nep-pbe New Economics Papers
on Public Economics
Issue of 2012‒02‒08
seven papers chosen by
Keunjae Lee
Pusan National University

  1. Strategic tax and public service competition among local governments By Lauridsen, Jørgen; Nannerup, Niels; Skak, Morten
  2. Fiscal Multipliers over the Business Cycle By Pascal Michaillat
  3. Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment By Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas
  4. Analyse du capital humain : diagnostic des dépenses d'éducation au Sénégal By Youssouph Ba
  5. Is Public-Private Partnership Obsolete? By Claude Ménard
  6. GINI DP 20: Does Income Inequality Negatively Affect General Trust? Examining three potential problems with the inequality-trust hypothesis By Sander Steijn; Bram Lancee
  7. Foreign direct investment in provinces: A spatial regression approach to FDI in Vietnam By Esiyok, Bulent; Ugur, Mehmet

  1. By: Lauridsen, Jørgen (Department of Business and Economics); Nannerup, Niels (Department of Business and Economics); Skak, Morten (Department of Business and Economics)
    Abstract: Tax and public service competition between local governments concerning localisation of new residents is analysed in a setting of economic spillovers which means that also a neighbouring region will benefit from localisation via demand of residents in a border region, (a so-called host region). We identify two basic Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the analysed tax-game. In one of these outcomes local tax rates will be different across the regions – a fact that appears important for (future) empirical studies of local tax competition. Due to the lack of adequate theoretical modelling, studies in this field have often demonstrated spatial dependence of local policy variables without identifying the source of interaction between decision-makers. Our theoretical findings prove to be robust to a range of important expansions of the basic simple framework.
    Keywords: Local tax competition; household locational choice; spillover effects; Nash-equilibria
    JEL: H21 H31 H71
    Date: 2011–12–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2011_009&r=pbe
  2. By: Pascal Michaillat
    Abstract: This paper illustrates why fiscal policy becomes more effective as unemployment rises in recessions. The theory is based on the equilibrium unemployment model of Michaillat (forthcoming), in which jobs are rationed in recessions. Fiscal policy takes the form of government spending on public-sector jobs. Recessions are periods of acute job shortage without much competition for workers among recruiting firms; hiring in the public sector does not crowd out hiring in the private sector much; therefore fiscal policy reduces unemployment effectively. Formally the fiscal multiplier—the reduction in unemployment rate achieved by spending one dollar on public-sector jobs—is countercyclical. An implication is that available estimates of the fiscal multiplier, which measure the average effect of fiscal policy over the business cycle, do not apply in recessions because the multiplier is much higher in recessions than on average.
    Keywords: Fiscal multiplier, unemployment, business cycle, job rationing, matching frictions
    JEL: E24 E32 E62 J64
    Date: 2012–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1115&r=pbe
  3. By: Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas
    Abstract: We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In each period, a legislature with presentatives of each of n districts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and transfers to each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes required for passage. We show that the efficiency of the public policy is increasing in q because higher q leads to higher investment in the public good and less pork. We examine the theoretical equilibrium predictions by conducting a laboratory experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and dictatorship (q=1). --
    Keywords: dynamic political economy,voting,public goods,bargaining,experiments
    JEL: D71 D72 C78 C92 H41 H54
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2011205&r=pbe
  4. By: Youssouph Ba (USTV UFR SEG - Université Sud-Toulon-Var - UFR Sciences économiques et de gestion - Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Le but de notre travail consistait dans un premier temps à revisiter les soubassements théoriques du capital humain et savoir si l'augmentation du capital humain a un effet ponctuel sur la croissance économique (aussi bien dans la sphère des pays industrialisés que dans celle des pays en développement). Dans un second temps, il consistait à mesurer la politique du Sénégal en terme de capital humain : mesurer les efforts de financement de l'éducation d'une part et d'autre part, voir si ces efforts financiers aboutissent à des résultats probants en termes d'insertion économique et productive, de réduction des inégalités et de lutte efficace et durable contre la pauvreté.
    Keywords: capital humain, croissance économique, emploi, insertion productive, dépenses d'éducation, pauvreté, Sénégal, réduction des inégalités
    Date: 2011–09–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00662055&r=pbe
  5. By: Claude Ménard (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne)
    Abstract: Public-Private Partnership has been high on the agenda of public decision makers since the 1990's. Primarily a contractual approach to the delivery of infrastructures, goods and services traditionally provided by the public sector or by private operators submitted to tight regulation, PPP is also a very special contractual practice as it seeks to introduce market-type relationships in a context in which non-market forces play a major role. An important consequence is the overlapping of decision rights as well as property rights, which exposes PPP to a double alignment problem, organizational and institutional. Away from the ideological controversies about the legitimacy of PPP in provisioning public goods, this chapter focuses on problems rooted in the very nature of PPPs and the actual design of their supportive contracts, as well as in the institutions in which they are embedded and that define the capacity to implement and monitor these arrangements properly.
    Keywords: Public-Private Partnership; transaction costs; organization; infrastructures; misalignment
    Date: 2011–10–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00653090&r=pbe
  6. By: Sander Steijn (AISSR, University of Amsterdam); Bram Lancee (AIAS, Universiteit van Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Many studies on the consequences of income inequality find that where inequality is high, trust is low. There are, however, reasons to examine the relation between inequality and trust more closely. First, previous research does not differentiate between the effect of income inequality and that of national wealth. Furthermore, the underlying mechanism is often unclear. Finally, the association might be dependent on non-Western countries where income inequality is extremely high. In this paper, we evaluate whether there is a relation between income inequality and trust in a sample of Western developed economies when taking into account national wealth. Theoretically, we distinguish between stratification effects and perception effects of inequality. Empirically, besides actual income inequality and national wealth, we include a measurement of perceived inequality on the basis of individual level earnings estimations for stereotypical jobs. We find no significant effect of inequality on trust when taking into account national wealth, suggesting that in Western countries the amount of resources rather than its distribution explains trust. Key words: trust, income inequality, perceived inequality, national wealth, comparative research.
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:dp20&r=pbe
  7. By: Esiyok, Bulent; Ugur, Mehmet
    Abstract: Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Vietnam have increased significantly in recent years, with unequal distribution between provinces and regions. We aim to contribute to the literature on locational determinants of FDI by accounting for spatial interdependence between 62 Vietnamese provinces from 2006-2009. For this purpose, we estimate a spatial lag model using maximum likelihood estimation method. We report existence of spatial dependence between provinces as well as spatial spill-over effects. The results are robust to different specifications for weight matrices and inclusion of different explanatory variables and/or proxies. We also report that conventional determinants of FDI such as market size, domestic investment, openness to trade, labour cost, education and governance, etc. are significant and remain robust to inclusion of spatial interdependence. The sign of the spatial dependence suggests that the distribution of FDI between provinces is subject to conglomeration effects.
    Keywords: Foreign direct investment; spatial dependence; conglomeration; Vietnam
    JEL: R12 F21 C31
    Date: 2011–12–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:36145&r=pbe

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