|
on Post Keynesian Economics |
By: | Samuel Perlo-Freeman (School of Economics, University of the West of England); Don Webber (School of Economics, University of the West of England) |
Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationships between basic needs and economic growth where the interactions between output, health, nutrition and education are explicitly simultaneous. We find a unidirectional relationship that improving basic welfare contributes strongly to labour productivity change, but a clear reverse causation only from growth to nutrition. There are substantial differences in the patterns of simultaneous interactions at different income and welfare levels. There are strong self-reinforcing effects of literacy and debt service on poverty, making it difficult for poor countries to rectify their situation. Channelling resources towards improving health, education and nutrition could bring dramatic economic returns. |
Keywords: | Income, Health, Education, Nutrition, Government debt, Womens’ education |
JEL: | O47 I12 I20 C31 |
Date: | 2007–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0706&r=pke |
By: | J Paul Dunne (School of Economics, University of the West of England); Samuel Perlo-Freeman (School of Economics, University of the West of England); Ron P Smith (Birkbeck College, London) |
Abstract: | This paper has considers the interpretation of the empirical results of the developing literature on the demand for military spending that specifies a general model with arms race and spillover effects and estimates it on cross-section and panel data. It questions whether it is meaningful to talk of an ‘arms race’ in panel data or cross-section data, and suggests that it may be more appropriate to talk about the relevant variables – aggregate military spending of the ‘Security Web’ (i.e. all neighbours and other security-influencing powers) and the aggregate military spending of ‘Potential Enemies’– as acting as proxies for threat perceptions, which will reflect both hostility and capability. |
Keywords: | Military Spending, Developing Countries, Demand. |
JEL: | H56 C33 |
Date: | 2007–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0707&r=pke |
By: | Robert Pollin (Univ. of Massachusetts); Gerald Epstein (Univ. of Massachusetts); James Heintz (Univ. of Massachusetts); Léonce Ndikumana (Univ. of Massachusetts) |
Abstract: | . |
Keywords: | . |
JEL: | H21 |
Date: | 2006–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipc:cstudy:1&r=pke |
By: | Dag Ehrenpreis (International Poverty Centre) |
Abstract: | . |
Keywords: | Poverty, Pro-Poor Growth, measures |
JEL: | B41 D11 D12 E31 I32 O54 |
Date: | 2007–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipc:ifocus:10&r=pke |
By: | Liam Delaney (University College Dublin); Colm Harmon (University College Dublin and IZA); Patrick Wall (University College Dublin) |
Abstract: | This paper examines the results of single-equation regression models of the determinants of alcohol consumption patterns among college students modelling a rich variety of covariates including gender, family and peer drinking, tenure, personality, risk perception, time preferences and age of drinking onset. The results demonstrate very weak income effects and very strong effects of personality, peer drinking (in particular closest friend), time preferences and other substance use. The task of future research is to verify these results and assess causality using more detailed methods. |
Keywords: | alcohol, peer effects, time preferences |
JEL: | I12 |
Date: | 2007–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2883&r=pke |
By: | Daniel Berkowitz; Karen Clay |
Abstract: | Several important studies of institutions assume that the quality of institutions is persistent following some formative historic event. The assumption of institutional persistence, however, begs the question of how these institutions persisted. To better understand this issue, this paper examines the evolution of state courts in the United States. We begin by reviewing the evidence that France, Spain, and Mexico operated civil-law legal systems in territory that would later make up thirteen states. One important philosophical difference between civil-law and common-law legal systems arises from differences in their beliefs regarding the appropriate degree of judicial independence. To show how these beliefs, if persistent, would manifest themselves, we present a model in which legislatures allocate budgets to their judges. In the model, common and civil-law legislatures have different preferences regarding the level of judicial independence. Our model predicts civil-law legislatures will give fewer discretionary resources to their judges when judicial elections are replaced by a system of appointments. We confirm this prediction using state-level data for the period 1961-1999. Finally, we argue that one important reason why civil-law preferences for a weak judiciary appear to have persisted in the American states is that the political culture within state legislatures is slow-moving. |
Date: | 2007–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:320&r=pke |