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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Marchionatti Roberto (University of Turin) |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:cesmep:200902&r=pke |
| By: | James K. Galbraith |
| Abstract: | In 1930, John Maynard Keynes wrote: "The world has been slow to realise that we are living this year in the shadow of one of the greatest economic catastrophes of modern history." The same holds true today: we are in the shadow of a global catastrophe, and we need to come to grips with the crisis--fast. According to Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith, two ingrained habits are leading to our failure to do so. The first is the assumption that economies will eventually return to normal on their own--an overly hopeful view that doesn't take into account the massive pay-down of household debt resulting from the collapse of the banks. The second bad habit is the belief that recovery runs through the banks rather than around them. But credit cannot flow when there are no creditworthy borrowers or profitable projects; banks have failed, and the failure to recognize this is a recipe for wild speculation and control fraud, compounding taxpayer losses. Galbraith outlines a number of measures that are needed now, including realistic economic forecasts, more honest bank auditing, effective financial regulation, measures to forestall evictions and keep people in their homes, and increased public retirement benefits. We are not in a temporary economic lull, an ordinary recession, from which we will emerge to return to business as usual, says Galbraith. Rather, we are at the beginning of a long, painful, profound, and irreversible process of change--and we need to start thinking and acting accordingly. |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levysa:sa_apr_09&r=pke |
| By: | Jan Kregel |
| Abstract: | International financial flows are the propagation mechanism for transmitting financial instability across borders; they are also the source of unsustainable external debt. Managing volatility thus requires institutions that promote domestic financial stability, ensure that domestic instability is contained, and guarantee that international institutions and rules of the game are not themselves a cause of volatility. This paper analyzes proposals to increase stability in domestic markets, in international markets, and in the structure of the international financial system from the point of view of Hyman P. Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, and outlines how each of these three channels can produce financial fragility that lays the system open to financial instability and financial crisis. |
| Date: | 2009–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_558&r=pke |
| By: | Luca Fiorito |
| Abstract: | Edwin Chamberlin's The Theory of Monopolistic competition is often described as containing omportant traces of institutionalist influence. This is also confimred by Chamberlin himself who, repeadetly, referred to the work of Veblen, and John Maurice Clark among his inspirational sources. The aim of this paper is to analyse the institutionalist rection to the publication of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition. What will be argued is that the institutionalist response to Chamberlin was a mixed one, and involved some substantial criticisms of his analysis of market structures both on methodological and theoretical grounds. The paper is organized as follows. The first section presents a sketch of the main theoretical implications contained in The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. The second section analyses the general aspects of the institutionalist reaction to Chamberlin. The third and fourth sections deal with the more theoretical aspects of the institutionalist criticism of Chamberlin. The final section presents a conclusion |
| JEL: | B25 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:560&r=pke |
| By: | Elias Karakitsos |
| Abstract: | All of the various schemes that have been put forward to resolve the current credit crisis follow either the "business as usual" or the "good bank" model. The "business as usual" model takes different forms--insurance or guarantee of the assets or liabilities of the financial institutions, creation of a "bad bank" to buy toxic assets, temporary nationalization--and is the one favored by banks and pursued by government. It amounts to a bailout of the financial system using taxpayer money. Its drawback is that the cost may exceed by trillions the original estimate of $700 billion, and despite the mounting cost, it may not even prevent the bankruptcy of financial institutions. Moreover, it runs the risk of government insolvency, and turning an already severe recession into a depression worse than that in the 1930s. The "good bank" solution consists of creating a new banking system from the ashes of the old one by removing the healthy assets and liabilities from the balance sheet of the old banks. It has a relatively small cost and the major advantage that credit flows will resume. Its drawback is that it lets the old banks sink or swim. But if they sink, with huge losses, these might spill over into the personal sector, and the ultimate cost may be the same as in the business-as-usual model: a catastrophic depression. In this new Policy Note, author Elias Karakitsos of Guildhall Asset Management and the Centre for Economic and Public Policy, University of Cambridge, outlines a modified "good bank" approach, with the government either guaranteeing a large proportion of the personal sector's assets or assuming the first loss in case the old banks fail. It has the same advantages as the original good-bank model, but it makes sure that, in the eventuality that the old banks become insolvent, the economy is shielded from falling into depression, and recovery is ultimately ensured. |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levypn:09-3&r=pke |
| By: | Arturo Guillen R. (Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana Iztapalapa) |
| Abstract: | The housing crisis is a debt-deflation Minsky's type crisis. The new economy bubble was replaced by the housing bubble. However, it is a deflationary crisis with specificities. It seems to point to the limits of a securities-backed financial regime, which forces a review of the regulation of financial markets and a return to more conservative credit practices. That crisis is global both in terms of its causes and its repercussions. It is far from over. Although the injection of liquidity by central banks has restored a relative stability in financial markets and a greater drop in stock markets, both remain unstable. The repercussions of the crisis will also be global, since decoupling does not exist. The United States continues to be the world economy's buyer of last resort. While some countries, like the BRIC countries will continue to grow, although more slowly, others will sooner or later experience recessions.This paper was presented May 22, 2008, at the 18th International Conference of the International Trade and Finance Association, meeting at Universidad Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal. |
| Date: | 2008–08–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bep:itfapp:1135&r=pke |