equilibrium is never reached. However, the ability to communicate before investing, or to vote on binding “industrial policy” proposals, improves average earnings. Combining both of these simple institutions enables all of the economies to escape the poverty trap. This experimental environment constitutes a platform onto which many more complex features can be added. |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emo:wp2003:0508&r=pol |
| By: | Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak; Andrew Sunil Rajkumar; Maureen L. Cropper |
| Abstract: | Mobarak, Rajkumar, and Cropper examine the impact of local politics and government structure on the allocation of publicly subsidized (SUS) health services across municipios (counties) in Brazil, and on the probability that uninsured individuals who require medical attention actually receive access to those health services. Using data from the 1998 PNAD survey they demonstrate that higher per capita levels of SUS doctors, nurses, and clinic rooms increase the probability that an uninsured individual gains access to health services when he or she seeks it. The authors find that an increase in income inequality, an increase in the percentage of the population that votes, and an increase in the percentage of votes going to left-leaning candidates are each associated with higher levels of public health services. The per capita provision of doctors, nurses, and clinics is also greater in counties with a popular local leader and in counties where the county mayor and state governor are politically aligned. Administrative decentralization of health services to the county decreases provision levels and reduces access to services by the uninsured unless it is accompanied by good local governance. This paper is a product of the Infrastructure and Environment Team, Development Research Group. |
| Keywords: | Health & Population; Public Sector Management |
| Date: | 2005–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3508&r=pol |