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on Public Economics |
| By: | Etienne Lehmann (CREST); François Marical (INSEE); Laurence Rioux (CREST(INSEE)) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the responses of gross labor income with respect to marginal and average net-of-tax rates in France over the period 2003-2006. We exploit a series of reforms to the income-tax and payroll-tax schedules affecting individuals who earn less than twice the minimum wage. Our estimate for the elasticity of gross labor income with respect to the marginal net-of-income-tax rate is around 0.2, while we find no response to the marginal net-of-payroll-tax rate. The elasticity with respect to the average net-of-tax rate is not significant for the income-tax schedule, while it is close to -1 for the payroll-tax schedule. A plausible explanation is the existence of significant labor supply responses to the income-tax schedule, combined with sticky posted wages (i.e., the gross labor income minus payroll taxes divided by hours worked). Finally, the effect of the net-of-income-tax rate seems to be driven by participation decisions, in particular those of married women. |
| Keywords: | Labor income, Payroll tax, Income tax |
| JEL: | H24 H31 J22 J38 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpaper:2012-24&r=pbe |
| By: | Ebeke, C.; Ehrhart, H. |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the sources and consequences of the instability of tax revenue in Sub-Saharan African countries. We took advantage of a unique and extraordinarily rich dataset on the composition of tax revenues for a large number of countries. Using panel data for 37 countries observed over the period 1980-2005, our results are twofold. First, the instability of government tax revenue leads to the instability of both public investment and government consumption, and also reduces the level of public investment. Second, the reliance on domestic indirect taxation-based systems appears to have a robust stabilising effect. |
| Keywords: | Tax instability; tax composition; public spending; Sub-Saharan Africa. |
| JEL: | H20 E32 O11 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:418&r=pbe |
| By: | Randjelovic, Sasa |
| Abstract: | Due to limited access to foreign savings after the 2008 crisis, transition economies are forced to rely more on domestic savings in financing their growth. In that respect, it is often argued that the government should use tax policy to encourage domestic savings. Since the personal income tax reform is a burning issue in Serbia, the aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the expected effects of each of the three income tax reform scenarios (flat, dual and comprehensive income tax scheme) on personal savings in Serbia, by taking into account both capital income tax effects and labour income tax effects. Taylors theoretical model suggests that the personal saving is a function of personal income and the rate of return to savings. This is one of the seminal papers, in which the savings effects of tax policy reform are empirically estimated for a transition economy by taking into account both transmission channels. By combining Engle-Granger cointegration methods based on monthly macro data from 2004 to 2009, with the tax-benefit microsimulation model based on cross section micro data for 2007, it has been estimated that changes of capital income tax rate effects prevail over the effects of labour income tax changes, in terms of savings response. The results suggest that introduction of dual income tax in Serbia would boost personal savings in the long run, by 0.20%, while the flat tax and comprehensive income tax would lead to its decline by 2.15% and 3.64% respectively. |
| Date: | 2013–01–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ese:emodwp:em1-13&r=pbe |
| By: | Cristina Bodea; Adrienne LeBas |
| Abstract: | How do social contracts come into being? This paper argues that norm adoption plays an important and neglected role in this process. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, we examine why individuals adopt norms favoring a citizen obligation to pay tax where state enforcement is weak. We find that public goods delivery by the state produces the willingness to pay tax, but community characteristics also have a strong and independent effect on both social contract norms and actual tax payment. Individuals are less likely to adopt pro-tax norms if they have access to community provision of security and other services. In conflict-prone communities, where “self-help” provision of club goods is less effective, individuals are more likely to adopt social contract norms. Finally, we show that social contract norms substantially boost tax payment. This paper has broad implications for literatures on state formation, taxation, clientelism, and public goods provision. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2013/02&r=pbe |
| By: | Callan Tim; Savage Michael |
| Keywords: | taxes/Ireland/Comparative/qec |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:rn2012/4/1&r=pbe |
| By: | Ehrhart, H. |
| Abstract: | This article analyses the impact of the electoral calendar on the composition of tax revenue (direct versus indirect taxes). It thus represents an extension of traditional political budget-cycle analyses assessing the impact of elections on overall revenue. Panel data from 56 developing countries over the 1980-2006 period reveals a clear pattern of electorally-related policy interventions. Taking the potential endogeneity of election timing into account, we find robust evidence of lower indirect taxes being applied by incumbent governments in the period just prior to an election. Indirect tax revenue in election years is estimated to be 0.3 GDP percentage points lower than in other years, corresponding to a fall of about 3.4% of the average figure in the sample countries, while there is no such relationship with direct tax revenue. |
| Keywords: | Political budget cycles, Elections, Taxation, Developing countries. |
| JEL: | D72 E62 O10 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:419&r=pbe |
| By: | Mike Brewer (Institute for Fiscal Studies and ISER, Essex University); Monica Costa Dias (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Institute for Fiscal Studies); Jonathan Shaw (Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we look at lifetime inequality to address two main questions: How well does a modern tax system, based on annual information, target lifetime inequality? What aspects of the tranfser system are most progressive from a lifetime perspective? To answer to these questions it is crucial to relate lifetime and annual inequality and determine the main building blocks of lifetime disparities. We look at lifetime inequality and the redistribution properties of taxes and benefits using a dynamic life-cycle model of women's education, labour supply and savings with family dynamics and rich individual heterogeneity in preferences and productivity. The model is coupled with a detailed description of the UK personal tax and benefit system and is estimated on UK longitudinal data covering the 1990s and early 2000s. We show that the tax and benefits system is more redistributive from an annual than from a lifetime perspective, and it most progressive at the bottom of the income distribution in both cases. We then establish that heterogeneity in family experiences throughout adult life is the main vehicle through which the tax and benefits system moderates lifetime inequality. Although transitory, family conditions under which working is especially costly, such as lone-motherhood, are escpecially prevalent among the lifetime poor. By targeting this group, particularly using policies specifically designed to improve the work incentives of those with the lowest earnings capacity, the tax and benefits system does achieve life-cycle redistribution. Other policies like universal benefits towards family with children are less well targeted towards the lifetime poor but are more progressive and improve the work incentives in the middle 60% of the distribution of lifetime income. |
| Keywords: | female laboursupply, life-cycle, inequality, redistribution, taxes |
| JEL: | H23 H24 I24 I38 J22 J24 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:12/23&r=pbe |
| By: | Ugo Panizza (UNCTAD and The Graduate Institute, Geneva); Andrea Filippo Presbitero (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, MoFiR) |
| Abstract: | This paper surveys the recent literature on the links between public debt and economic growth in advanced economies. We find that theoretical models yield ambiguous results. Whether high levels of public debt have a negative effect on long-run growth is thus an empirical question. While many papers have found a negative correlation between debt and growth, our reading of the empirical literature is that there is no paper that can make a strong case for a causal relationship going from debt to economic growth. We also find that the presence of thresholds and, more in general, of a non-monotone relationship between debt and growth is not robust to small changes in data coverage and empirical techniques. We conclude with a discussion of the challenges involved in measuring and defining public debt and some suggestions for future research which, in our view, should emphasize cross-country heterogeneity. |
| Keywords: | Government Debt, Growth, OECD countries |
| JEL: | F33 F34 F35 O11 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:78&r=pbe |
| By: | Jing Wu; Yongheng Deng; Jun Huang; Randall Morck; Bernard Yeung |
| Abstract: | In generating fast economic growth, China is also generating growing concern about its environmental record. Using 2000-2009 data, we find that, while spending on environmental infrastructure has visible positive environmental impact, city spending is strongly tilted towards transportation infrastructure. Investment in transportation infrastructure correlates strongly with both real GDP growth, a measure of tangible economic growth relevant to city-level Party and government cadres’ promotion odds, and with land prices, which affect city governments’ revenues from land lease sales. In contrast, city governments’ spending on environmental improvements is at best uncorrelated with cadres’ promotion odds, and is uncorrelated with local GDP growth and land prices. These findings suggest that, were environmental quality explicitly linked to a cadre’s chance of promotion, or were environmental quality to affect land prices substantially, city-level public investment in environmental improvement would rise. |
| JEL: | G0 H54 P2 P26 Q56 Q58 R11 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18754&r=pbe |
| By: | Wojciech Kopczuk |
| Abstract: | I consider nonlinear taxation of income and bequests with a joy-of-giving bequest motive and explicitly characterize the estate tax rate structure that maximizes social planner's welfare function. The solution trades off correction of externality from giving and discouraging effort of children due to income effect generated by bequests. The analysis shows that optimality of a positive tax on bequests in this context rests on the strength of the effect of bequests on behavior of future generations, and suggests that inheritance rather than estate tax is better suited to implement the corresponding policy. |
| JEL: | E21 H2 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18747&r=pbe |
| By: | Mike Brewer (Institute for Fiscal Studies and ISER, Essex University); Monica Costa Dias (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Institute for Fiscal Studies); Jonathan Shaw (Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | Personal taxes and benefits affect the incentive to work over the lifecycle by altering income-age profiles, insuring against adverse shocks, and changing the returns to human capital. Previous work investigating the impact of taxes and benefits on work incentives has tended to ignore these dynamic considerations. In this paper, we use a dynamic model to show how a lifecycle perspective alters our impression of the effect of the tax and benefit system on female work incentives. We describe how work incentives change over the life and show how they depend on lifecycle circumstances. We also devise a forward-looking measure of work incentives that incorporates all the dynamic considerations likely to affect work decisions at any given age. We find that individuals experience considerable variability in work incentives across life that outweighs the variability across individuals. Changes pattern of family types across life is key to explaining these patterns: work incentives vary dramatically depending on family composition, and most women experience a number of different family types during the course of their lives. We also find that differences in family type are an important explanation for why static and forwardlooking PTRs diverge, though this is more to do with differences in how women in families with different compositions behave. |
| Keywords: | female labour supply, lifecycle, work incentives, taxes |
| JEL: | H24 I24 I38 J22 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:13/01&r=pbe |
| By: | Nishimura, Junichi; Okamuro, Hiroyuki |
| Abstract: | R&D consortia (collaborative R&D projects among private firms, universities, and public research institutes) have been attracting increasing attention as an effective means of promoting innovation. Especially for SMEs, such collaboration provides important opportunities to access and obtain advanced scientific knowledge generated by universities and public research institutes. It is expected that not only the participants in R&D consortia will enhance their performance, through direct knowledge spillovers, but also that the business partners of consortia members may enjoy indirect effects (rent spillovers), through their business transactions. This paper empirically examines the spillover effects through government-sponsored R&D consortia using firm-level data and the propensity score method. Focusing on a major support program for R&D consortia in Japan, the “Consortium R&D Project for Regional Revitalization” by METI, we confirm that there are both direct (knowledge) spillover effects from firms’ participation in this program and indirect (rent) spillover effects on the customer firms of the consortia members. Moreover, by comparing SMEs and large firms, we find that only SMEs obtain knowledge spillovers in R&D consortia, whereas, among their customers, only large firms enjoy rent spillovers. |
| Keywords: | R&D consortia, business transaction, knowledge spillover, rent spillover, SME, policy evaluation |
| JEL: | H25 L53 O32 O38 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:cinwps:24&r=pbe |
| By: | David Heres; Steffen Kallbekken; Ibon Galarraga |
| Abstract: | The potential of taxation to correcting environmental externalities has been long recognized among economists. Yet, this welfare-enhancing policy commonly faces strong opposition by citizens. Conversely, externality-correcting subsidies frequently enjoy high levels of public acceptance. We conduct a lab experiment to explore public support for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. In an experimental market with a negative externality, participants vote on the introduction of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies under full or partial information concerning how the tax revenues will be spent and the subsidy paid for. Theoretically the two instruments should produce identical outcomes. We find substantially greater support for subsidies than taxes. This can partially be explained by the expectation that the subsidy will increase payoffs more than a tax, but not because it could be more effective in changing behavior. Furthermore, we find that under partial information, the preference for subsidies is even stronger. |
| Keywords: | Pigouvian taxes; subsidies; lab experiment; public policy; revenues; effectiveness |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcc:wpaper:2013-04&r=pbe |
| By: | Timothy Besley; Torsten Persson |
| JEL: | H11 H20 O17 O43 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieop:41&r=pbe |
| By: | Ibon Galarraga; Luis M. Abadie; Alberto Ansuategi |
| Abstract: | Energy labels are used to promote the purchase of efficient appliances. Many countries in Europe use subsidies (namely energy efficiency rebates) to support these purchases as it is the case of Spain. A figure ranging from 50 to 105€ subsidy has been granted in the past for the acquisition of the most efficient appliances. This paper first analyses the impact of a 80€ subsidy on the dishwasher market and compares the results with a 40 € tax for non-labelled ones. The results take into account the effects that the policies generate in the market segment that is a close substitute, that is, cross effects. The paper shows that the subsidy is expensive for the Government, generates some welfare losses and it also generates a rebound effect as a consequence of the increase in the total number of appliances sold. The 40 € tax does not cost money to the Government, it generates a lower welfare loss and reduces the energy bill. However, the analysis is extended to go beyond the two extreme scenarios: subsidies without taxes and taxes without subsidies. Different combinations of both instruments are suggested and they are assessed based on their performance regarding economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness and political feasibility. |
| Keywords: | Energy efficiency rebates, deadweight losses, rebound effect |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcc:wpaper:2013-05&r=pbe |
| By: | Monica Martinez-Bravo (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros) |
| Abstract: | New democracies experience greater electoral fraud and more clientelistic spending than established democracies. This paper shows that the body of appointed local officials that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime is a key determinant of the extent of these practices. With a unique dataset from the first post-Soeharto election in Indonesia, I show that the alignment of electoral results between village and district levels is considerably stronger for villages with appointed village heads than for those with elected village heads. I present a model that provides an intuitive interpretation of these results: Appointed officials have stronger incentives to influence voters because of their political career concerns. |
| Keywords: | Institutions, local elections, clientelism, new democracies. |
| JEL: | D72 P16 O12 O17 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2013_1302&r=pbe |
| By: | Andreas Chai; Wolfhard Kaus |
| Abstract: | We empirically evaluate two competing explanations about how the dispersion of income within social groups affects household spending on visible goods. Using South African household expenditure data, we find evidence that precisely the reverse of the effect predicted by Charles et al. (2009) takes place in that rich households tend to reduce, rather than increase, spending on visible goods as the dispersion of social group income increases. Our results instead support rank-based models of status competition since the number of within-group peers who possess a similar income level is found to be positively correlated with household spending on visible goods. Moreover, we find that the effect of this 'local' density tends to be stronger in the tail regions of the distribution and performs better than other proxies for the overall income distribution used in recent studies. How the range of visible goods used to signal wealth expands as household income grows is also explored. |
| Keywords: | Conspicuous consumption, Signaling, Status, South Africa, Income distribution |
| JEL: | D12 D83 J15 O12 |
| Date: | 2013–01–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2012-18&r=pbe |
| By: | Engin Kara; Jasmin Sin |
| Abstract: | Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that accounts for credit constraints, we study the effects of fiscal stimulus on the macroeconomy. We show that the presence of credit constraints results in larger fiscal multipliers than indicated by the standard DSGE models. If credit-crunch conditions persist, the multipliers become large enough for fiscal policy to be highly effective. |
| Keywords: | DSGE models, Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Liquidity Trap, Credit constraints |
| JEL: | E32 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:uobdis:12/634&r=pbe |
| By: | Conefrey, Thomas; FitzGerald, John; Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura; Tol, Richard S. J. |
| Keywords: | taxes |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:rb2012/4/2&r=pbe |