nep-pbe New Economics Papers
on Public Economics
Issue of 2005‒02‒27
four papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System By Hans Pitlik; Friedrich Schneider; Harald Strotmann
  2. A Quantitative Investigation of the Laffer Curve on the Continued Work Tax: The French Case By Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Sopraseuth, Thepthida
  3. Getting the most out of public sector decentralisation in Japan By Isabelle Joumard; Tadashi Yokoyama
  4. Cultural Goods Production, Cultural Capital Formation and the Provision of Cultural Services By Sao-Wen Cheng

  1. By: Hans Pitlik; Friedrich Schneider; Harald Strotmann
    JEL: D7 H77
  2. By: Hairault, Jean-Olivier (University of Paris I, EUREQUA, CEPREMAP and IZA Bonn); Langot, François (University of Maine, GAINS and CEPREMAP); Sopraseuth, Thepthida (University of Evry, EPEE and CEPREMAP)
    Abstract: It is often argued that the tax on continued work should be removed by implementing actuarially fair schemes. However, these schemes cannot help fund the expected Social Security deficit. This paper proposes to give individuals only a fraction of the marginal actuarially fair incentives in case of postponed retirement. Social Security then faces a tradeoff between giving enough incentives to make individuals actually delay retirement and giving little increase in pensions in order to help finance its expected deficit. This trade-off is captured by a Laffer curve that we quantify on French data. Furthermore, we analyze the interactions between wealth and retirement behavior.
    Keywords: retirement behavior and wealth, actuarially fair benefits
    JEL: H31 H55 J26
    Date: 2005–02
  3. By: Isabelle Joumard; Tadashi Yokoyama
    Abstract: Revamping fiscal relations across levels of government is of paramount importance in supporting fiscal consolidation and public sector effectiveness. This paper analyses a number of problems, including regulations that limit local governments’ ability to innovate and respond to local citizens’ preferences, the inefficient system of intergovernmental grants, the complex structure of local taxes and fiscal rules which are too lenient to secure fiscal discipline. The paper concludes that the grant system should be reformed to promote local governments’ incentives to introduce innovations so as to better respond to needs at lower cost. Barriers to the effective use of sub-national governments’ taxing powers should be removed while efforts should be made to keep the tax system as simple and neutral as possible. Existing fiscal rules and market instruments should be hardened. This would require that the central government state clearly that it will not intervene as a lender of last resort to local government and ensure adequate information on local governments’ outstanding and implicit liabilities is available. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Japan ( <p> Optimiser l’impact de la décentralisation au Japon <p> La réforme des relations financières entre l’État et les collectivités territoriales est essentielle pour soutenir le processus d’assainissement budgétaire et l’efficacité du secteur public. Ce document met en lumière un certain nombre de problèmes, notamment les réglementations qui limitent la capacité des collectivités territoriales à innover et à répondre aux préférences des citoyens, un système inefficace de transferts intergouvernementaux, une fiscalité locale excessivement complexe et des règles budgétaires trop laxistes. Ce document conclut qu’une réforme du système des transferts est nécessaire pour inciter les collectivités territoriales à innover afin de répondre mieux et à moindre coût aux besoins des citoyens. Les dispositions institutionnelles qui limitent l’utilisation effective des pouvoirs des collectivités territoriales en matière d’impôts doivent être éliminées tout en s’assurant que le système fiscal soit le plus simple et le plus neutre possible. Les règles budgétaires en vigueur doivent être rendues plus strictes et le fonctionnement des marchés financiers amélioré. Cela requiert que l’État annonce clairement qu’il ne jouera pas le rôle de préteur en dernier ressort en cas de difficultés financières des collectivités territoriales et qu’il s’assure de la qualité des informations concernant leurs engagements explicites et implicites. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l'Etude économique de l'OCDE du Japon 2005 (
    Keywords: Fiscal federalism;local government;intergovernmental grants;fiscal discipline;Japan
    JEL: H2 H7 R58
    Date: 2005–01–27
  4. By: Sao-Wen Cheng
    Abstract: Cultural capital is assumed to benefit all members of society. It is accumulated through the consumption of cultural goods, cultural services are provided by cultural services industry; the stock of cultural goods is enlarged by the flow of new cultural goods created by individuals who are both consumers and creators of culture and whose utility is positively affected by the cultural goods they created. In the no-policy market economy, individuals tend to ignore the positive external effects of their cultural services consumption and creation of cultural goods on other individuals via augmenting cultural capital and cultural-goods stock. Consequently, less cultural capital and cultural-goods stock will be accumulated. The efficient allocation can be restored by introducing an appropriate subsidy that stimulates the consumers’ demand for cultural services, and the creation of new cultural goods, promotes the accumulation of cultural capital and cultural goods.
    Keywords: cultural capital, cultural services, cultural goods
    JEL: H2 H3 Z1
    Date: 2005–01

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