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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Cleo Chassonnery-Zaigouche (UNIBO - University of Bologna = Università di Bologna); Aurélien Goutsmedt (ISPOLE - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain, F.R.S.-FNRS) |
| Abstract: | Elisabeth Popp Berman's Thinking Like an Economist unfolds a captivating and detailed historical account of the rise of economics and economists' influence within the US Administration during the 1960s and 1970s. This transformation played a pivotal role in reshaping American policy, Berman argues. At the core of her story is the concept of an "economic style of reasoning", inspired by Ian Hacking's (1994) work. Berman's "economic style of reasoning" describes a distinct approach to policy problems, one anchored in microeconomic concepts (rather than macroeconomic ones) such as incentives, externalities, and efficiency. Crucially, the "economic style of reasoning" does not designate what some economists think, but rather, a set of ideas, related to economics but not completely overlapping with it, that are used in policy—not only by economists. Throughout 230 pages, Berman masterfully traces the progressive ascension of the economic style of reasoning within US administration, from its rise in the 1960s to its relative decline during the Reagan Presidency. "Efficiency" as a policy criterion gradually supplanted other foundational values that had long justified policy actions, values such as "rights, universalism, equity, and limiting corporate power" (4). These concepts were actually loosely used by the actors Berman is interested in. Berman posits that the dissemination of this style of reasoning exerted a profound influence by eroding the legitimacy of policy propositions rooted in alternative values, notably those championed by the left-wing of the Democratic party. One strength of the book is to show how the economic style of reasoning stuck and consolidated, even in the absence of economists, and how unusual suspects—center-left technocrats, favoring government intervention—were responsible for promoting a sense of ineluctability of its use. |
| Keywords: | Expertise, Economic expertise, Public policy, Style of reasoning, Neoliberalism |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04270601&r=pke |
| By: | Fix, Blair |
| Abstract: | There’s an old joke that economics is too important to be left to economists. In the same vein, I think rich people are too important to be left to the self-help industry. Yes, the popular appeal of you-can-get-rich-too books is obvious. But what’s not obvious is why so few social scientists study wealth.1 Clearly, the public thirsts for serious inquiries about the rich. (Thomas Piketty’s opus on inequality was a bestseller.) But for the most part, social scientists are content to focus on ‘poverty’ and let the self-help gurus wax about ‘wealth’. The irony, in my view, is that poverty and wealth are two sides of the same coin. Concentrated wealth begets concentrated poverty. Still, there is an asymmetry between the two extremes. As a rule, poor people have little power, which means they cannot be blamed for their own poverty. But almost by definition, the rich wield power to their own benefit, which means they create the conditions of their own opulence … and everyone else’s misery. Given their power over society, I find myself on a research kick studying rich people. This post concludes the binge with a look at what drives wealth concentration among the richest Americans. I find that there’s a straight line between wealth concentration, corporate consolidation, and the strategy of ‘buying, not building’. In short, Peter Thiel is correct when he says that ‘competition is for losers’. |
| Keywords: | corporation, distribution, mergers & acquisitions, stock market, United States |
| JEL: | P P1 D3 G3 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:279885&r=pke |
| By: | Anthony de Grandi (PHARE - Philosophie, Histoire et Analyse des Représentations Économiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne); Christian Tutin (LAB'URBA - LAB'URBA - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | Cette communication examine la relation entre facteurs réels et facteurs monétaires dans la théorie des crises de Marx. Après une présentation des concepts avancés par Marx, notamment celui de capital fictif, est présentée sa vision de l'instabilité financière, puis le lien possible entre crise financière et crise de reproduction, en suivant les intuitions de Rudolf Hilferding. |
| Keywords: | Marx, Théorie des crises, Instabilité financière |
| Date: | 2022–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04284569&r=pke |
| By: | Fix, Blair |
| Abstract: | The rich get richer. It’s a phrase that packs a lot of punch. It’s potent rhetoric, yet surprisingly accurate at describing how rising inequality plays out. Of course, there’s nothing inevitable about the rich getting richer. We just happen to live in an age of growing corporate despotism. And our friends at Forbes have been there to document the disease. Forbes. Forbes who loves the free market. Forbes who loves obscene wealth. Forbes … the unwitting social scientist? When Malcolm Forbes started publishing his rich list — the Forbes 400 — back in 1982, he surely wasn’t intending to do social science. By all accounts, Forbes simply loved opulence, and wanted to celebrate those who had the most of it. It was part of a 1980s trend that fetishized obscene fortunes. For the middle class, there was the saccharine show ‘Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous’, which exalted the excesses of elite living. But for the upper class there was something less crass — a list that ignored the material trappings of wealth. It was called the Forbes 400, and it did nothing but report the raw numbers of capitalism — the capitalized wealth of the richest Americans. In hindsight, Malcolm Forbes’ obsession with wealth seems ominous — kind of like the Sackler’s claim that OxyContin wasn’t addictive. But while Malcolm Forbes certainly cheerled the excesses of modern capitalism, he (and his magazine successors) also left an exquisite record of how US elites enriched themselves. Sure, the enrichment left a big mess. But for the moment, let’s forget about cleaning it up and instead, investigate how it happened. Come, let’s look at how the American rich got richer. |
| Keywords: | billionaires, corporation, distribution, ownership |
| JEL: | P P1 D3 G3 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:279881&r=pke |
| By: | Daniel Albalate (Department of Economics, Statistics & Applied Economics. John Keynes 1-11, 08034 Barcelona. +34934021943, Spain.); Germà Bel (Department of Economics, Statistics & Applied Economics. John Keynes 1-11, 08034 Barcelona, Spain. + 34934021946); Ferran A. Mazaira-Font (Department of Economics, Statistics & Applied Economics. John Keynes 1-11, 08034 Barcelona. + 34934021943.); Xavier Ros-Oton (Department of Mathematics & Informatics. Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes 585, 08007 Barcelona, Spain. + 34934039330) |
| Keywords: | Military alliances, Trade, Defense spending. JEL classification: H56, F19, F50, D74. |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ira:wpaper:202317&r=pke |
| By: | Artur Doshchyn |
| Abstract: | While financial crises tend to be preceded by economic booms, most booms do not end with crises. Crises typically occur when booms are interrupted by persistent slowdowns in productivity growth. I develop a model in which risk of crisis emerges endogenously during boom because of increased fragility of the banking sector. Banks raise financing from households to invest in long-term projects, but their ability to do so is hindered by moral hazard, since bankers can misappropriate investors’ funds. Demandable deposits create discipline by exposing misbehaving banks to runs, and thus help them increase external financing. Normally, banks finance themselves with a mix of equity and deposits that maximizes discipline, but ensures that they always remain solvent. But when growth prospects become sufficiently strong, worsening agency problems induce banks to intensify deposit financing, which enables a boom in credit, asset prices, and investment. If the anticipated growth fails to materialise, however, the excessive deposit financing leads to a systemic banking crisis. |
| Date: | 2022–12–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:1027&r=pke |