nep-pbe New Economics Papers
on Public Economics
Issue of 2011‒03‒19
six papers chosen by
Keunjae Lee
Pusan National University

  1. Decentralization of public-sector agricultural extension in India: The case of the district-level Agricultural Technology Management Agency (ATMA) By Glendenning, Claire J.; Babu, Suresh C
  2. The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China By Mu, Ren; Zhang, Xiaobo
  3. The Role of Housing Tax Provisions in the 2008 Financial Crisis By Thomas Hemmelgarn; Gaetan Nicodeme; Ernesto Zangari
  4. Fighting Multiple Tax Havens By May Elsayyad; Kai A. Konrad
  5. The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries By Michael Finus; Raoul Schneider; Pedro Pintassilgo
  6. Migration and capital accumulation: Evidence from rural Mexico By Vera Chiodi; Esteban Jaimovich; Gabriel Montes-Rojas

  1. By: Glendenning, Claire J.; Babu, Suresh C
    Keywords: agricultural extension reform, Decentralization, demand-driven, organizational capacity,
    Date: 2011
  2. By: Mu, Ren; Zhang, Xiaobo
    Keywords: appointed leader, election, Public goods,
    Date: 2011
  3. By: Thomas Hemmelgarn (European Commission); Gaetan Nicodeme (European Commission); Ernesto Zangari (Banca d'Italia)
    Abstract: The 2008 financial crisis is the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. It has been characterised by a housing bubble in a context of rapid credit expansion, high risk-taking and exacerbated financial leverage, ending into deleveraging and credit crunch when the bubble burst. This paper discusses the interactions between housing tax provisions and the financial crisis. In particular, it reviews the existing evidence on the links between capital gains taxation of houses, interest mortgage deductibility and characteristics of the crisis.
    Keywords: financial crisis, tax policy, housing, interest deductibility, capital gains
    JEL: E62 G21 H24 H31
    Date: 2011–03
  4. By: May Elsayyad; Kai A. Konrad
    Abstract: This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a "big bang" multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their "tax haven business" more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their "tax haven business". Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.
    Keywords: tax haven, harmful tax practices, bidding for haven inactivation
    JEL: F21 H26 H77 H87
    Date: 2011–01
  5. By: Michael Finus (Department of Economics, University of Exeter); Raoul Schneider (Department of Economics, Ulm University); Pedro Pintassilgo (Faculty of Economics, University of Algarve)
    Abstract: We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics on the incentive structure of impure public good provision. The degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration, the degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the design of international law and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. We construct a bioeconomic model, including the high seas and exclusive economic zones in order to study the incentives to form stable fully or partially cooperative agreements. We show that the spatial allocation of property rights is crucial for the success of cooperation as long as technical excludability is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show how economic and ecological factors influence the success of cooperation.
    Keywords: pure and impure public goods, technical and socially constructed nonexcludability, property rights, coalition formation, free-riding, bioeconomic model, shared fish stocks, regional fisheries management organizations.
    JEL: Q34 C72 H87 F53
    Date: 2011
  6. By: Vera Chiodi (J-PAL Europe - J-PAL Europe, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Esteban Jaimovich (Collegio Carlo Alberto - Collegio Carlo Alberto); Gabriel Montes-Rojas (Department of Economics - City University London - City University London)
    Abstract: This paper studies the link between migration, remittances and productive assets accumulation for a panel of poor rural households in Mexico over the period 1997- 2006. In a context of financial markets imperfections, migration may act as a substitute for imperfect credit and insurance provision (through remittances from migrants) and, thus, exert a positive effect on investment. However, it may well be the case that remittances are channelled towards increasing consumption and leisure goods. Exploiting within family variation and an instrumental variable strategy, we show that migration indeed accelerates productive assets accumulation. Moreover, when we look at the effect of migration on consumption of non-productive assets (durable goods), we find instead a negative effect. Our results then suggest that poor rural families resort to migration as a way to mitigate constraints that prevent them from investing in productive assets.
    Keywords: migration ; remittances ; capital accumulation ; rural poverty
    Date: 2011–03–09

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