nep-pbe New Economics Papers
on Public Economics
Issue of 2016‒04‒09
eighteen papers chosen by
Thomas Andrén

  1. Inheritance and wealth inequality: Evidence from population registers By Elinder, Mikael; Erixson, Oscar; Waldenström, Daniel
  2. Taxing away M&A: The effect of corporate capital gains taxes on acquisition activity By Feld, Lars P.; Ruf, Martin; Schreiber, Ulrich; Todtenhaupt, Maximilian; Voget, Johannes
  3. U.S. Inequality, Fiscal Progressivity, and Work Disincentives: An Intragenerational Accounting By Alan J. Auerbach; Laurence J. Kotlikoff; Darryl R. Koehler
  4. Study on Structures of Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators By Ramboll Management Consulting and Corit Advisory
  5. Tax bunching by owners of small corporations By Leon Bettendorf; Arjan Lejour; Maarten van 't Riet
  6. Avoiding Taxes by Transfers Within the Family By Edoardo Di Porto; Henry Ohlsson
  7. Effects of Taxes on Youth Self-Employment and Income By Egebark, Johan
  8. Sub-national Tax Policy and State Level Growth Dynamics: Evidence from U.S. States By William Gbohoui (Sans nom); François Vaillancourt
  9. How Does Maternal Pension Wealth Affect Family Old-Age Savings in Germany? By Andreas Thiemann
  10. Fiscal austerity in ambiguous times By Ferrière, Axelle; Karantounias, Anastasios G.
  11. Exploring Tax and Welfare Options By Callan, Tim; Colgan, Brian; Savage, Michael; Walsh, John R.
  12. Inequality and top incomes in Uruguay: a comparison between household surveys and income tax micro-data By Gabriel Burdín; Fernando Esponda; Andrea Vigorito
  13. Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis By Heinemann, Friedrich; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel; Yeter, Mustafa
  14. A Choice Experiment on Tax: Are Income and Consumption Taxes Equivalent? By Hirofumi Kurokawa; Tomoharu Mori; Fumio Ohtake
  15. A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework By Grégory Claeys; Zsolt Darvas; Alvaro Leandro
  16. Beyond the austerity dispute: new priorities for fiscal policy By Luca Agnello; Nikola Altiparmakov; Michal Andrle; Maria Grazia Attinasi; Jan Babecký; Salvador Barrios; John Bluedorn; Vladimir Borgy; Othman Bouabdallah; Andries Brandsma; Adi Brender; Vítor Castro; Cristina Checherita-Westphal; Jérôme Creel; Jasper De Jong; Luiz de Mello; Francesco Di Comite; Olga Diukanova; Luc Eyraud; Serena Fatica; Marien Ferdinandusse; Davide Fiaschi; Maura Francese; Maximilian Freier; Josip Funda; Davide Furceri; Paul Hubert; Anna Iara; João Tovar Jalles; d’Artis Kancs; Tidiane Kinda; Gábor P. Kiss; Petya Koeva-Brooks; Martin Larch; Jesús López Rodríguez; Prakash Loungani; Sandro Momigliano; Carlos Mulas-Granados; Ludovít Ódor; George Palaiodimos; Lucio Pench; Damiaan Persyn; Álvaro Pina; Lesley Potters; Doris Prammer; Jonathan Pycroft; Ernesto Rezk; Marzia Romanelli; Fabrizio Saccomanni; Francesco Saraceno; Gerd Schwartz; Ricardo Sousa; Martino Tasso; Teresa Ter-Minassian; Pietro Tommasino; Anke Weber; Jochen Zimmer
  17. The Market for Paid Sick Leave By Markussen, Simen; Røed, Knut
  18. The distributive effects of work-family life policies in European welfare states By Tine Hufkens; Gerlinde Verbist

  1. By: Elinder, Mikael; Erixson, Oscar; Waldenström, Daniel
    Abstract: We use new population-wide register data on inheritances and wealth in Sweden to estimate the causal impact of inheritances on wealth inequality. We find that inheritances reduce relative wealth inequality (e.g., the Gini coefficient falls by 5-10 percent) but that absolute dispersion increases. Examining different parts of the wealth distribution, we find that the top decile's wealth share decreases substantially, whereas the wealth share of the bottom half increases from a negative to a positive share. In essence, wealthier heirs inherit larger amounts, but less wealthy heirs inherit more relative to their pre-inheritance wealth. We also find that post-inheritance behavioral adjustments mitigate the equalizing effect of inheritances because less wealthy heirs consume larger shares of their inheritances. Moreover, we find that the Swedish inheritance tax reduced the equalizing inheritance effect but that the redistribution of tax revenues could reverse this result. Finally, we show that inheritances increase wealth mobility.
    Keywords: bequests; estates; inheritance taxation; net worth; wealth distribution
    JEL: D63 E21 H24
    Date: 2016–03
  2. By: Feld, Lars P.; Ruf, Martin; Schreiber, Ulrich; Todtenhaupt, Maximilian; Voget, Johannes
    Abstract: Taxing capital gains is an important obstacle to the efficient allocation of resources because it imposes a transaction cost on the vendor which locks in appreciated assets by raising the vendor's reservation price in prospective transactions. For M&As, this effect has been intensively studied with regard to share-holder taxation, whereas empirical evidence on the effect of capital gains taxes paid by corporations is scarce. This paper analyzes how corporate level taxation of capital gains affects inter-corporate M&As. Studying several substantial tax reforms in a panel of 30 countries for the period of 2002-2013, we identify a significant lock-in effect. Results from estimating a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) model suggest that a one percentage point decrease in the corporate capital gains tax rate would raise both the number and the total deal value of acquisitions by about 1.1% per year. We use this result to estimate an efficiency loss resulting from corporate capital gains taxation of 3.06 bn USD per year in the United States.
    Keywords: corporate taxation,M&A,capital gains tax,lock-in effect
    JEL: H25 G34
    Date: 2016
  3. By: Alan J. Auerbach; Laurence J. Kotlikoff; Darryl R. Koehler
    Abstract: This study combines the 2013 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances data and the Fiscal Analyzer, a highly detailed life-cycle consumption-smoothing program, to a) measure ultimate economic inequality – inequality in lifetime spending power – within cohorts, b) assess fiscal progressivity within cohorts, c) calculate marginal remaining lifetime net tax rates, taking into account all major federal and state tax and transfer policies, d) evaluate the ability of current income to correctly classify households as rich, middle class, and poor, e) determine whether current-year average net tax rates accurately capture actual fiscal progressivity, and f) determine whether current-year marginal tax rates on labor supply accurately capture actual remaining lifetime marginal net tax rates. We find far less inequality in spending power than in wealth or labor earnings due to the fiscal system’s high degree of progressivity. But U.S. fiscal redistribution generally comes with very high work disincentives for households of all ages, regardless of income class. There is, however, substantial dispersion in marginal net tax rates, which seems hard to reconcile with standard norms of optimal taxation. We also find that current income is a very poor proxy for remaining lifetime resources and that current-year net tax rates can provide a highly distorted picture of true fiscal progressivity and work disincentives.
    JEL: A0 D31 D63 D91 E25 E62 H20 H21 H22 H55
    Date: 2016–02
  4. By: Ramboll Management Consulting and Corit Advisory
    Abstract: As a response to the increasing sophistication of tax planners in identifying and exploiting the legal arbitrage opportunities and the boundaries of acceptable tax planning, policy makers across OECD, G20 and EU countries have taken steps to ensure that taxation duly takes place where economic value is generated and where the economic activity is actually carried out. In this context, the European Commission sees a strong need to obtain increased knowledge of the tax laws and practices of Member States of the European Union, which may expose particular jurisdictions to aggressive tax planning (ATP). The present study was commissioned with the aim to: 1. Identify model ATP structures; 2. Identify ATP indicators which facilitate or allow ATP; 3. Review the corporate income tax systems of the EU Member States by means of the ATP indicators, in order to identify those tax rules and practices (or lack thereof) that result in Member States being vulnerable to ATP. This study was carried out by Ramboll and Corit Advisory with the support of a network of independent national tax experts. It reviews and assesses the corporate income tax systems of all EU Member States. It identifies weaknesses of the national tax systems in the EU and sets the ground for additional analysis and new policy initiatives
    Keywords: European Union, corporate income tax, BEPS, agressive tax planning, ACE, CCCTB
    JEL: G30 H21 H26
    Date: 2016–01
  5. By: Leon Bettendorf; Arjan Lejour; Maarten van 't Riet
    Abstract: In the Netherlands owners of small corporations face taxation of corporate, labour and capital income. Taxation of the latter may be deferred. We study their options for income shifting using bunching techniques. Based on individual tax records over the period 2007-2011 we report four main findings. The first is that the distribution of gross labour income strongly peaks at the legal 'minimum' level. Second, taxable labour income bunches at the cut-offs of the tax brackets. The elasticity of taxable income at the top tax cut-off ranges from 0.06 to 0.11. Third, we show that distributed profits strongly responded to the temporary tax cut from 25 to 22% in 2007, which doubled tax revenues on dividends. Fourth, using a Heckman selection model we find that the size of own equity has a positive effect on the probability of distributing profits and the size. We reconfirm the importance of intertemporal income shifting for business owners.
    JEL: E62 H24 H68
    Date: 2016–03
  6. By: Edoardo Di Porto (Università di Napoli Federico II, CSEF and UCFS, Uppsala University); Henry Ohlsson (Uppsala University and Sveriges Riksbank)
    Abstract: We document an episode with considerable tax avoidance that occurred in Italy after 2008 when the Italian government reformed the property taxation by abolishing taxation on principal residences and increasing taxation on secondary properties. In presence of a very low inter vivos gift tax, Italian families found it beneficial to redistribute properties among their members. Difference-in-difference estimates indicate that property tax reform increased the probability that high-wealth donors made an inter vivos property gift by 3 percentage points and the size transferred by 4 square meters relative to less wealthy donors. Our estimates allow us to compute (back of the envelope) the amount of tax avoidance due to inter vivos transfer. The amount is around 78 million euros, or 4 percent of the annual tax revenue from principal residences.
    Keywords: Tax avoidance, property taxes, inter vivos gifts
    JEL: H27 D31 D11
    Date: 2016–04–04
  7. By: Egebark, Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
    Abstract: I study the link between taxes and youth self-employment. I make use of a Swedish reform, implemented in 2007–09, which suddenly made the payroll tax and the self-employment tax vary by age. The results suggest that youth self-employment is insensitive to tax reductions, both in the short run and in the somewhat longer run. I also study the effect of the tax reductions on income. For those that are defined as self-employed, I find positive effects on income from self-employment, and negative effects on income from wage employment. This finding suggests that the lower taxes caused the self-employed to reallocate time from employment to self-employment.
    Keywords: Youth unemployment; Self-employment tax; Tax subsidy; Self-employment
    JEL: H25 H32 J23 J38 J68
    Date: 2016–03–10
  8. By: William Gbohoui (Sans nom); François Vaillancourt
    Abstract: To understand the role of subnational tax policies in explaining regional growth, we present stylized facts on U.S. state income and state-level tax policies. We use real Gross State Products (GSP) as the indicator of economic performance in contrast to the existing literature, which relies on Personal Income. The results reveal an increase in per capita income disparities, and time - persistent differences in human capital and physical capital between U.S. states. In addition, we find that subnational tax policies vary widely between states. Using augmented Barro regressions, we show that educational attainment, and state-level tax policies are the key determinants in explaining the differences between state-level economic growth. More precisely, higher corporate income or general sales taxes significantly retard economic growth, while human capital positively impacts state-level growth.
    Keywords: Regional growth, state and local taxation,
    JEL: H71 R11
    Date: 2016–03–29
  9. By: Andreas Thiemann
    Abstract: This paper examines how families adjust their private old-age savings in response to a change in individual pension wealth. The regression discontinuity approach exploits two expansions of the child care pension benefit, in 1992 and in 1999, as natural experiments. The empirical analysis is based on three waves of the Survey of Income and Expenditure (EVS): 1998, 2003 and 2008. All results indicate that families do not adjust their private old-age savings in response to the increase in their pension wealth. From a political point of view, this suggests that the increase in individual pension wealth does not crowd-out old-age private savings. Hence, child care pension benefits increase a mother's old-age income without causing negative savings effects.
    Keywords: Old-age savings, pension wealth, regression discontinuity design
    JEL: D14 E21 H55
    Date: 2016
  10. By: Ferrière, Axelle (European University Institute); Karantounias, Anastasios G. (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta)
    Abstract: How should public debt be managed when uncertainty about the business cycle is widespread and debt levels are high, as in the aftermath of the last financial crisis? This paper analyzes optimal fiscal policy with ambiguity aversion and endogenous government spending. We show that, without ambiguity, optimal surplus-to-output ratios are acyclical and that there is no rationale for either reduction or further accumulation of public debt. In contrast, ambiguity about the cycle can generate optimal policies that resemble "austerity" measures. Optimal policy prescribes front-loaded fiscal consolidations and convergence to a balanced primary budget in the long run. This is the case when interest rates are sufficiently responsive to cyclical shocks; that is, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low.
    Keywords: endogenous government expenditures; distortionary taxes; balanced budget; austerity; fiscal consolidation; martingale; ambiguity aversion; multiplier preferences
    JEL: D80 E62 H21 H63
    Date: 2016–03–01
  11. By: Callan, Tim; Colgan, Brian; Savage, Michael; Walsh, John R.
    Date: 2015–06
  12. By: Gabriel Burdín; Fernando Esponda; Andrea Vigorito
    Abstract: After increasing over more than a decade, recent studies based on household surveys data show that income inequality in Uruguay started to decline in 2008. In this study we assess whether this trend is robust to the use of novel micro-data from the recently restored Uruguayan personal income tax for the years 2009-2011. We analyze primary income and pensions and carry out to main comparative exercises. In the first part of the paper, we adjust household surveys to make them comparable to tax records. After that, we follow the methodology proposed by Atkinson et al (2011) and Alvaredo (2011) to compute top income shares and corrected inequality measures. We also investigate the redistributive effect of the personal income tax burden in the two data sets. Inequality indexes depict a similar trend in inequality reduction, even though the decrease is less sharp in tax records than in harmonized household surveys. According to our estimations from income tax data, the share of the top 1% did not decline in this period, and was situated around 14%. Household survey data underestimate the share of the top 1% in total income by approximately 3 p.p. and depict an opposite trend in the top shares evolution throughout the period compared to the one observed in income tax micro-data. This result might be revealing an increasing difficulty of ECH for capturing very high incomes. Finally, personal income tax in Uruguay redistributes roughly 2 p.p. of the Gini index. Effective tax rates exhibit a progressive pattern in the case of total income, labour income and pensions, whereas they are slightly regressive when considering capital income.
    Keywords: top incomes, income inequality, personal income taxation, Uruguay
    JEL: D31 H24 O54
    Date: 2014–05
  13. By: Heinemann, Friedrich; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel; Yeter, Mustafa
    Abstract: We implement a meta-regression-analysis for the budgetary impact of numerical fiscal rules. Based on 30 studies published in the last decade, we offer a consensus estimate with respect to the level of statistical significance, provide suggestive evidence for the effect size, and identify study features of relevance for the measured impact of fiscal rules. Overall, the results document a constraining impact of rules. However, this impact is weakened if refined identification strategies are employed. Moreover, the results provide evidence for a publication bias in which journals are more likely to report constraining and statistically significant effects compared to working papers. We further provide recommendations for future research on the budgetary impact of fiscal rules.
    Keywords: fiscal rules,meta-regression-analysis,public finances
    JEL: H50 H6 H63
    Date: 2016
  14. By: Hirofumi Kurokawa; Tomoharu Mori; Fumio Ohtake
    Abstract: We test the equivalence of income and consumption taxes through a choice experiment. Under a given set of income and consumption parameters, subjects were asked to choose among an income tax of 20%, a consumption tax of 25% (which is an equivalent tax burden), a consumption tax of 22%, and a consumption tax of 20%. Our results showed that subjects prefer income tax to consumption tax when the nominal consumption tax rate is higher than the nominal income tax rate. However, subjects tend to prefer consumption tax to income tax when the nominal tax rates are identical. Our result, that subjects prefer income tax to consumption tax despite a higher tax burden, implies the consumption tax miscalculation bias. The consumption tax miscalculation bias is one where subjects miscalculate the amount of consumption tax as if it is declared by tax inclusive, as in the case of income tax, despite consumption tax being tax exclusive. If the income tax burden is equivalent to the consumption tax burden, subjects prefer income tax. This result implies that income and consumption taxes are not equivalent due to the consumption tax miscalculation bias.
    Date: 2016–03
  15. By: Grégory Claeys; Zsolt Darvas; Alvaro Leandro
    Abstract: Highlights • Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives - public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts,leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and tointroduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.
    Date: 2016–03
  16. By: Luca Agnello (University of Palermo); Nikola Altiparmakov (Fiscal Council - Republic of Serbia); Michal Andrle (International Monetary Fund); Maria Grazia Attinasi (European Central Bank); Jan Babecký (Czech National Bank); Salvador Barrios (European Commission); John Bluedorn (International Monetary Fund); Vladimir Borgy (Banque de France); Othman Bouabdallah (European Central Bank); Andries Brandsma (European Commission); Adi Brender (Bank of Israel); Vítor Castro (University of Coimbra and University of Minho); Cristina Checherita-Westphal (European Central Bank); Jérôme Creel (OFCE-Sciences Po); Jasper De Jong (De Nederlandsche Bank); Luiz de Mello (OECD); Francesco Di Comite (European Commission); Olga Diukanova (European Commission); Luc Eyraud (International Monetary Fund); Serena Fatica (European Commission); Marien Ferdinandusse (European Central Bank); Davide Fiaschi (University of Pisa); Maura Francese (International Monetary Fund); Maximilian Freier (European Central Bank); Josip Funda (Hrvatska Narodna Banka); Davide Furceri (International Monetary Fund); Paul Hubert (OFCE-Sciences Po); Anna Iara (European Commission); João Tovar Jalles (OECD); d’Artis Kancs (European Commission); Tidiane Kinda (International Monetary Fund); Gábor P. Kiss (Magyar Nemzeti Bank)); Petya Koeva-Brooks (International Monetary Fund); Martin Larch (European Commission); Jesús López Rodríguez (European Commission); Prakash Loungani (International Monetary Fund); Sandro Momigliano (Banca d'Italia); Carlos Mulas-Granados (International Monetary Fund); Ludovít Ódor (Council for Budget Responsibility, Bratislava); George Palaiodimos (Bank of Greece); Lucio Pench (European Commission); Damiaan Persyn (European Commission); Álvaro Pina (OECD); Lesley Potters (European Commission); Doris Prammer (Bank of Austria); Jonathan Pycroft (European Commission); Ernesto Rezk (National University of Córdoba, Argentina); Marzia Romanelli (Banca d'Italia); Fabrizio Saccomanni (Ministry of Finance, Italy); Francesco Saraceno (OFCE-Sciences Po); Gerd Schwartz (International Monetary Fund); Ricardo Sousa (University of Minho); Martino Tasso (Bank of Italy); Teresa Ter-Minassian (Inter-American Development Bank); Pietro Tommasino (Banca d'Italia); Anke Weber (International Monetary Fund); Jochen Zimmer (Deutsche Bundesbank)
    Abstract: The workshop aimed at moving forward the fiscal policy debate, which in the crisis years was unavoidably focused on how to regain fiscal credibility and to implement sizable and fast consolidation plans. Four main themes have been proposed for the debate during the workshop. First, the two-way link between fiscal consolidation and inequality, with the idea that consolidation efforts cannot be successful in the long run if they entail a socially unsustainable increase in inequality. Second, the importance of preserving, even in contexts in which the fiscal policy stance is necessarily restrictive, growth-enhancing public investments. Third, the challenges posed to fiscal management by a low inflation context, taking into account that a subdued price dynamics not only makes the real burden of debt heavier, but it also has subtle effects, at least in the short term, on several budgetary items. Finally, the need for a simpler and more appropriate set of rules for the governance of the EMU. The latter topic was also the object of the high-level panel at the end of the workshop. While differences in emphasis emerged among the panellists, they agreed that the current framework could be streamlined, and – more importantly – that no set of rules can work if trust and a sense of sharing a common objective is not rebuilt among the Member States.
    Keywords: Gini index, fiscal consolidation, fiscal expansion, narrative approach, cyclically-adjusted primary balance, expenditure-based, tax-based, recession, inequality, distribution, factor income distribution, wage share, measure of individual welfare, non-parametric methods, polarization, distribution dynamics, inequality, income inequality, fiscal stimuli, political (in)stability, wealth distribution, wealth taxation, capital income taxation, household data, public investment, private investment, elasticity, production function, RHOMOLO, multiregional spatial CGE, cohesion policy, fiscal policy, inflation shock, spending indexation, fiscal drag, debt sustainability, mandatory pensions, pension contribution, tax incidence, rational behavior, smoothing lifetime income, fiscal framework, fiscal indicators, cyclical adjustment, fiscal council, fiscal governance, fiscal policy, fiscal rules, european economic and monetary union
    JEL: D9 D63 D31 D33 C14 D30 D31 D63 E6 E31 E32 E62 E64 H2 H5 H23 H24 H54 H55 H60 H62 H63 H68 H77 G01 G15 J3 J32 J58 K31 O5 O32 R13 R58
    Date: 2016–03
  17. By: Markussen, Simen (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research); Røed, Knut (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)
    Abstract: In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients' insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services.
    Keywords: absenteeism, gatekeeping, competition, role-conflicts
    JEL: H55 I11 I18
    Date: 2016–03
  18. By: Tine Hufkens; Gerlinde Verbist
    Abstract: An aspect that has only recently received attention in the study of policy measures aimed at supporting families with young children in their work-family life balance is its distributive impact. Are these measures used by poor and rich families alike, or is there a ‘Matthew effect’ at play, in the sense that poor families are underrepresented in using such measures? In order to perform such an evaluation one needs to have a measure of both cash and in-kind benefits related to policies that help families cope with the care of young children and job expectations. In-kind benefits are offered mainly in the form of subsidized early childhood education and care (ECEC), for which an appropriate cash equivalent has to be derived. As the value of in-kind benefits from publicly provided services is not included in the EU-SILC data, we derive them for this paper in line with earlier studies (e.g. Matsaganis and Verbist, 2009; Vaalavuo, 2011; Förster and Verbist, 2012; Van Lancker, 2014; Van Lancker and Ghysels, 2014). In comparison to these earlier studies, however, our analysis is much more fine-grained as we use the microsimulation model EUROMOD to include more precise estimates of parental fees and related tax-benefit policies; thus, we will have a better estimate of the net in-kind benefit households derive from ECEC services. We focus on policy measures going to children under compulsory schooling age for a selection of seven EU-countries. These improved estimates allow us to analyze the work-family polices from three perspectives: 1) how do the distributive characteristics of cash and in-kind benefits compare to one another in this domain?; 2) how do countries compare to one another in their policy perspective in terms of supporting outsourcing or home-based care for young children?; 3) what is the balance between private and public efforts for outsourced childcare across countries? Our results show that including net fees in the analysis attenuates the Matthew effect, in the sense that net fees are relatively more heavy for richer households than for the poor. There is, however, considerable cross-country variation.
    Keywords: Family policy, child care, in-kind benefits, income distribution, microsimulation
    JEL: H23 I38 J13 C53

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