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on Post Keynesian Economics |
By: | Esteban Pérez-Caldentey; Matías Vernengo |
Abstract: | Argentina adopted currency type board arrangements to put an end to monetary instability in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries under very different historical circumstances and contexts with very different results. The first currency board functioned within an international system that functioned in manner similar to a closed economy. The second currency board experiment the historical conditions. The poor export performance, and the unsustainable trade and current account deficits, resulting from the process of external liberalization, and the process of international financial liberalization eventually led to the collapse of the Convertibility experiment. The role of economic ideas – in particular, the incorrect lessons taken from the first globalization period – in furthering the economic imbalances were central to the failure of the 1991 Convertibility experiment. |
Keywords: | Globalization, Monetary Reform, Argentina |
JEL: | F33 N26 O54 |
Date: | 2007–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uta:papers:2007_01&r=pke |
By: | Alex Coad (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - [CNRS : UMR8174] - [Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I], LEM - Laboratory of Economics and Management - [Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies]) |
Abstract: | Complicated neoclassical models predict that if investment is sensitive to current financial performance, this is a sign that something is "wrong" and is to be regarded as a problem for policy. Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, refers to the principle of "growth of the fitter" to explain investment-cash flow sensitivities as the workings of a healthy economy. In particular, I attack the neoclassical assumption of managers maximizing shareholder-value. Such an assumption is not a helpful starting point for empirical studies into firm growth. one caricature of neoclassical theory could be "Assume firms are perfectly efficient. Why aren't they getting enoug funding ?", whereas evolutionary theory considers that firms are forever struggling to grow. This essay highlights how policy guidelines can be framed by the initial modelling assumptions, even though these latter are often chosen with analytical tractability in mind rather than realism. |
Keywords: | Financial constraints, firm growth, evolutionary theory, neoclassical theory, investment. |
Date: | 2007–05–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00144415_v1&r=pke |
By: | Marek Hudon (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels and Harvard University, Boston.) |
Abstract: | Access to credit is today a main constrain for many entrepreneurs. This article studies the question of a right to credit. If access to financial services is so crucial and too many hurdles stop the very poor citizens to benefit from the opportunities the markets can offer, one can consider, as Nobel Prize Laureate M. Yunus, that a specific right should be established. Nevertheless, the use of credit is still controversial and does not always lead to economic development. Hence, rather than a loose right to credit, we argue for a right in a goal-right system. This system could take into account the important elements necessary to the positive impact of credit. |
Keywords: | human right, credit, justice, microfinance |
JEL: | B0 O16 Q14 |
Date: | 2007–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:07-008&r=pke |
By: | Garey C. Durden; Richard J. Cebula; Patricia Gaynor |
Abstract: | This paper extends the well known rational interest voting (rational voter) model to include a composite measure to capture the residual effects of internal, sociological motives not previously accounted for in empirical studies of general election voting. These motives are referred to here as “social conditioning” or “internal motivation” and may to at least some extent reflect a sense of duty or sense of civic duty to vote, as well as a simple “habit” of voting. Estimations using CPS data from the 1984 Presidential elections suggest that previously unmeasured internal motives, which we capture in a variable called “Social Conditioning,” may exert a powerful influence on individual voting behavior. |
Date: | 2007 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:07-05&r=pke |
By: | Oxoby, Robert |
Abstract: | We explore the effects of listening to the music of AC/DC in a simple bargaining environment. |
Keywords: | bargaining; reciprocity; music; experiments |
JEL: | Z19 C91 |
Date: | 2007–05–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3196&r=pke |