|
on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Edward N. Wolff |
| Abstract: | I find that median wealth plummeted over the years 2007 to 2010, and by 2010 was at its lowest level since 1969. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades of little movement, was up sharply from 2007 to 2010. Relative indebtedness continued to expand from 2007 to 2010, particularly for the middle class, though the proximate causes were declining net worth and income rather than an increase in absolute indebtedness. In fact, the average debt of the middle class actually fell in real terms by 25 percent. The sharp fall in median wealth and the rise in inequality in the late 2000s are traceable to the high leverage of middle class families in 2007 and the high share of homes in their portfolio. The racial and ethnic disparity in wealth holdings, after remaining more or less stable from 1983 to 2007, widened considerably between 2007 and 2010. Hispanics, in particular, got hammered by the Great Recession in terms of net worth and net equity in their homes. Households under age 45 also got pummeled by the Great Recession, as their relative and absolute wealth declined sharply from 2007 to 2010. |
| JEL: | D31 J15 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18559&r=pke |
| By: | Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| Abstract: | Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse this flexibility to exploit the agent. We capture this tradeoff in an experimental design and show that principals exhibit a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions, inducing them to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread, endogenous formation of efficient long-run employment relations. Our results inform the theory of the firm by showing how behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical basis for assessing differences between the Marxian and the Coasian view of the firm, as well as Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) critique of the Coasian approach. |
| Keywords: | theory of the firm; transaction cost economics; authority; power abuse; employment relation; fairness; reputation |
| JEL: | C91 D23 D86 M5 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:14243&r=pke |
| By: | Fields, Gary |
| Abstract: | Various development objectives are worthy, but to my mind, one objective dominates all others: reducing the scourge of absolute economic misery in the world. In this paper, I focus on an important but relatively underemphasized approach to poverty reducti |
| Keywords: | foreign assistance, economic growth, employment, poverty, developing countries |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2012-86&r=pke |
| By: | Pitt, Mark M.; Khandker, Shahidur R. |
| Abstract: | "The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh: Revisiting the Evidence,"by David Roodman and Jonathan Morduch (2011) is the most recent of a sequence of papers and postings that seeks to refute the findings of the Pitt and Khandker (1998) article"The Impact of Group-Based Credit on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?"that microcredit for women had significant, favorable effects on poverty reduction. In this paper the authors show that these latest Roodman and Morduch claims are based on seriously flawed econometric methods and theory and a lack of due diligence in formulating models and interpreting output from packaged software. On the basis of Roodman and Morduch's preferred two-stage least squares regression, an alternative calculation of the standard errors would lead one to conclude that the problem with Pitt and Khandker is that they underestimate the positive and statistically significant effect of women's credit on household consumption. As in their previous efforts, the methods of Roodman and Morduch are shown to bias the findings in the direction of rejecting the results of Pitt and Khandker. We also further examine two aspects of our instrumental variable approach that have been attacked by Roodman and Morduch. The first is the validity of the exclusion restrictions underlying the use of interactions between program choice and the set of exogenous variables (including the village fixed effects) as instruments. The second is the application of the"one-half acre"program eligibility rule. The authors show that identification does not require both of these, and present new results dropping each assumption in turn. The results originally reported in the Pitt and Khandker paper hold up extremely well in this new analysis. |
| Keywords: | Statistical&Mathematical Sciences,Economic Theory&Research,Econometrics,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education |
| Date: | 2012–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6273&r=pke |