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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Thilo Pausch (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The standard situation of ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is extended by risk aversion and heterogenous levels of reservation utility of lenders. In a situation of direct contracting optimal incentive compatible contracts are valuable for both, borrowers and lenders. However, there may appear credit rationing as a consequence of borrowers optimal decision making. Introducing a bank into the market increases total wealth due to the appearance of a portfolio effect in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. It can be shown that this effect may even reduce the problem of credit rationing provided it is sufficiently strong. |
| Keywords: | risk aversion, costly state verification, credit rationing, bank |
| JEL: | D82 G21 L22 |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0271&r=pke |
| By: | Werner Hölzl (Vienna University of Economics & B.A.) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an overview on the evolutionary theory of the firm. The specific feature of the evolutionary approach is that it explains the adaptive behaviors of firms through the tension between innovation and selection. It is suggested that the evolutionary theory can provide a useful basis for a theory of the firm which is concerned with change over time and development. |
| Keywords: | theory of the firm, complexity, routines, change of routines |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwgee:geewp46&r=pke |
| By: | GIAMBONI LUIGI; WALDMANN ROBERT |
| Abstract: | This paper studies whether anomalies in consumption can be explained by a behavioral model in which agents do not have rational expectations and make predictable errors in forecasting income. We use a micro-data set containing subjective expectations about future income. The paper shows that, the null hypotheses of rational expectations is rejected in favor of the behavioral model, as that consumption responds to predictable forecast errors. On average agents who we predict are too pessimistic increase consumption after the predictable positive income shock. On average agents who are too optimistic reduce consumption. (JEL classification: D11, D12, D84) |
| Date: | 2004–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:202&r=pke |
| By: | Chih Ming Tan |
| Abstract: | Do institutions “rule” when explaining cross-country divergence? This paper finds that to a large extent they do. However, the role of ethno-linguistic fractionalization cannot be ignored. Sufficiently high-quality institutions are necessary if the negative impact on development from high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is to be mitigated. Interestingly, I find no role for geographic factors; neither those associated with climate nor geographic isolation, in explaining divergence. There is also no evidence to suggest a role for religious fractionalization. Finally, my findings affirm earlier work in the literature that sets apart Sub-Saharan Africa’s development process from the rest of the world. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0512&r=pke |
| By: | Andreas Pyka (University of Augsburg, Department of Economics); Giorgio Fagiolo (Laboratory of Economics and Management, Pisa (Italy)) |
| Abstract: | Modellers have had to wrestle with an unavoidable trade-off between the demand of a general theoretical approach and the descriptive accuracy required to model a particular phenomenon. A new class of simulation models has shown to be well adapted to this challenge, basically by shifting outwards this trade-off: So-called agent-based models (ABMs henceforth) are increasingly used for the modelling of socio-economic developments. Our paper deals with the new requirements for modelling entailed by the necessity to focus on qualitative developments, pattern formation, etc. which is generally highlighted within Neo-Schumpeterian Economics and the possibilities given by ABMs. |
| Keywords: | Simulation, Neo-Schumpeterian Economics, Agents |
| JEL: | B52 O30 |
| Date: | 2005–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aug:augsbe:0272&r=pke |