|
on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Gérard Charreaux (Université de Bourgogne) |
| Abstract: | The objective of this article is to conduct a survey of the different corporate governance theories. In the first part, we present the micro theories by opposing the disciplinary view to the knowledge-based view. The second part deals with the macro or national systems theories. We separate the theories based on appropriation of the organizational rent from those attributing a dominant role to production. This survey highlights that the financial view of corporate governance is a very particular case and presents many limits. |
| Keywords: | national systems of governance;micro theories of corporate governance;macro theories of corporate governance;disciplinary view;knowledge-based view;law and finance view;political theory;varieties of capitalism. |
| JEL: | G30 P50 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1041202&r=pke |
| By: | Cervellati, Matteo (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and University of Bologna); Fortunato, Piergiuseppe (University of Bologna); Sunde, Uwe (IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favorable economic institutions ensure the appropriability of rents in form of a state of law. We study the conditions under which a state of law can be implemented under oligarchy, and when democratization is necessary. Inequality in endowments and incomes prolongs the absence of good institutions and delays democratization. Conversely, institutions shape the income distribution. Simulations illustrate how inequality affects the development process and may lead to overtaking and divergence. The implications are in line with historical and empirical evidence. |
| Keywords: | inequality, democratization, institutions, state of law, long-term development |
| JEL: | H10 O20 N10 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1450&r=pke |
| By: | Enriqueta Aragones (Autonomous University of Barcelona - Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)); Itzhak Gilboa (Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University); Andrew Postlewaite (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); David Schmeidler (Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University) |
| Abstract: | People may be surprised by noticing certain regularities that hold in existing knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational complexity. We show that, given a knowledge base, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term is used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this result and of fact-free learning in general. |
| Keywords: | Learning, Behavioral Economics |
| JEL: | D11 |
| Date: | 2003–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:05-002&r=pke |