|
on Public Economics |
| By: | Lefebvre Mathieu; Pestieau Pierre; Riedl Arno; Villeval Marie Claire (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and theNetherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a ‘registered’ income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an ‘unregistered’ income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Taxtreatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging. |
| Keywords: | public economics ; |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2011023&r=pbe |
| By: | Daria Burnes; David Neumark; Michelle J. White |
| Abstract: | We test the hypothesis that local government officials in jurisdictions that have higher local sales taxes are more likely to use fiscal zoning to encourage retailing. We find that total retail employment is not significantly affected by local sales tax rates, but employment in big box and anchor stores is higher significantly in jurisdictions with higher sales tax rates. This suggests that local officials in jurisdictions with higher sales taxes concentrate on attracting large stores and shopping centers. We also find that the effect of local sales taxes on big box and anchor store retail employment is larger in county interiors, where residents tend to be captive to local retailers. Finally, fiscal zoning has the opposite effect on manufacturing employment, suggesting that local officials’ efforts to attract shopping centers and large stores crowd out manufacturing. |
| JEL: | H71 J2 R52 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16932&r=pbe |
| By: | Jordi Caballé; Judith Panadés |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the busi- ness cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empiri- cally plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession. |
| Keywords: | Tax evasion, Technology shocks, Growth |
| JEL: | H23 H26 O41 |
| Date: | 2011–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aub:autbar:870.11&r=pbe |
| By: | Antonio Acconcia (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Giancarlo Corsetti (Cambridge University, EUI, Rome III and CEPR.); Saverio Simonelli (University of Naples "Federico II" and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the multiplier by relying on differences in spending in infrastructure across Italian provinces and an instrument identifying investment changes that are large and exogenous to local cyclical conditions. We derive our instrument from the Italia law mandating the interruption of public work on evidence of mafia infiltration of city councils. Our IV estimates on cross sectional data allow us to address common problems in time series analysis, such as the risk of estimating spuriously high multipliers because of endogeneity and reverse causation, or the risk of confounding the e¤ects of fiscal and monetary measures. While accounting for contemporaneous and lagged effects, and controlling for the direct impact of anti-ma.a measures on output, our results suggest a multiplier as high as 1.4 on impact, and 2 including dynamic effects. |
| Keywords: | Government Spending, Multiplier, Instrumental Variables |
| Date: | 2011–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:281&r=pbe |
| By: | Ligthart, J.E. (Tilburg University); Martin Suarez, R.M. |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4515325&r=pbe |
| By: | Dai, Meixing; Sidiropoulos, Moïse |
| Abstract: | In a Stackelberg equilibrium, central bank opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces the government to reduce taxes and public expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and output distortions. This effect could disappear or be dominated by the direct effect of opacity when the fiscal and monetary authorities play a Nash game. |
| Keywords: | Distortionary taxes; output distortions; central bank transparency (opacity); fiscal disciplining effect. |
| JEL: | E62 E58 E52 H30 E63 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:29843&r=pbe |