nep-pbe New Economics Papers
on Public Economics
Issue of 2018‒02‒12
eighteen papers chosen by
Thomas Andrén

  1. Prospects for progressive tax reform in Asia and the Pacific By Zheng Jian; Daniel Jeongdae
  2. Assessing the Economic and Social Impact of Tax and Transfer System Reforms: A General Equilibrium Microsimulation Approach By Peter, Benczur; Gabor, Katay; Aron, Kiss
  3. The Mortgage Interest Deduction: Revenue and Distributional Effects By Austin J. Drukker; Ted Gayer; Harvey S. Rosen
  4. Optimal Taxation under Different Concepts of Justness By Robin Jessen; Maria Metzing; Davud Rostam-Afschar
  5. GDP-linked Bonds: Some Simulations on EU Countries By Nicolas Carnot; Stéphanie Pamies Sumner
  6. Welfare Effects of Housing Transaction Taxes By Terviö, Marko; Määttänen, Niku
  7. The measurement of targeting intentions in complex welfare states: a proposal and empirical applications By Sarah Marchal; Wim Van Lancker
  8. Inequality and Structural Reforms: Methodological Concerns and Lessons from Policy By Caterina Astarita; Gaetano D'Adamo
  9. The Magic of Layoff Taxes Requires Equilibrium Stability By Frédéric Gavrel
  10. Macroeconomic indicators of determination on tax behaviour of OECD countries By Sokolovskyi, Dmytro
  11. Decentralized leadership in a federation and competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter? By Thierry Madiès; Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
  12. Tax simplicity and heterogeneous learning By Aghion, Philippe; Akcigit, Ufuk; Lequien, Matthieu; Stantcheva, Stefanie
  13. On asymmetric information and tax morale in developing countries By Salim Nuhu Ahmed; John M. Musah
  14. Tax influence on financial structures of M&As By Harendt, Christoph
  15. Paying More For Less: Why Don't Households In Tanzania Take Advantage Of Bulk Discounts? By Brian Dillon; Joachim De Weerdt; Ted O’Donoghue
  16. Metropolitan city finances in Asia and the Pacific region: issues, problems and reform options By Roy Bahl
  17. Tax incentives and tax base protection in developing countries By Joosung Jun
  18. Risk-based selection in unemployment insurance: evidence and implications By Landais, Camille; Nekoei, Arash; Nilsson, Peter; Seim, David; Spinnewijn, Johannes

  1. By: Zheng Jian (Macroeconomic Policy and Financing for Development Division, ESCAP); Daniel Jeongdae (Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division, ESCAP)
    Abstract: Progressive tax policies are important measures to narrow the inequality gaps and maintain a balanced distribution of income and wealth in a society. However, the potentials of such policies have yet to be fully realized in Asia-Pacific developing countries, where direct taxes remain a smaller component in the overall tax mix and redistributive tax tools such as the personal income tax and wealth taxes are under-utilized. As Asia-Pacific developing countries become middle-income and higher-middle income economies, they are experiencing the negative impacts of rapidly rising income and wealth inequalities that have come with fast economic growth. Therefore, a transition towards a more balanced strategy that emphasizes inclusive development needs to happen and progressive tax policies would have an important role in facilitating such a transition. However, implementing progressive tax reforms in developing countries is a challenging task, where the local institutional, historical, and social-economic contexts could be deciding factors for success or failure. This paper advocates for a differentiated, pragmatic and prudent approach for progressive tax reforms in Asia-Pacific. First, countries at different stages of development should follow different strategies. Second, countries need to anchor their policy making on the actual outcomes rather than on theoretical assumptions, and should always be prepared to adjust their policies according to local context and realities. Last but not least, policy makers and to some extent also the general public need to understand that there is a learning curve of policy design and implementation when it comes to progressive taxation, and therefore should allow the policies to improve and mature over time.
    Keywords: Fiscal policy, public expenditure, revenues, taxation
    JEL: E62 H20 H50
  2. By: Peter, Benczur (European Commission – JRC); Gabor, Katay (European Commission – JRC); Aron, Kiss (European Commission)
    Abstract: We present a general-equilibrium behavioural microsimulation model designed to assess long-run macroeconomic, fiscal and social consequences of reforms to the tax and transfer system. The behaviour of labour supply is assessed along both the extensive and intensive margins, by merging the discrete choice and the elasticity of taxable income approaches. General-equilibrium feedback effects are simulated by embedding microsimulation in a parsimonious macro model of a small open economy. We estimate and calibrate the model to Hungary, and then perform three sets of simulations. The first one explores the impact of personal income tax reductions that are identical in cost but different in structure. The second one compares three different tax shift scenarios, while the third one evaluates actual policy measures between 2008 and 2013. The results suggest that while a cut in the marginal tax rate of high-income individuals may boost output, it does not have a significant employment effect. On the other hand, programs like the Employee Tax Credit do have a significant employment effect. We find that the policy measures introduced since 2008 substantially increase income inequality in the long run; the contribution of the changes after 2010 are about four times that of the changes before 2010. Our results highlight that taking account of household heterogeneity is crucial in the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of tax and transfer reforms.
    Keywords: behavioural microsimulation; linked micro macro model; tax system; transfers
    JEL: H22 H31 C63
    Date: 2017–11
  3. By: Austin J. Drukker (Brookings Institution); Ted Gayer (Brookings Institution); Harvey S. Rosen (Princeton University)
    Abstract: Conventional estimates of the size and distribution of the mortgage interest deduction (MID) in the personal income tax fail to account for potentially important responses in household behavior. As noted by Gervais and Pandey (2008) and Poterba and Sinai (2011), among others, were the MID to be eliminated, households would sell financial assets such as stocks and bonds to pay down their mortgage debt, and the smaller holdings of these taxable assets would offset some of the revenue gains from taxing mortgage interest. Conventional estimates therefore overstate the increase in revenues associated with eliminating the MID. Conventional estimates also overstate the progressivity of eliminating the MID, because households with higher levels of non-residential assets would respond by selling their taxable, non-residential assets. This paper builds on previous work that estimates the consequences of removing the MID using a framework that allows for the possibility of portfolio rebalancing. Unlike previous studies, we analyze data for several years — every third year from 1988 to 2012, inclusive. This reduces the likelihood that our estimates are due to the idiosyncrasies of some particular year, and allows us to investigate how and why the differences between estimates with and without a portfolio response have evolved over time. We then turn to the distributional implications of eliminating the MID, again looking at multiple years. A noteworthy feature of our distributional analyses is that we focus on both wealth and income as classifying variables. Our main findings are: (i) The revenue loss associated with the MID is smaller if one allows for rebalancing, with the ratio of the rebalancing-adjusted revenue loss to the conventionally estimated revenue loss varying from 76 percent in 1997 to 90 percent in 2009. While not dramatic, these are non-trivial effects. (ii ) During our sample period, changes in the ratio of the 2 revenue loss estimates were due primarily to changes in the relative stocks of assets to mortgage debt as opposed to changes in rates of return and the tax system, (iii) Portfolio rebalancing attenuates the increase in progressivity associated with elimination of the MID.
    JEL: H24 H31
    Date: 2017–10
  4. By: Robin Jessen; Maria Metzing; Davud Rostam-Afschar
    Abstract: A common assumption in the optimal taxation literature is that the social planner maximizes a welfarist social welfare function with weights decreasing with income. However, high transfer withdrawal rates in many countries imply very low weights for the working poor in practice. We reconcile this puzzle by generalizing the optimal taxation framework by Saez (2002) to allow for alternatives to welfarism. We calculate weights of a social planner’s function as implied by the German tax and transfer system based on the concepts of welfarism, minimum absolute and relative sacrifice, as well as subjective justness. For the latter we use a novel question from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that the minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in line with social weights that decline with net income. Absolute subjective justness is roughly in line with decreasing social weights, which is reflected by preferences of men, West Germans, and supporters of the grand coalition parties.
    Keywords: Justness, Optimal Taxation, Income Redistribution, Equal Sacrifice, Inequality, Subjective Preferences
    JEL: D63 D60 H21 H23 I38
    Date: 2017
  5. By: Nicolas Carnot; Stéphanie Pamies Sumner
    Abstract: The economic and fiscal outlook has recently improved for European economies, raising the odds that high public debts inherited from the crisis will be gradually wound down in line with EU fiscal rules. This will however take time and future debt trajectories remain exposed to significant uncertainties. In this context, this paper explores some implications of GDP-linked bonds (GLBs), an instrument for national debt management that has recently sparked growing interest. Based on the data and tools of the Commission Debt Sustainability Monitor, our results suggest significant potential benefits from GLBs in reducing debt uncertainties for all European economies. These benefits would be notably large in countries characterised by medium-to-high debt, high macroeconomic volatility and limited alternative tools to smoothen shocks. A risk premium would not eliminate the debt-stabilisation benefits brought by GLBs. The fall in the probability of explosive debt paths could also reduce the premium demanded by investors on conventional bonds in high-debt countries. The issuance of a fraction of GLBs can however be no substitute for pursuing sound economic and budgetary policies curbing national debts.
    JEL: H63 F34 E62
    Date: 2017–12
  6. By: Terviö, Marko; Määttänen, Niku
    Abstract: We evaluate the welfare cost of ad valorem housing transaction taxes, focusing on distortions in the suboptimal matching of houses and households as the channel of welfare effects. We present a one-sided assignment model with transaction costs and imperfectly transferable utility where households are heterogeneous by incomes, houses are heterogeneous by quality, and housing is a normal good. We calibrate the model with data from the Helsinki metropolitan region to assess the welfare impact of a counterfactual tax reform, where the transaction tax is replaced by a revenue equivalent ad valorem property tax. The aggregate welfare gain would be 13% of the tax revenue at the current 2% tax rate. The share of ex post losers from the reform is increasing in the tax rate even though the aggregate welfare cost of transaction taxation increases rapidly with the tax rate, with the Laffer curve peaking at about 10%.
    Keywords: transaction tax; stamp duty; housing market; assignment models
    JEL: D31 R21
    Date: 2017–12
  7. By: Sarah Marchal; Wim Van Lancker
    Abstract: The extent to which welfare states target resources to the poor and the effect this may have on redistribution and public support remains an important question in contemporary social policy and welfare state research. Usually in this line of research, targeting is measured as the extent of transfers accruing to the lowest income groups. Such an outcome measure depends on both policy design and contextual factors, such as the composition of the population. For some research questions however, researchers may want to separate the effect of the design of benefit schemes, i.e. targeting intentions, from the context in which targeting takes place. For instance to assess the effect of policy design on redistributive outcomes, or to track whether policymakers resorted to more or less targeting in their benefit schemes over time. Therefore, in this article we develop an institutional targeting indicator that captures the policy intention to target towards the poor. Our indicator summarizes policy design into one parameter, and captures the complexity of benefit design in contemporary welfare states in a meaningful way. Drawing on the OECD Benefits and Wages data that capture the rules and legislation of tax benefit systems, we demonstrate different empirical applications for this indicator.
    Date: 2018–01
  8. By: Caterina Astarita; Gaetano D'Adamo
    Abstract: Income inequality became more and more prominent in the academic and policy debate in recent years and particularly since the economic downturn. Inequality, indeed, may have long-term effects on (potential) growth and macroeconomic stability, reinforcing existing inequalities and reducing opportunities, skills development and social and occupational mobility. Structural reforms, i.e. labour and product market reforms and tax-benefit systems reforms, are one of the main tools available for public interventions aimed at boosting growth while not being detrimental to equality. In this context, DG ECFIN of the European Commission organised two workshops held on the 16th of May and the 19th of June 2017 aimed at enriching the existing knowledge of the relationship between structural reforms and inequality and taking place at a time where Europe discusses the social dimension, notably the European Pillar of Social Rights as proposed by the Commission and proclaimed at the Social Summit in Gothenburg. The first workshop focused on the methodological issues whilst the second one focused on policy evidence of the impact of structural reforms on inequality. These proceedings take stock of the discussions held in the workshops, in order to contribute to the growing debate on how to better take into account distributional effects when formulating policy advice.
    JEL: C2 C3 C53 C61 C68 D1 D2 D3 D4 E6 H2 H3
    Date: 2017–12
  9. By: Frédéric Gavrel (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: In the same vein as Blanchard and Tirole (2008) First Pass, this note shows that, under the condition for equilibrium stability, the partial implementation of layoff taxes invariably increases firms' profits as well as workers' utilities by lowering payroll taxes. It also proves that requiring stability does not raise any equilibrium existence issue per se: since the budget constraint of unemployment compensation induces multiple equilibria, the condition for stability simply permits the selection of one of these equilibria. These insights could favor the introduction of firing taxes, which in practice would probably be a gradual process
    Keywords: Layoff taxes,payroll taxes,public policy efficiency
    Date: 2017
  10. By: Sokolovskyi, Dmytro
    Abstract: The article deals with investigation of principles, factors and conditions of the government’s tax behavior, notably by means of changing the tax burden. We define a set of potential indicators of the economic efficiency, based on GDP and FDI, nominal and per capita, as well as the ratio of FDI to GDP. By using the statistical analysis techniques we found the statistical dependence between government’s behavior and each of the selected indicators. We argued that the factor GDP per capita has the biggest impact on the government’s tax decisions. Also it showed that the governments mostly act as satisfiers. The obtained results allow to understand the principles of governments’ decision-making, and, therefore, to forecast in some way their behavior in certain economic conditions. Moreover, it could help to understand the reasons why the “race to the bottom” situation appears. The present paper differs from previous studies both by the topic, studying the relations between government’s tax behavior and efficiency of countries economies and by the approach to define this dependence, since the latest can be observed only when each variant of government’s tax reaction is analyzed separately.
    Keywords: economic efficiency; tax burden; tax behavior; satisfier; CIT; GDP; FDI; per capita
    JEL: C12 E22 H30
    Date: 2018–01–20
  11. By: Thierry Madiès (Université de Fribourg); Emmanuelle Taugourdeau (CNRS ; CREST ; University Paris-Saclay ; ENS Paris Saclay)
    Abstract: Our paper presents a model of decentralized leadership with fiscal equalization and imperfect economic integration. The degree of trade integration (re ected by trade costs) turns out to have an effect on both the equilibrium tax rates across states and the ex-post vertical equalization transfers. Our main results are the following: Ex post vertical transfers are welfare deteriorating for low levels of trade integration while they are welfare improving compared to tax competition when trade integration is high enough. However, when public goods are highly valued by the citizens of the federation, ex post transfers are always welfare enhancing.
    Keywords: Tax competition, Trade Integration, Decentralized Leadership
    JEL: H7 H2 F15
    Date: 2017–12–14
  12. By: Aghion, Philippe; Akcigit, Ufuk; Lequien, Matthieu; Stantcheva, Stefanie
    Abstract: We study the effects of fiscal incentives for self-employment using new French tax data from 1994 to 2012. France serves as a good quasi-laboratory: It has three fiscal regimes - or modes of taxation - for the self-employed, which differ in their financial payoffs and in their administrative simplicity. These regimes have changed extensively over time - offering the opportunity to study how people learn about them and understand them. We find that the self-employed respond to the tax and administrative notches created by the eligibility thresholds: there is strong bunching right before the eligibility thresholds, which we use to estimate self-employed taxable income elasticities and the value of administrative simplicity. Even a small preference for administrative simplicity could explain the bunching observed. There is a sizable cost of tax complexity; agents are not immediately able to understand what the right regime choice is and there is evidence for costly learning over time. The cost of complexity is regressive because it affects mostly the uneducated, low income, and low skill agents. Agents who can be viewed as more informed and knowledgeable (e.g., the more educated or high-skilled) are more likely to make the correct regime choice and to learn faster
    Keywords: self-employment; taxation; entrepreneurship
    JEL: H21
    Date: 2017–11–01
  13. By: Salim Nuhu Ahmed; John M. Musah
    Abstract: Our paper investigates the implications of asymmetric non-tax revenue information for tax morale using micro data from thirty-six African countries. We utilize a model in which agents form their perceptions about the sufficiency of government non-tax revenue for development financing under asymmetric information conditions. We then construct a composite index of information access that generates predictions about these perceptions and tax morale at the household level. Two important predictions emerge: (i) in the presence of asymmetric information, households overestimate the ability of non-tax revenues alone to finance development, which (ii) has significant negative effects on household-level tax morale. Our findings—which are robust across specifications and controls of cross-country fixed differences in tax morale—provide evidence that improvement in government information supply regarding the use of non-tax revenues, beyond annual budget readings and households tax obligations, could significantly enhance tax morale and compliance.
    Date: 2018
  14. By: Harendt, Christoph
    Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the influence of tax incentives on the financial structures of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) conducted by multinational entities (MNE). Previous research has already found evidence for tax avoidance by debt shifting. I analyze the importance of locating debt at holdings which own the operating firm. Placing debt at the level of the holding is more advantageous since it allows inter alia for debt financing up to the purchase price. Accordingly, by using firm-level data provided by the German Central Bank I show empirically that the probability that a firm is held by a holding in the same country increases with the tax rate in that country (though the effect is rather small). As a limitation, I find this effect only for a sample of all firms and no additional effect in case of M&As (denoted as M&A firms). Since this way of debt financing requires that interest payments of holdings are used to offset profits of the operating firms, I consolidate financial structures of holdings and the operating firms. I discuss theoretically and show with descriptive statistics that this consolidation - the major contribution of my paper - leads to a higher total debt ratio compared to the unconsolidated case. However, this effect can only be observed in particular for the subsample of those M&A firms which actually belong to such structures of holdings and operating firms and does not lead to an increase of the debt ratio in the sample of all M&A firms. Finally, I show that the tax sensitivity of external debt financing increases with the consolidation (though again with no additional effect in case of M&A firms). I conclude that those findings may be one explanation why previous studies have found relatively low effects of taxes on debt financing.
    Keywords: Corporate Taxation,Multinational Firms,Foreign Direct Investment,Capital structure,Mergers and acquisitions,Empirical Analysis,Firm-level data
    JEL: F23 G32 G34 H25 H26 H32
    Date: 2018
  15. By: Brian Dillon; Joachim De Weerdt; Ted O’Donoghue
    Abstract: Despite average per-capita consumption of roughly $1 per day, many Tanzanian households do not take advantage of bulk discounts for staple goods. Using transaction diaries covering nearly 57,000 purchases by 1,499 households over two weeks, we find that through bulk purchasing the average household could spend 8.9% less on observed quantities (or consume 15.6% more at observed expenditure). We investigate several explanations for the observed purchasing patterns, and find evidence consistent with inattention, worries about over-consumption, avoidance of social taxation, and coordination problems. Contrary to prior work, we find little evidence that liquidity constraints prevent poor households from bulk purchasing.
    Keywords: bulk discounts; liquidity constraints; inattention; social taxes; coordination costs; self-control problems; consumer behavior
    JEL: O12 D03 D12
    Date: 2017
  16. By: Roy Bahl (Former Regents Professor and Founding Dean of the Center for State and Local Finance at Georgia State University, United States)
    Abstract: Asia and the Pacific is witnessing the world’s fastest urbanization in history. In the period 2000-2025, 1.1 billion people are projected to migrate into Asian cities and the region is now home to more than half of the megacities worldwide. Providing quality jobs, housing, urban infrastructure and public services for these new urban migrants and supporting sustainable development of the region’s large metropolitan areas would be a significant fiscal challenge for many governments. The current approach of revenue mobilization for cities and municipal fiscal reform efforts are unlikely to meet the substantial financing needs. Instead, there is a need for a metropolitan public financing strategy that is integrated into national urban development plans and matches national development objectives. The governance arrangements in metropolitan areas would be critical for such strategies to succeed. Compared to fragmented governance structures, the area-wide metropolitan governance model, which allows for effective coordination of service provision and revenue mobilization in the broad metropolitan areas, offer the most promising prospects. When the jurisdiction boundary is large enough, public service delivery can have better coverage and be more efficient, more revenue productive tax bases would become available, debt repayment capacity can be enhanced, and fiscal disparities can be reduced. While these changes may come at a cost of diminished local government control in some countries, reforms towards area-wide metropolitan governments would be a step in the right direction. Financing Asia-Pacific’s big cities also requires a broad mix of revenue tools for metropolitan governments, including property and land taxes, transport or fuel taxes, user charges, and broad-based local business, sales and consumption taxes, or surcharges on national taxes. In many cases, the availability and efficiency of these revenue tools depend on the extent of local fiscal autonomy. Accordingly, the intergovernmental transfer schemes should be rationalized in such context. Three central elements for a successful metropolitan public finance strategy can be highlighted. First, there is no universal solution, and policy choices should be aligned with local policy objectives. Second, where local fiscal autonomy is deemed important, local governments should be provided with adequate space for revenue mobilization. However, at the same time, they should be constrained from accessing intergovernmental transfer and special subsidy regimes. Third, higher level governments might consider establishing a commission to study the feasibility of a special regime for metropolitan area finances.
    Keywords: Taxation, local government revenue, local government budget
    JEL: H20 H71 H72
  17. By: Joosung Jun (Professor of economics, Ewha Womans University, Republic of Korea)
    Abstract: This paper considers the implications of using tax incentives for improving the tax base in developing countries, especially in the context of enforcement difficulties and international capital mobility. Noting that the tax structure in developing countries reflects pressures stemming from the large size of the informal sector and the prevalence of tax evasion in the formal sector, it suggests alternative channels through which the use of tax incentives can help protect the tax base, at least in the interim period. Governments can support the tax-paying local firms operating in the formal sector by providing tax incentives that appear to be more generous than warranted by their perceived effects on marginal investment, along with nontax benefits such as easier access to bank loans. In the process, foreign firms that are prone to tax evasion via profit shifting might be discriminated against, explicitly or implicitly, through a variety of regulations. In addition, the paper argues that the efficacy of investment incentives in attracting foreign investment is understated and the prospect of base erosion due to tax competition is overstated in the literature. The conventional prediction that the incentive effects increase with stronger investment climates may be technically correct, but seems to be too simplistic as a policy prescription. Smaller effects of investment incentives imply lower revenue costs unless these incentives are redundant. At the margin, therefore, tax incentives can possibly be wasted in countries with stronger investment climates, while they can be effective in countries with weak investment climates but strong rent potential such as natural resources or other locational advantages. Even countries with weak investment climates and low rent potential can still use such incentives as a signaling tool for prospective investors at a low revenue cost. The case study of Hong Kong, China; Singapore and Republic of Korea confirms that effective use of tax incentives critically hinges on country-specific factors and priorities, defying ‘one-size-fits-all’ best practices. In Hong Kong China, market-friendly investment environments, including a simple tax system with low and uniform rates, were a dominating factor to attract foreign investors. Singapore has been very proactive in providing foreign investors with generous tax incentives as part of investment-friendly environments, but has adjusted the extent of these incentives with their declining efficacy at the margin. In contrast, Republic of Korea provides a case in which countries with relatively weak investment climates can still make good use of tax incentives. The potential role of its tax incentives has sometimes been stretched beyond their purported goals, effectively serving as an incentive for firms not to shift their operations into the informal sector or abroad. This paper discusses various proposals that can reduce informal activity and tax evasion, which can also lead to a reduction in corruption. It also suggests that countries set statutory corporate tax rates in conformity with the neighboring countries with similar economic attributes in the face of increased profiting shifting by multinationals. Then, existing investment incentives can be adjusted in a most cost-effective way, taking into account country-specific characteristics such as general investment climates, the nature of local rents and the size of the informal sector as well as policy environments such as administrative capacity and the efficacy of the overall tax system.
    Keywords: Fiscal policy, public expenditure, revenues, taxation
    JEL: E62 H20 H50
  18. By: Landais, Camille; Nekoei, Arash; Nilsson, Peter; Seim, David; Spinnewijn, Johannes
    Abstract: This paper studies whether adverse selection can rationalize a universal mandate for unemployment insurance (UI). Building on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt for supplemental UI coverage above a minimum mandate, we provide the first direct evidence for adverse selection in UI and derive its implications for UI design. We find that the unemployment risk is more than twice as high for workers who buy supplemental coverage, even when controlling for a rich set of observables. Exploiting variation in risk and prices to control for moral hazard, we show how this correlation is driven by substantial risk-based selection. Despite the severe adverse selection, we find that mandating the supplemental coverage is dominated by a design leaving the choice to workers. In this design, a large subsidy for supplemental coverage is optimal and complementary to the use of a minimum mandate. Our findings raise questions about the desirability of the universal mandate of generous UI in other countries, which has not been tested before
    Keywords: adverse selection; unemployment insurance; mandate; subsidy
    JEL: H40 J65
    Date: 2017–10–01

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