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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | David Colander |
| Abstract: | From the movie, Inside Job, one gets the sense that economists are ethically challenged because they take payments for writing papers that say what the funders of their research want them to say. This paper takes issue with that and suggests that the more serious ethical problem of economics has little to do with the funding of economic research. It has to do with lack of humility. It argues that economists have a tendency to convey more scientific certainty in their policy positions than the theory and evidence objectively would allow. Too many economists are willing to make seemingly definitive scientific statements about policy based on models, that they know, or should know, are highly imperfect. To deal with that problem, this paper suggests that applied economists should see themselves as engineers, not as applied scientists. It argues that doing so is important because engineering has a broader and more humble methodology than does science. Because applied economists are essentially engineers, the paper argues that an Economist’s Code of Ethics can be closely based on the National Society of Professional Engineer’s Code of Ethics. |
| Keywords: | code of ethics; methodology; science; humility; applied; moral |
| JEL: | A1 B0 B4 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:1103&r=pke |
| By: | Jean-Claude Thoenig (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - CNRS : UMR7088 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX) |
| Abstract: | This chapter covers the evolution of institutional theory and its application to public adminsitrations in the last 20 years. It discusses the various streams, their reseach agendas and their contributions, but also their limits to add value to knowledge. |
| Keywords: | New institutional theories: historical, sociological, "new institutionalism", co-constructed local orders. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00638348&r=pke |
| By: | Julián Andrada-Félix (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain); Fernando Fernández-Rodríguez (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Spain); Simón Sosvilla-Rivero (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain) |
| Abstract: | This paper tries to shed light on the historical analogies of the current crisis. To that end we compare the current sample distribution of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index returns for a 769-day period (from 15 September 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, to September 2011), with all historical sample distributions of returns computed with a moving window of 769 days in the 2 January 1900 to 12 September 2008 period. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov and a x2 homogeneity tests which have the null hypothesis of equal distribution we find that the stock market returns distribution during the current crisis would be similar to several past periods of severe financial crises that evolved into intense recessions, being the sub-sample from 28 May 1935 to 17 Jun 1938 the most analogous episode to the current situation. Furthermore, when applying the procedure proposed by Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998) for comparing densities of sub-samples, we obtain additional support for our findings and discover a period from 10 September 1930 to 13 October 1933 where the severity of the crisis overcomes the current situation having sharper tail events. Finally, when comparing historical market risk with the current risk, we observe that the current market risk has only been exceeded at the beginning of the Great Depression. |
| Keywords: | Financial crisis, Great Recession, Great Depression |
| JEL: | E32 G15 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aee:wpaper:1108&r=pke |
| By: | Ilgmann, Cordelius |
| Abstract: | Given the renewed interest in negative interest rates as method for removing the floor to nominal interest rates, this article offers a concise review of Gesell's life, work and its place in the history of economic thought. It provides a brief biographical sketch of Gesell, demonstrating both his relative prominence as a social reformer during the interwar years as well as his close affiliation with anarchism. The article then gives a concise summary of Gesell's theory of effective demand and interest as expounded in the Natural Economic Order, the former being neglected by most scholars working on the subject. Finally, it is demonstrated that Keynes endorsement of Gesell as a strange, unduly neglected prophet is another piece of evidence for rejecting Hick's classic interpretation of the General Theory. If one takes Keynes extensive discussion of Gesell's theory of interest as a key for understanding the General Theory, Keynes main innovation of General Theory becomes a monetary theory of interest based on uncertainty that results in liquidity preference. The limited literature on Keynes' link to Gesell, published mainly in the 1940s, has however been widely ignored in the debate about the General Theory. -- |
| Keywords: | History of Economic Thought,Theory of Interest,Negative Interest Rates,John Maynard Keynes,Silvio Gesell |
| JEL: | B19 B22 B31 E49 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:23&r=pke |
| By: | Eduardo Antonelli |
| Abstract: | El trabajo reúne tres grandes desarrollos en la macroeconomía: la Eficacia Marginal del Capital, de Keynes, que establece el volumen de inversión que desean las empresas; la Hipótesis Financiera de Minsky, que indica cuánta inversión en definitiva se puede financiar; y los Aspectos Redistributivos en la determinación del ingreso, que es una antigua preocupación de los clásicos, revalorizada por Palley. Por otra parte, el trabajo apunta, conforme la propia preocupación de este último autor, a reunir estos tres grandes lineamientos en un único marco analítico. |
| Date: | 2011–06–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000418:009119&r=pke |
| By: | Sergio Cesaratto |
| Abstract: | In a contribution to Pensions: An International Journal, Prof. Jan Kuné discusses whether a fully funded (FF) pension scheme can cope with a demographic shock better than a payas- you-go (PAYG) system. He makes ample use of my own contributions on this issue but ignores my criticism of the neoclassical interpretation of FF pension schemes and especially of the claim that an FF scheme is superior to PAYG in this and other respects. The purpose of this note is to stimulate some response, from Prof. Kuné or others, to my critique of the neoclassical interpretation. The policy implications of this discussion for pension reforms are evident. |
| JEL: | E11 G23 H55 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:624&r=pke |
| By: | Luca Fiorito |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to analyze American economists’ influence in the passing of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts (1914). Specifically, it is argued and documented that American economists were important in this process in two ways. Many economists exercised an “indirect” influence by discussing in academic journals and books problems concerning trusts, combinations, and the necessary measures to preserve the working of competitive markets. At least as importantly, if not more so, some economists took an active role in the reform movement both contributing to draft proposals for the amendment of existing antitrust legislation and providing help and advice during the Congressional debates which led to the passing of the FTC and Clayton Acts. Among these, we will focus primarily, albeit not exclusively, on the contribution of John Bates Clark. |
| JEL: | B13 B14 B15 K21 L41 L42 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:623&r=pke |
| By: | Baird, Sarah; McIntosh, Craig; Ozlera, Berk |
| Abstract: | Despite their explicit focus on reaching the poor, many community driven development (CDD) projects have been found to be only mildly pro-poor in their funding allocations. This paper presents evidence of an explanation that has been overlooked in the CDD literature to date: the requirement that beneficiaries must apply for projects in order to receive support. The authors first examine data on the universe of project applications and funding under Tanzania's flagship CDD program, Tanzania's Social Action Fund, and then use a census of 100 program villages to examine the determinants of both program awareness and program participation at the household level. The data paint a consistent picture at both levels: wealth, access to information, and political capital are important correlates of the ability to navigate the application process successfully. The centrally dictated features of this decentralized program appear to be the most effective mechanisms in directing funds to the poor. The results suggest that unless demand-driven projects can develop ways of soliciting engagement from a broader cross-section of the population, they are unlikely to achieve truly progressive targeting. |
| Keywords: | Rural Poverty Reduction,Housing&Human Habitats,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Services&Transfers to Poor,Regional Economic Development |
| Date: | 2011–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5883&r=pke |
| By: | Samuel Bowles; Sandra Polania-Reyes |
| Abstract: | Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals’ altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences. In the 50 experimental studies that we survey these effects are common, so that incentives and social preferences may be either substitutes (crowding out) or complements. We provide evidence for four mechanisms that may account for these incentive effects on preferences, based on the fact that incentives may (i) provide information about the person who implemented the incentive, (ii) frame the decision situation so as to suggest appropriate behavior, (iii) compromise a control averse individual’s sense of autonomy and (iv) affect the process by which people learn new preferences. An implication of the fact that incentives affect preferences is that the evaluation of public policy must be restricted to allocations that are supportable as Nash equilibria when account is taken of these crowding effects. We show that well designed fines, subsidies and the like minimize crowding out and may even do the opposite, making incentives and social preferences complements rather than substitutes |
| Keywords: | Public goods, behavioral experiments, social preferences, endogenous preferences, motivational crowding, explicit incentive |
| JEL: | A13 C90 D02 D63 D64 H41 D78 E61 Z13 |
| Date: | 2011–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:617&r=pke |
| By: | Elvio Accinelli; Edgar Sanchez Carrera |
| Abstract: | Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and we claim the corruption is driven by imitative behavior for those agents facing an institutional design of corruption. So this paper analyzes an individual level approach and tackles the question of why people engage in corrupt exchange. We show that institutional design determines corruption and that there exists a threshold level in order to imitate the noncorrupt (honest) behavior. |
| Keywords: | Corrupt behavior; Evolutionary dynamics; Imitative behavior; Institutions and operations |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D02 K42 P37 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:616&r=pke |