nep-pke New Economics Papers
on Post Keynesian Economics
Issue of 2006‒05‒06
three papers chosen by
Karl Petrick
Leeds Metropolitan University

  1. The Fallacy of the Revised Bretton Woods Hypothesis: Why Today’s System is Unsustainable and Suggestions for a Replacement By Thomas I. Palley
  2. The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks? By Hendrik Hakenes; Isabel Schnabel
  3. Banking Crises, Financial Dependence and Growth By Klingebiel, Daniela; Kroszner, Randall S; Laeven, Luc

  1. By: Thomas I. Palley
    Abstract: Dooley et al. (2003) have argued that today’s international financial system has structural similarities with the earlier Bretton Woods (1946 – 71) arrangements and is stable. This paper argues that the comparison is misplaced and ignores fundamental microeconomic differences, and that today’s system is also vulnerable to a crash. Eichengreen (2004) and Goldstein and Lardy (2005) have also argued that the system is unsustainable. However, their focus is the sustainability of financing to cover the U.S. trade deficit, whereas the current paper focuses on inadequacies on the system’s demand side. The paper concludes with suggestions for a global system of managed exchange rates that should replace the current system – hopefully, before it crashes.
    Keywords: Revised Bretton Woods, export-led growth, aggregate demand
    JEL: F02 F32 F33
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uma:periwp:wp114&r=pke
  2. By: Hendrik Hakenes (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany, hakenes@coll.mpg.de); Isabel Schnabel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany, schnabel@coll.mpg.de)
    Abstract: This paper yields a rationale for why subsidized public banks may be desirable from a regional perspective in a financially integrated economy. We present a model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions in which public banks prevent a capital drain from poorer to richer regions by subsidizing local depositors, for example, through a public guarantee. Under some conditions, cooperative banks can perform the same function without any subsidization; however, they may be crowded out by public banks. We also discuss the impact of the political structure on the emergence of public banks in a political-economy setting and the role of interregional mobility.
    Keywords: Public banks, cooperative banks, capital drain, credit rationing, financial integration, privatization.
    JEL: G21 F36 H11 L33
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:107&r=pke
  3. By: Klingebiel, Daniela; Kroszner, Randall S; Laeven, Luc
    Abstract: This paper investigates the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external sources of finance to analyze the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. If the banking system is the key element allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system where such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. On average, in a country experiencing a banking crisis, a sector at the 75th percentile of external dependence and located in a country at the 75th percentile of private credit to GDP would experience a 1.6 percent greater contraction in growth in value added between the crisis and pre-crisis period than a sector at the 25th percentile of external dependence and private credit to GDP. This effect is sizeable compared with an overall mean decline in growth of 3.5 percent between these two periods. Our results, however, do not suggest that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.
    Keywords: banking and financial crises; credit channel; financial development; financing constraints
    JEL: G21 O16
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5623&r=pke

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