nep-pbe New Economics Papers
on Public Economics
Issue of 2009‒05‒16
seven papers chosen by
Oliver Budzinski
Philipps-University of Marburg

  1. ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT By Daniele Nosenzo; Martin Sefton
  2. Taxation trends in the European Union: 2008 edition By Florian Woehlbier; Marco Fantini; Beata Heimann; Gaetan Nicodeme; Katri Kosonen; Werner Vanborren; Milan Pein; Stefanie Knoth; Federico Martire; Alessandro Lupi; Monika Wozowczyk; John Verrinder; Anne Paternoster
  3. âPocket and Potâ: Hypothetical Bias in a No-Free-Riding Public Contribution Game By Gubanova, Tatiana; Adamowicz, W.L.; McMillan, Melville
  4. The domestic stability pact in Italy: a rule for discipline? By Giuriato, Luisa; Gastaldi, Francesca
  5. The Effect of the Housing Boom on Farm Land Values via Tax-Deferred Exchanges By Williamson, James M.; Brady, Mike; Durst, Ron
  6. Impact of local public goods on agricultural productivity growth in the U.S. By Sun, Ling; Ball, Eldon; Fulginiti, Lilyan; Plastina, Alejandro
  7. Toward defining and measuring the affordability of public utility services By Kessides, Ioannis; Miniaci, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo; Valbonesi, Paola

  1. By: Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good when the timing of contributions is endogenously determined by contributors, focusing on the simple quasi-linear setting with two players (Varian, 1994). We show that the move order that is predicted to emerge is sensitive to how commitment opportunities are modeled. We show that a favorable move order is predicted to emerge in Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) "observable delay" extended game, but a detrimental move order is predicted to emerge in their "action commitment" extended game. We then report a laboratory experiment designed to examine whether the predicted move ordering emerges, and how this impacts overall contributions, in these extended games. The results are similar in both extended games. We find that when the detrimental move order is observed, contributions are indeed lower, as predicted. However, this detrimental move order is seldom observed. Instead of committing to low contributions, players tend to avoid making a commitment. These experimental results on timing decisions suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.
    Keywords: Public Goods, Voluntary Contributions, Sequential Contributions, Endogenous Timing, Action Commitment, Observable Delay, Experiment
    JEL: H41 C72 C92
    Date: 2009–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-09&r=pbe
  2. By: Florian Woehlbier; Marco Fantini (European Commission; European Commission); Beata Heimann (European Commission); Gaetan Nicodeme (European Commission); Katri Kosonen (European Commission); Werner Vanborren (European Commission); Milan Pein (European Commission); Stefanie Knoth; Federico Martire; Alessandro Lupi (European Commission); Monika Wozowczyk (European Commission); John Verrinder (European Commission); Anne Paternoster (European Commission)
    Abstract: Taxation trends in the European Union: 2008 covers the development of taxation in all 27 Members of the European Union and Norway in a comparable format since 1995. The report is organised as follows: Part I offers an overview of taxation in Europe, describing the trends in the total tax ratio, the structure of revenues by tax type, the distribution of revenues amongst government levels, and the main developments in the rates of the personal and corporate income tax. Part II focuses on taxation of consumption, labour, and capital, as well as on environmental taxation. Part III consists of 28 Country Chapters illustrating, for each Member State (and Norway), the revenue trends and supplying a summary description of the tax system. This chapter outlines the main results from Parts I and II.
    Keywords: European Union, taxation
    JEL: H23 H24 H25 H27 H71
    Date: 2008–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tax:taxtre:2008&r=pbe
  3. By: Gubanova, Tatiana; Adamowicz, W.L.; McMillan, Melville
    Abstract: Hypothetical bias arises when values which people say they place on a good or service differ systematically from the values people reveal for the same good or service through actual, binding economic transactions. Studies of hypothetical bias with respect to public goods often use charitable contributions or other relatively unique goods and these studies employ a variety of mechanisms to elicit the stated and revealed values. This study proposes the inclusion of a free-rider barring random dictatorship mechanism in the standard public contribution game to investigate the issue of bias when a public good involves immediate monetary returns to subjects. Steps are taken to make the game have the look and feel of a real-world tradeoff between private investment and public good provision. Data for the experiment were collected using a sample of students from the University of Alberta. A statistically significant negative hypothetical bias is found for the first hypothetical and the first real rounds of the game. The bias decays in subsequent round pairs, oscillating around zero.
    Keywords: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea09:49318&r=pbe
  4. By: Giuriato, Luisa; Gastaldi, Francesca
    Abstract: The 1999-2006 versions of the Italian Domestic Stability Pact had many shortcomings and a modest impact with respect to the aim of aligning the fiscal behaviour of sub-national government units with the national commitments under the European Stability and Growth Pact. The Domestic Pact was revised in 2007 and 2008 to tighten the monitoring and sanctions framework and prevent some inefficient behaviour. However, some undesirable features still mar the new regime: no coordination exists between the Domestic Pact and the debt and tax constraints applied to local governments; a clear definition of the contribution of sub-national governments to aggregate compliance with the external rule is still lacking; flexibility has been introduced by means of an artificial reference budget balance; side effects on resource redistribution are ignored; and monitoring and sanctioning remain weak. Remedies for the above shortcomings can possibly be found in the domestic pacts of the other EMU countries. Most of all, the Domestic Pact should be adjusted to the specific characteristics of fiscal decentralization in Italy, where a large fiscal gap exists, revenue autonomy is constrained and a large share of the responsibility for spending is rigid and politically sensitive.
    Keywords: Domestic Stability Pact; fiscal federalism
    JEL: H77 H74
    Date: 2009–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:15183&r=pbe
  5. By: Williamson, James M.; Brady, Mike; Durst, Ron
    Abstract: This project examines Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code and agriculture land exchanges. Stakeholders in rural communities and agriculture are particularly interested in Section 1031 because the recent growth in transaction values of farmland may have, in part, been stimulated by Section 1031 land exchanges. Further, although many have speculated that such exchanges are widely used, little empirical research exists about the provision. We examine the theory of exchanges and develop a theoretical premium value for exchanges. We also present the first evidence of like-kind exchanges involving farmland using Federal tax data.
    Keywords: Like-Kind Exchange, Capital Gains Tax, Agricultural Land, Land Economics/Use, Public Economics, Q15, H24,
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea09:49299&r=pbe
  6. By: Sun, Ling; Ball, Eldon; Fulginiti, Lilyan; Plastina, Alejandro
    Abstract: In this paper we revisit the issue on the impact of public R&D expenditure on US agricultural productivity growth. We estimate a dual cost function using a state-by-year panel data set. We construct the potential R&D âspillinsâ based on both geographical location and production mix. We also examine the role of the extension service, transportation network, and human capital in the process of technology dissemination. The results indicate that higher levels of local public goods, R&D spillins, extension activities, and an intensive transportation network decrease costs. The contributions to agricultural productivity from all series of R&D spillins are positive even though the social rate of return may differ.
    Keywords: productivity, public R&D expenditure, cost function, extension services, Productivity Analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, O3, O4,
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea09:49333&r=pbe
  7. By: Kessides, Ioannis; Miniaci, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo; Valbonesi, Paola
    Abstract: This paper reviews the progress made in the literature toward defining and measuring the affordability of utilities. It highlights the relative merits of alternate affordability metrics; the practical challenges to their operationalization, including the underlying data requirements; and their implications for the design, evaluation, and implementation of appropriate affordability programs.
    Keywords: Access to Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Rural Poverty Reduction
    Date: 2009–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4915&r=pbe

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