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on Public Economics |
| By: | Matias Giaccobasso; Marcelo Bergolo; Gabriel Burdin; Mauricio De Rosa; Martin Leites; Horacio Rueda |
| Abstract: | This paper presents new evidence on how top income earners respond to changes in the personal labor income tax schedule, uncovering both own- and cross-tax base responses within a unified framework. For identification, we exploit a 2012 tax reform in Uruguay that generated quasi-random variation in top marginal rates within the top 1% of the labor income distribution. Our empirical approach relies on a difference-in-differences identification strategy and administrative records linked at the individual level across multiple tax bases. We estimate an own-tax base intensive margin elasticity of 0.82 and extensive margin semi-elasticity of 3.36. Extensive margin responses are mostly driven by taxpayers shifting from the personal labor income tax base toward corporate income or capital income tax bases (semi-elasticities of -1.00 and -0.61, respectively). Our preferred estimates suggest that the reform was effective in increasing tax revenues, with efficiency costs representing 31% of the projected increase. However, it had limited impact on inequality, most likely due to its narrow scope and income shifting toward tax bases with lower and flat rates. Overall, our results indicate that policy efforts aiming to reduce inequality by increasing top marginal tax rates should also focus on limiting income shifting opportunities to strengthen their redistributive effects. |
| Keywords: | income taxation, top income earners, tax reform, reported income supply, income-shifting |
| JEL: | H21 H24 H30 J22 O23 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13119 |
| By: | Margaret Chen; Mikhail Golosov; Ilia Krasikov |
| Abstract: | We study taxation in matching environments in which both equilibrium sorting and the sharing of match surplus are endogenous. Tax reforms lead to complex adjustments in sorting and surplus sharing patterns across the whole economy. We develop a general approach for characterizing these equilibrium adjustments using matching elasticities, which are primitive objects that describe how agents' matching choices are affected by pecuniary payoffs in partial equilibrium. Applying this approach to a workhorse model of family formation, we first show that the sorting and surplus sharing responses are closely linked to complementarities in the creation of economic surplus, as first emphasized by Becker (1973). We then describe the effects of arbitrary tax reforms on tax revenues, the utilities of different agents, and social welfare; design tests to assess Pareto efficiency of existing tax systems; derive formulas that characterize optimal taxes; and propose numerical techniques to compute them. In a calibrated model, we find that optimal marginal tax rates are substantially lower and less progressive than in the Mirrleesian benchmark. |
| JEL: | E60 H21 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35970 |
| By: | Max Löffler; Jonas Wogh |
| Abstract: | We study whether financial assistance to prospective homebuyers succeeds in promoting homeownership by analyzing a prominent real-estate transfer tax exemption for young homebuyers in the Netherlands. The reform offers quasi-experimental variation across time, buyers, and units, which we exploit using granular administrative data and various complementary reduced-form approaches. The two-percentage-point transfer tax cut substantially raised transactions among the young, but we can rule out even modest medium-run increases in homeownership. Instead, we document large timing and bunching responses. Prices of qualifying units increased by between 1.2% and 1.8%, suggesting that the tax cut mostly benefitted sellers. Welfare simulations reveal that, while the tax cut reduced transfer tax distortions and increased overall economic surplus, gains accrued primarily to upper-middle-income households. |
| Keywords: | housing markets, homeownership, transfer taxes, welfare |
| JEL: | R21 R28 H22 H31 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13116 |
| By: | David Murphy; Maximilian Todtenhaupt; Floris T. Zoutman |
| Abstract: | Cum-fake schemes use pre-release ADRs without underlying shares to create dividend withholding tax (DWT) refund claims. Using daily ADR data for 2008–2019 and a triple-differences design, we document lending patterns consistent with these schemes. Before 2014, excess dividend-window ADR lending equaled 0.35% of issuer market value in DWT countries, versus 0.04% for U.K. ADRs, where dividends generally face no DWT. This gap vanished after the SEC intensified scrutiny in 2014. ADR and underlying security prices show no persistent wedge. Calibration suggests a tax revenue loss of $264–640 million. |
| Keywords: | dividend withholding tax, tax enforcement, securities lending |
| JEL: | H26 K22 G18 F23 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13106 |
| By: | Brounstein, Jakob; Bachas, Pierre; Bajaña, Alex |
| Abstract: | Tax havens weaken tax enforcement by obscuring firm ownership and facilitating offshore evasion. This paper studies a reform in Ecuador that imposed a corporate tax surcharge on firms with owners in tax havens, using a newly available ownership registry. Comparing haven-owned firms to other foreign-owned firms, the analysis finds that the reform reduced haven ownership by 12 percentage points, largely through disclosure of non-haven individual owners. Exposed firms reduced transactions with tax havens and increased corporate tax payments, with no detectable effects on investment or firm size. The results suggest that ownership transparency can meaningfully improve tax compliance at limited efficiency cost, even through unilateral action. |
| Date: | 2026–10–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:11493 |
| By: | António Afonso; José Alves; Kakoum Eudes Somda |
| Abstract: | Independent fiscal institutions, or fiscal councils, have no authority to set or collect taxes, yet their scrutiny of fiscal policy may shape governments’ incentives to mobilize revenue. This paper examines whether fiscal council adoption helps close the tax gap, defined as the share of estimated revenue potential that remains uncollected. Using a panel of 159 countries over 1990–2021, we estimate revenue potential with a stochastic frontier and exploit the staggered adoption of fiscal councils using a difference-in-differences estimator robust to heterogeneous treatment effects. On average, countries leave about 36% of their estimated revenue potential uncollected, with a mean tax gap of 0.38 in emerging and developing economies compared with 0.30 in advanced economies. We find that fiscal council adoption reduces the tax gap by 5.0 percentage points, or roughly 15% of its pre-adoption level. The effect builds up gradually after adoption and holds across a range of robustness checks, including alternative frontier specifications and estimators. It is concentrated in emerging and developing economies, where the scope for improving revenue mobilization is greatest, and remains significant across preadoption fiscal conditions, whether or not a fiscal rule is in place and whether public debt and deficits are high or low. The adjustment operates on the revenue side rather than the expenditure side, mainly through VAT, trade and property taxes, consistent with governments mobilizing revenue sources that were available but left untapped. Overall, the findings suggest that fiscal councils can support domestic revenue mobilization by strengthening fiscal scrutiny. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal councils; Domestic revenue mobilization; Tax gap; Stochastic frontier analysis; Staggered difference-in-differences. |
| JEL: | E62 H11 H20 H26 O23 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ise:remwps:wp04382026 |
| By: | Soled, Jay A.; Morris, Mallory A. |
| Abstract: | To secure income, taxpayers often incur a wide range of expenses. At least theoretically, one might think that the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) would accord all such expenses similar tax treatment, but (i) trade or business expenses and (ii) investment expenses endure the exact opposite tax treatment: the former are generally allowed, whereas the latter are commonly disallowed. The obvious question is why there is a difference in treatment between the two. This Article explores possible answers to that important question. It first traces the evolution of the Code’s dichotomous tax treatment of trade or business versus investment expenses. It then investigates possible justifications and their associated merits for the different handling of these two expense categories. With this background information in mind, to make the tax system more administrable, equitable, and efficient, this Article advocates for the deductibility of investment expenses and describes several beneficial implications associated with the institution of this proposed reform |
| Date: | 2026–10–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:lawarc:c2bmg_v1 |
| By: | Soled, Jay A. |
| Abstract: | Due to technological advances and the COVID-19 pandemic, taxpayers are increasingly utilizing their homes as a focal point from which to conduct their business affairs. On the one hand, the nation should applaud this workplace transformation insofar as it may enhance job performance and efficiency, reduce product cost and overhead, and improve work-life balance. On the other hand, this transformation process may open the door to rampant tax abuse as taxpayers alone or in collusion with their employers seek to transform home usage into a tax shelter refuge. This analysis delves directly into the income tax compliance concerns that the workplace transformation engenders. It does so by exposing the nature of the problem, its prevalence, what it might cost the nation annually in terms of lost revenue, and why current safeguards are failing to achieve their sought-after objectives. The good news is that if Congress proactively takes immediate remedial measures to address this nascent problem, such actions could help foster taxpayer compliance, defend the income tax base, and halt the depletion of the nation’s revenue coffers. However, if Congress dallies and is derelict in fulfilling its oversight duties, this problem is poised to go from bad to worse. |
| Date: | 2026–10–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:lawarc:5z3u4_v1 |
| By: | Antoine Germain (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, University of Pennsylvania [Philadelphia], FRS-FNRS - Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique = Fund for Scientific Research [Bruxelles]) |
| Abstract: | I study redistribution between inactive, unemployed, and employed agents who are heterogeneous in their preferences and their productive skills in the labor market and at home. The government considers that redistribution across skills is desirable, but redistribution across preferences is not: if everyone has the same preferences, equality is optimal, but if everyone has the same skills, laissez-faire is optimal. In turn, this leads to a simple sufficient statistic to assess any reform: any extra dollar of transfer should go to the agent whose consumption is the furthest below what she would have consumed if everyone had average skills. In high-income countries, the gap between the lowest consumption and the average production is empirically much larger in the labor market than among inactives. Hence, introducing an inactivity benefit, or basic income, would neither be welfare-improving nor optimal for that social welfare function, regardless of labor supply elasticities. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution, Labor market inactivity, Home production, Optimal taxation, Fairness, Equality of opportunity, Basic income |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05839323 |
| By: | Sabien Dobbelaere (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Ana Popovici (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We study whether firms share gains from innovation tax incentives with incumbent workers and whether such rent sharing is associated with increased worker retention. The Dutch innovation box reduces tax rates on profits from in-house innovation. Linking first-time beneficiaries to matched employer-employee data, we combine nearest-neighbour matching with staggered difference-in-differences. Part of the additional after-tax surplus is passed on to incumbent workers: wages rise by 3.27% on average, with increases of 2.05% for workers least involved in R&D and 4.14% for tertiary-educated STEM workers. Descriptively, treated non-R&D incumbents are 3.47 percentage points less likely to switch employers following treatment. |
| Keywords: | Innovation policy, rent sharing, worker mobility |
| JEL: | H25 J31 J62 O31 |
| Date: | 2026–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260087 |
| By: | Samba Diop (Saint-Louis, Senegal); Alioune Badara Seck (Dakar, Senegal); Simplice A. Asongu (Johannesburg, South Africa) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the effect of individuals’ perception of government public policies, confidence in institutions, and economic expectations on the willingness to pay tax, taking into account the moderating role of macroeconomic context such as inflation. The empirical framework is based on a contextual logistic model with more than 140 000 respondents from the Afrobarometer survey data covering Round 4 (2008, 20 countries), Round 5 (2011-2013, 34 countries), Round 6 (2016, 36 countries) and Round 7 (2019, 34 countries) corresponding to the period 2008-2019. The findings reveal that citizens who appreciate the current government performance in creating jobs, fighting corruption, trust in the executive office and have good economic expectations are more willing to pay a tax or fee. Regarding the moderating role of inflation, the findings suggest that individuals’ perception on public policies, their confidence in the president or economic expectation do not attenuate or moderate the negative effects of inflation on attitude towards paying taxes. The findings are robust to sensitivity analyses. They theoretically improve insights into fiscal contract theory and policy implications are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Attitude; Paying Tax; Government Performance; Inflation |
| JEL: | E3 H1 H25 O55 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:26/056 |
| By: | Chengfeng Shen; Felix K\"{u}bler |
| Abstract: | We consider the Ramsey problem of optimal government policy and give examples where lotteries are essential for the optimal solution. When markets are complete and the representative agent's coefficient of relative prudence is bounded, lotteries are typically not optimal. For the incomplete markets case, we prove analytically that lotteries improve welfare for some calibrations with CRRA utility, and we give a simple numerical example for this claim. When the agent's coefficient of relative risk aversion is unbounded for small consumption, lotteries typically improve welfare and can be used to approximate the first-best solution arbitrarily well in both the complete and the incomplete markets cases. However, in the complete markets case, when debt constraints are not too tight and the representative agent is sufficiently patient, lotteries can be purified in the sense that there is a deterministic solution that gives the same value. |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.32681 |