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on Public Economics |
| By: | Osterloh, Steffen; Debus, Marc |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of political factors, mainly partisanship, on corporate taxes in the past 30 years - a period of intensifying competitive pressure in Europe. Extending the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model by decision-makers who have ideological preferences yields the hypothesis that left-wing leaders set higher corporate tax rates. In the empirical analysis, we introduce a sophisticated measure of ideology derived from content analysis of party manifestos into the literature dealing with partisan effects on tax policy. We can confirm our main hypothesis, but we also find evidence that this partisan effect declines in the course of time. Moreover, we are able to reveal that this effect is mainly driven by the legislatures' stance on welfare policies. Finally, we show that a higher degree of government fragmentation, as well as the leadership of a head of state with an educational background in law counteracts the general tendency to lower tax rates. -- |
| Keywords: | company taxation,tax competition,political ideology,partisan politics |
| JEL: | H25 H87 D78 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09078&r=pbe |
| By: | Claudio Parés (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción) |
| Abstract: | Political decentralization involves an incentive game in which the President and regional authorities have to share power to provide public goods. In such a game, it is never reasonable to allocate political power to appointed Governors. In fact, when formal authority goes to the President —i.e. under administrative decentralization—, the maximization of the expected public good provision lead to allocate no real authority to Governors. In other words, mere delegation does not exist because regional incentives are not high enough. On the other hand, if formal authority is given to regions —i.e. under democratic decentralization where regional authorities are elected—, Governors may receive some real authority if their incentives are high enough. Additionally, other results of the model say that communication between regions makes the President more accountable and may revert a decentral allocation made under no communication. Finally, asymmetric regions prefer different power allocations and power concerns lead national politicians to avoid proposing decentralizing reforms. |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cnc:wpaper:04-2009&r=pbe |
| By: | Dean Baker |
| Abstract: | Although the national debate on financial transactions taxes has just begun, there have been a wide range of responses arguing that the tax is either undesirable or unenforceable, or both. This paper presents a brief response to these criticisms. |
| Keywords: | taxes, speculation, transactions |
| JEL: | G G1 G18 G2 G24 G28 G3 G38 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:epo:papers:2010-01&r=pbe |
| By: | Matt Sherman; Nathan Lane |
| Abstract: | In the current recession, millions of Americans have lost their jobs. Unemployment has increased nationwide to levels not witnessed since the 1980s. This issue brief tallies more than 110,000 jobs that have been shed from state and local governments in the last two years and breaks them down by state (and metropolitan area where available). Without the stimulus passed in February of this year, there would have been many more layoffs at the the state and local level. |
| Keywords: | economic stimulus, fiscal stimulus, recession, ARRA, unemployment |
| JEL: | H H2 H25 H3 I I1 I18 E E2 E24 E6 E62 E64 |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:epo:papers:2009-32&r=pbe |
| By: | Dean Baker |
| Abstract: | The unemployment rate is expected to average 10.2 percent for 2010, 9.1 percent for 2011, and 7.3 percent for 2012. With this in mind, this Issue Brief describes a job sharing tax credit, designed to provide a quick and substantial boost to the economy. It would use tax dollars to pay firms to shorten the typical workweek, while keeping pay constant. This should cause employers to want to hire additional workers. A rough estimate of the impact of this tax credit is between 1.3 and 2.7 million jobs created. |
| Keywords: | economic stimulus, fiscal stimulus, ARRA, recession, paid time off, work-sharing, work sharing, work share |
| JEL: | H H2 H25 H3 I I1 I18 E E2 E24 E6 E62 E64 J J2 J22 J23 J3 J38 J6 J68 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:epo:papers:2009-39&r=pbe |
| By: | Xiaobing Wang; Jenifer Piesse |
| Abstract: | Using three comparable national representative household surveys for China in 1988, 1995 and 2002, this paper provides micro level evidence of a policy of absolute regressive taxation and an inverted welfare system. It reviews the economic effects of taxes and subsides and shows that a dual and regressive taxation system increases the urban rural income gap and enhances overall inequality. The empirical evidence indicates that the relatively poorer rural population pay net tax while those in the richer urban areas receive net subsidies. This biased system of taxes and welfare payments is one of the major causes of the persisting urban-rural income gap and is largely responsible for overall income inequality in China. |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwp:bwppap:10809&r=pbe |
| By: | Ashima Goyal |
| Abstract: | The record of different post reform governments in meeting their targets and improving both delivery and finances is assessed. A variety of indices are constructed, and consistency checks devised to measure relative performance. |
| Keywords: | expenditure, poor, sustainability, debt, budget, Indian, consistency, finances, reform, fiscal capacity, Expenditure, Deficits; Governments; Delivery, indices, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2384&r=pbe |
| By: | Daniel R. Carroll; Eric R. Young |
| Abstract: | This paper compares the steady state outcomes of revenue-neutral changes to the progressivity of the tax schedule. Our economy features heterogeneous households who differ in their preferences and permanent labor productivities, but it does not have idiosyncratic risk. We find that increases in the progressivity of the tax schedule are associated with long-run distributions with greater aggregate income, wealth, and labor input. Average hours generally declines as the tax schedule becomes more progressive implying that the economy substitutes away from less productive workers toward more productive workers. Finally, as progressivity increases, income inequality is reduced and wealth inequality rises. Many of these results are qualitatively different than those found in models with idiosyncratic risk, and therefore suggest closer attention should be paid to modeling the insurance opportunities of households. |
| Keywords: | Taxation ; Income tax |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0913&r=pbe |