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on Payment Systems and Financial Technology |
| By: | Wilko Bolt; Maarten van Oordt |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an economic framework to analyze the exchange rate of virtual currency. Three components are important: first, the current use of virtual currency to make payments; second, the decision of forward-looking investors to buy virtual currency (thereby effectively regulating its supply); and third, the elements that jointly drive future consumer adoption and merchant acceptance of virtual currency. The model predicts that, as virtual currency becomes more established, the exchange rate will become less sensitive to the impact of shocks to speculators’ beliefs. This undermines the notion that excessive exchange rate volatility will prohibit widespread use of virtual currency. |
| Keywords: | Asset Pricing, E-Money, Exchange rates |
| JEL: | E42 E51 F31 G1 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:16-42&r=pay |
| By: | Borsenberger, Claire; Cremer, Helmuth; Joram, Denis; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the pricing of delivery services and its impact on the market structure in the-commerce sector. We focus on one of the ongoing trends, namely the development of marketplaces. A retailer may not just sell its own products; but also provide a marketplace for other sellers, offering a variety of services including delivery. Marketplaces create a "secondary" market which undermines the delivery operator's abilityto differentiate prices. We study the subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential game with two operators where retailer 0 may potentially develop a marketplace. The delivery operator and retailer 0 bargain over the delivery rate. Then, retailer 0 chooses the per-unit rate and the fixed fee at which it is willing to sell its delivery service to the other retailer. Finally, retailer 1 chooses its delivery option: either it directly patronizes the independent delivery operator, or it uses the services o¤ered by the marketplace, and the corresponding subgame is played. Analytical results are completed by numerical simulations and lead to three main lessons. First the equilibrium nearly always implies a discount to the "leading" retailer, even when the profit maximizing operator has all the bargaining power. Second, the delivery operator cannot avoid the emergence of a marketplace even though this decreases its profits. Third, the market power of the delivery operator cannot be assessed solely by considering its market share. |
| Keywords: | E-commerce, parcel delivery, marketplace, pricing and market structure,price discrimination |
| JEL: | L1 L5 L81 |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:30650&r=pay |
| By: | Kosten, Dmitri |
| Abstract: | The modern system of centralized governance and hierarchical control of socio-economic relations is coming to an end – the society is transitioning to peer-to-peer model of socio-economic relations. The peer-to-peer model of socio-economic relations is the model of the mesh network. Such model does not fit into the modern system of centralized governance and control. The source of many modern social vices are derived from the artificially created separation of money from contractual obligation. In reality money and contract is one entity. Contract and money cannot exist in harmony without each others. There is no money without contract, and there is no contract without money. Those concepts cannot exist without each other. The Bitcoin technology represents technical solution of such principal, and historically represents that technological jump in the means of production, that will bring the society to the next level of socio-economic development – the era of “Crypto-Socialism”. |
| Keywords: | Bitcoin, Blockchain, peer-to-peer relations, Crypto-Socialism, Socio-Economic Relations, contractual relations, decentralization, decentralized platform, Биткоин, Блокчейн, Одноранговые Отношения, Крипто-Социализм, децентрализация, социально-економические отношения, платформа, Пирамида Маслова (Маслоу), контрактно-денежные отношения, ячеистая топология общества, |
| JEL: | A1 A3 B0 E0 E4 E5 E6 G0 G2 P0 |
| Date: | 2016–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:73572&r=pay |