|
on Public Economics |
| By: | Javier J. Pérez (Centro de Estudios Andaluces) |
| Abstract: | In this paper I evaluate the usefulness of a set of fiscal indicators as early-warning-signal tools for annual General Government Net Lending developments for some EMU countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Finland) and an EMU aggregate. The indicators are mainly based on monthly and quarterly public accounts' figures. I illustrate how the dynamics of the indicators show a remarkable performance when anticipating general government accounts' movements, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms. |
| Keywords: | Leading indicators; Fiscal forecasting and monitoring; General Government Deficit; European Monetary Union |
| JEL: | C53 E6 H6 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cea:doctra:e2005_14&r=pbe |
| By: | Daniel J. Wilson |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I exploit the cross-sectional and time-series variation in R&D tax credits, and in turn the user cost of R&D, available from U.S. states between 1981-2002 to estimate the elasticity of private R&D with respect to both the within-state (internal) user cost and the out-of-state (external) user cost. To faciliate comparisons to previous studies of the R&D cost elasticity, I first estimate an R&D cost elasticity omitting external R&D costs; the estimated elasticity is negative, above unity (in absolute value), and statistically significant—a finding quite similar to that found by previous studies based on alternative data. Unlike previous studies, however, I then add the external R&D user cost to the regressions. I find the external-cost elasticity is positive and significant, raising concerns about whether having state-level R&D tax credits on top of federal credits is socially desirable. More importantly, I find the aggregate R&D price elasticity—the difference between the internal- and external-cost elasticities—is far smaller than previously estimated. In fact, the preferred specification yields a zero aggregate elasticity, suggesting a zero-sum game among states and raising questions about the efficacy of R&D tax credits more broadly. |
| Keywords: | Taxation ; Research and development |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2005-08&r=pbe |
| By: | Tatiana Damjanovic; Charles Nolan |
| Abstract: | In this paper we review and extend some of the key lessons that seem to be emerging from the Ramsey-inspired theory of dynamic optimal monetary and fiscal policies. We construct measures of the key distortions in our economy; we label these ‘dynamic wedges’. Inflation, actual or anticipated, distorts these wedges in the present period, it shrinks the tax base and increases the deadlweight loss. We show that, if possible, labour as well as capital ought to be subsidized in steady state. We point to a number of extensions to the Ramsey literature that may help in the formulation of actual policy. |
| Keywords: | Optimal taxation, aggregative monetary and fiscal policies. |
| JEL: | E31 E61 E62 H21 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:cdmawp:0509&r=pbe |
| By: | Lars P. Feld; Christoph A. Schaltegger |
| Abstract: | Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referen-dum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of state interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint. |
| Keywords: | Budget Referendums; Intergovernmental Grants; Interest Group Influence |
| JEL: | D7 D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2005-21&r=pbe |