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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Jan Kregel |
| Abstract: | The demand for reform of the financial system has focused on the dollar's loss of international purchasing power (the Triffin dilemma) and its substitution by an international reserve currency that is not a national currency. The problem, however, is not the particular asset that serves as the international currency but rather the operation of the adjustment mechanism for dealing with global imbalances. In a preliminary report issued in May, the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System made clear that the international system suffers from an inherent tendency toward deficient aggregate demand, a reflection of the asymmetry in the international adjustment mechanism. Even the simple creation of a notional currency to be used in a clearing union (proposed by Keynes) cannot do this without some commitment to coordinated symmetric adjustment by both surplus and deficit countries. Thus, the first steps in the reform process must be (1) to offset the balance sheet losses caused by the collapse of asset values and (2) to provide an alternative source of demand to replace the U.S. consumer and an alternative source of finance to offset the deleveraging of financial institutions. This can be done through the coordinated introduction of traditional, countercyclical deficit expenditure policies, on a global scale. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levypn:09-8&r=pke |
| By: | Eric Tymoigne |
| Abstract: | This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky's framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes--more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes--should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a "bubble" or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of "prudence." Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.2, 574.3, and 574.4. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_574_1&r=pke |
| By: | Eric Tymoigne |
| Abstract: | This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky's framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes--more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes--should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a "bubble" or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of "prudence." Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.3, and 574.4. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_574_2&r=pke |
| By: | Eric Tymoigne |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the trends in the financial sector over the past 30 years, and argues that unsupervised financial innovations and lenient government regulation are at the root of the current financial crisis and recession. Combined with a long period of economic expansion during which default rates were stable and low, deregulation and unsupervised financial innovations generated incentives to make risky financial decisions. Those decisions were taken because it was the only way for financial institutions to maintain market share and profitability. Thus, rather than putting the blame on individuals, this paper places it on an economic setup that requires the growing use of Ponzi processes during enduring economic expansion, and on a regulatory system that is unwilling to recognize (on the contrary, it contributes to) the intrinsic instability of market mechanisms. Subprime lending, greed, and speculation are merely aspects of the larger mechanisms at work. It is argued that we need to change the way we approach the regulation of financial institutions and look at what has been done in other sectors of the economy, where regulation and supervision are proactive and carefully implemented in order to guarantee the safety of society. The criterion for regulation and supervision should be neither Wall Street's nor Main Street's interests but rather the interests of the socioeconomic system. The latter requires financial stability if it's to raise, durably, the standard of living of both Wall Street and Main Street. Systemic stability, not profits or homeownership, should be the paramount criterion for financial regulation, since systemic stability is required to maintain the profitability--and ultimately, the existence--of any capitalist economic entity. The role of the government is to continually counter the Ponzi tendencies of market mechanisms, even if they are (temporarily) improving standards of living, and to encourage economic agents to develop safe and reliable financial practices. See also, Working Paper No. 573.1, "Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis, Part I: The Evolution of Securitization." |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_573_2&r=pke |
| By: | Eric Tymoigne |
| Abstract: | This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky's framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes--more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes--should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a "bubble" or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of "prudence." Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.2, and 574.4. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_574_3&r=pke |
| By: | Eric Tymoigne |
| Abstract: | This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky's framework of analysis and focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions, they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes--more precisely, pyramid Ponzi processes--should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a "bubble" or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of "prudence." Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter how new or marginal they might be. See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.1, 574.2, and 574.3. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_574_4&r=pke |
| By: | Dimitri B. Papadimitriou; Greg Hannsgen |
| Abstract: | A wave of revisionist work claims that "anti-competitive" New Deal legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) greatly slowed the recovery from the Depression; in this new public policy brief, President Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen review these claims in light of current policy debates and cast into doubt the argument that NIRA and NLRA significantly prolonged or worsened the Depression. Moreover, Social Security, federal deposit insurance, and other New Deal programs helped usher in an era of relative prosperity following World War II. When it comes to combating the current recession and employment slump, it is the successful experience with relief and public works, and not the repercussions of pro-union and regulatory legislation, that offer the most relevant and helpful lessons. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb_104&r=pke |
| By: | Fatma Gul Unal |
| Abstract: | Utilizing a 2002 household-level World Bank Survey for rural Turkey, this paper explores the link between concentration of land ownership and rural factor markets. We construct a unique index that measures market malfunctioning based on the neoclassical model linking land and labor endowments through factor markets to household income. We further test whether land ownership concentration affects market malfunctioning. Our empirical investigation supports the claim that factor markets are structurally limited in reducing existing inequalities as a result of land ownership concentration. Our findings show that in the presence of land ownership inequality, malfunctioning rural factor markets result in increased land concentration, increased income inequality, and inefficient resource allocation. This work fills an important empirical gap within the development literature and establishes a positive association between asset inequality and factor market failure. |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_575&r=pke |
| By: | Hoogendoorn, B.; Pennings, H.P.G.; Thurik, A.R. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University) |
| Abstract: | Despite the growing attention for social entrepreneurship as a scholarly field of research, it is still at a stage of infancy. Academic research in the past two decades was primarily dedicated to establish a conceptual foundation which resulted in a considerable stream of conceptual papers. Empirical articles are gradually appearing since the turn of the century. Although they are still by far outnumbered by conceptual articles, they are of considerable significance for social entrepreneurship to evolve as a field of scientific inquiry. This paper reviews 14 empirical research studies on social entrepreneurship, classifies them along four dimensions and summarizes research findings for each of these dimensions. Preliminary to the analysis of the empirical researches, an overview of four schools of thought is presented that serves as a background for interpreting the empirical inquiries. |
| Keywords: | social entrepreneurship;definition;empirical research;school of thought |
| Date: | 2009–07–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:1765016558&r=pke |
| By: | Joshy Easaw (University of Bath); Antonio Savoia (University of Reading and Universitá di Salerno) |
| Abstract: | In the present paper we study the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. In such economies, economic institutions, such as property rights systems, may act to preserve the interests of a rich minority, but this depends crucially on the level of political equality. For example, dominant classes can control key-markets, access to assets and investment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middle-income economies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasing the protection of property rights increases income inequality; (b) such an effect is larger in low-democracy environments; (c) a minority of countries have developed a set political institutions capable of counterbalancing this effect. |
| Keywords: | Inequality, developing economies, institutions, property rights, democracy |
| JEL: | O15 O17 D70 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2009-121&r=pke |
| By: | Stefan Voigt (MACIE (Philipps University Marburg), Barfüßertor 2, 35032 Marburg, Germany; CESifo; ICER, Torino) |
| Abstract: | The statement “institutions matter” has become commonplace. A precondition for it to be supported by empirical evidence, is, however, that institutions are measurable. Glaeser et al. (2004) attacks many studies claiming to prove the relevance of institutions for economic development as being based on flawed measures of institutions, or not even on institutions at all. This paper shows that their criticism deserves to be taken seriously, but that it is somewhat overblown. Some of the difficulties in measuring institutions are described and some ways of measuring them are proposed. |
| Keywords: | Institutions, Institutions vs. Policies, Measurement, Formal vs. Informal Institutions |
| JEL: | B41 H11 K00 O17 O43 O57 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:200937&r=pke |
| By: | Agnès Festré (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis); Eric Nasica (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR6227 - Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we provide an institutional interpretation of Schumpeter's analysis of money, banking and finance. This interpretation is founded on an overall investigation into Schumpeter's writings addressing those issues from different perspectives.In section 1, we discuss the widespread evolutionist interpretation of Schumpeter and rather assert an institutionalist perspective. In support of our interpretation, we highlight the specific role played by economic sociology in Schumpeter's methodological approach. Economic sociology, indeed, provides the foundations of a theory of institutions and institutional change, which is often undermined by the usual evolutionary interpretation. We believe, however, that taking this dimension seriously into account may have implications for our understanding of economic and institutional change in Schumpeter. Section 2 illustrates this general statement by focusing on Schumpeter's analysis of money, banking and finance, and their respective roles in the process of economic development. |
| Keywords: | Schumpeter; Money; Credit, Financial system, Institutional change; Economic sociology |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00272405_v1&r=pke |