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on Public Economics |
| By: | Thomas Hemmelgarn (European Commission.); Gaëtan Nicodème (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, European Commission and CESifo.) |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the economic effects of the EU Savings Taxation Directive. The Directive aims at enabling taxation of foreign interest payments received by individuals in accordance with the rules of their State of residence. The data suggest that the Directive, which is based on automatic information exchange, has not led to major shifts in international savings. However, this result has to be interpreted with caution since the available data is scarce and not always conclusive. |
| Keywords: | Savings Taxation, Withholding Tax, Information Exchange, European Union |
| JEL: | F21 F33 G12 G28 H24 H26 H87 K34 O16 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:09-023&r=pbe |
| By: | Richard E. Baldwin (Graduate Institute, Geneva); Toshihiro Okubo (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies tax competition in a setting that allows for agglomeration economies and heterogeneous firms. We find that the Nash equilibrium involves the large country charging a higher tax than the small nation, with this rate being too low from a social point of view. Tighter integration of markets leads to an intensification of competition, a drop in Nash tax rates, and a narrowing of the gap. Since large, productive firms are naturally more sensitive to tax difference in our model, large firms are the crux of tax competition in our model. This also means that tax competition has consequences for the average productivity of the big and small nations' industry; by lowering tax rates, the small nation can attract high-productivity firms. |
| Keywords: | Firm heterogeneity, Nash equilibrium tax, Stackelberg equilibrium tax, collusion, average productivity |
| JEL: | H32 P16 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:237&r=pbe |
| By: | Antonio Pedone |
| Abstract: | The wide gap between tax theory and tax practice may be traced back, among other things, to the focus in tax theory on the level and optimal structure of tax rates, assuming that tax bases are consistently defined, precisely measurable and readily and uniformly assessable. This approach overlooks the variances between tax design, tax law, tax impact, tax incidence and tax perception. The effects of taxes on efficiency and equity depend not just on the tax rate schedule adopted but also on differences in tax treatments resulting from the definition, measurement and assessment of tax bases. The Italian experience in the field of income taxation shows the extent to which the definition, measurement and assessment of tax bases matter. Many problems associated with defining, measuring and assessing tax bases, which the personal nature and high progressivity of income tax had contributed to highlighting and accentuating, remain still unresolved and require further research of a better understanding of the rationale, causes and effects of many differentiated tax treatments. |
| Keywords: | tax treatment, tax design, personal income tax, tax assessment |
| JEL: | H20 H24 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sap:wpaper:119&r=pbe |
| By: | Daniel Broid (Secreataría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP)) |
| Abstract: | In this presentation, I will investigate the determinants of property tax collection in Mexico. The tax is paid by all owners of land and dwellings in Mexico for the right of holding their properties, and is collected and managed by municipal authorities at the local level. This type of tax has attractive economic features such as efficiency, progressiveness, and good capacity to finance local public goods. However, the amount of public funds that are raised through the collection of this tax are extremely low. This presentation will describe the main results of the study and show how Stata was used to perform the analysis. |
| Date: | 2009–06–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:msug09:08&r=pbe |
| By: | Aronsson, Thomas (Umeå University); Koskela, Erkki (University of Helsinki) |
| Abstract: | This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may outsource part of the production process abroad, and where outsourcing is substitutable for domestic low-ability labor. Our results show that the incentives for the government to relax the self-selection constraint and to increase the employment among the low-skilled reinforce each other in terms of marginal income taxation; both of them contribute to increase the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type and decrease the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type. The appearance of equilibrium unemployment also constitutes an incentive to implement a tax on outsourcing. Without a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, the government may reduce the amount of resources spent on outsourcing by increased provision of the public input good, which leads to less wage inequality and increased employment. |
| Keywords: | outsourcing, optimal nonlinear taxation, public goods, unemployment |
| JEL: | H21 H25 J31 J62 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4196&r=pbe |
| By: | Bruno Deffains; Jean Mercier Ythier |
| Abstract: | Most organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain’s organization is by far the most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain’s transplant organization proceeds from an efficient organization of the production chain, from organ procurement to transplantation. Transplant inputs from dead donors are analogous to a common resource for the transplant community. Their circulation through the national transplant organization creates public good externalities between the care units in charge of organ extraction and those in charge of transplantation. It is shown that a socially efficient production of transplant services requires an optimal control of both the production and the circulation of transplant inputs by the institutions of the transplant system. |
| Keywords: | organ transplants; donation; public goods; production organization. |
| JEL: | H41 H51 H57 I12 I18 K11 K23 L23 L38 L53 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-19&r=pbe |
| By: | Margaret McKenzie (Deakin University) |
| Abstract: | Privatisation was expected to promote investment in the economy as part of improving dynamic efficiency. The relation between aggregate public and private investment in Australia is investigated in an endogeneous ECM framework. Model selection for a simple investment function allows restrictions for neoclassical crowding out or Keynesian crowding in (after Aschauer 1989) in a small open economy. An ECM is estimated including annual aggregate private investment, public investment, income, rate of return, average interest cost, exchange rate and inventories from 1960 to 2005. Public capital appears unresponsive to shocks and crowding out is not evident. |
| Date: | 2007–12–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2007_15&r=pbe |
| By: | Amedeo Piolatto (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | Thinking of electoral rules, common wisdom suggests that proportional rule is more fair, since all voters are equally represented: at times, it turns out that this is false. I study the formation of both Parliament and Government; for the composition of the former I consider plurality and proportional rule; for the formation of the latter, I assume that parties play a non-cooperative game à la Rubinstein. I show that, unless parties are impatient to form a Government, proportional electoral rules translate into a more distortive distribution of power among parties than plurality rule; this happens because of the bargaining power of small parties during Government formation. |
| Keywords: | electoral systems, proportional rule, plurality rule, voters¿ representation. |
| JEL: | C71 D72 H1 P16 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2009-14&r=pbe |
| By: | Ratbek Dzhumashev; Emin Gahramanov |
| Abstract: | In this paper we develop a stochastic endogenous growth model augmented with income tax evasion. Our model avoids some existing discrepancies between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions of traditional tax evasion models. Further, we show that: i) productive government expenditures play an important role in affecting economy's tax evasion rate; ii) the average marginal income tax rate in Australia come close to the optimal; and iii) the phenomenon of tax evasion is not an excuse for a productive government to advocate an excessive income taxation. |
| Keywords: | Tax evasion; Economic growth; Public services |
| JEL: | H26 D91 O41 |
| Date: | 2009–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2009_5&r=pbe |