|
on Open Economy Macroeconomics |
| By: | Olivier J. Blanchard; Daniel Leigh; Prachi Mishra |
| Abstract: | We look at the effects of debt and primary fiscal balances on sovereign credit ratings through the lens of a simple model. We find that the ratings differ from the implications of the model in three important ways. They give much more weight to debt relative to forecast primary balances. They understate the effects of the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate. They give a very large role to country effects. For the same level of debt and forecast primary balances, they imply extremely different ratings across countries, and imply extremely different levels of debt needed to reach a given rating. |
| JEL: | E62 F34 G24 H63 H68 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35956 |
| By: | Louphou Coulibaly; Charles Engel |
| Abstract: | We examine optimal non-cooperative monetary policy in a two-country New Keynesian setting with complete financial markets and pricing to market for goods. In contrast to the case in which the law of one price holds for goods, currency misalignments are an important consideration even for self-oriented policymakers. Financial markets are critical in the analysis. Under “full” commitment, the optimal policy considers the effects on asset values and hence wealth distribution across countries. Optimal policy under full commitment differs from the “partial” commitment case in which the policy commitment is not made until after asset markets clear. Surprisingly, the optimal targeting rule under strategic policy with full commitment is the same as under cooperative policy. In this setting, changes in state-contingent claim prices offset the wealth a self-oriented policymaker might seek through terms-of-trade manipulation, and we show that there are no gains from cooperation. Although a policy chosen under partial commitment may be desirable from a country’s perspective, the resulting Nash equilibrium yields lower welfare. |
| JEL: | E44 E52 F31 F41 F42 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35928 |
| By: | Emilio Colombi |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the response of income inequality to commodity price shocks and identifies the underlying mechanisms at play. I provide novel cross-country evidence from commodity-exporting nations, showing that positive commodity price shocks reduce labor income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. This reduction in inequality is primarily driven by a fall in the skill premium, arising from the expansion of unskilled-labor-intensive sectors, such as construction, which grow more rapidly than skilled-labor-intensive ones, such as services. To interpret these results, I develop a quantitative multisector small-open-economy model that incorporates sectoral heterogeneity in both skilled-labor intensity and sensitivity to commodity price shocks. I use the model as a laboratory to explore the distributional impacts of various policy responses to commodity windfalls, demonstrating how saving or spending these gains can either reinforce or moderate the reduction in inequality. This analysis provides new insights into the broader economic and social impacts of commodity price shocks in emerging markets. |
| Keywords: | Monetary policy; Real economy and forecasting; Structural challenges; Digitalization and productivity |
| JEL: | E E3 E32 F F4 F41 J J3 J30 Q Q3 Q33 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:26-38 |
| By: | De Grauwe, Paul; Ji, Yuemei |
| Abstract: | We show first that the dominance of the dollar as the world currency is bound to decline. Second, there is no other currency today capable of taking over the dollar. The euro is handicapped by a fast decline of the economic importance of the euro area countries in the world. Even a Capital Markets Union will not compensate this, because a Capital Markets Union by itself does not create a safe asset. The latter is necessary as a benchmark to price the myriad of financial assets that make capital markets interesting for investors. Only a political union in which a federal European government has the authority to issue a common debt can achieve this. The most likely scenario, therefore, is that the world monetary system develops into a multi-polar currency system, where a limited number of currencies achieve a strong regional importance without any of them achieving the status of the dominant currency, in a way that the dollar has done in the post-war period. That seems to be the future for the euro, a future that can become a reality faster by developing a euro payment system alternative to the dollar and by creating a full-fledged digital euro. |
| Keywords: | global currency;international payment systems;euro;capital markets union;rule of law |
| JEL: | J1 F3 G3 |
| Date: | 2026–10–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:141657 |
| By: | Étienne Farvaque; Alexander Mihailov; Piotr Stanek |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether the National Bank of Ukraine’s policy remained rule-like through institutional reform, external constraints, and war. Using monthly data for 2009–2026, we estimate dynamic open-economy Taylor-type rules with inflation, economic activity, exchange-rate, and regime-interaction terms. Policy-rate persistence is strong, while the estimated inflation response changes across regimes and is largest during the full-scale war. The largest rule deviations occur during the 2015 currency crisis, the initial 2022 policy-rate freeze, and the June 2022 tightening. Descriptive event accounting links these episodes to institutional and geopolitical constraints. The evidence is consistent with state-contingent adaptation rather than a wholesale suspension of rules, with implications for monetary credibility and Ukraine’s prospective European integration. Cette étude examine dans quelle mesure la politique monétaire de la Banque nationale d’Ukraine est demeurée fondée sur des règles malgré les réformes institutionnelles, les contraintes extérieures et la guerre. À partir de données mensuelles couvrant la période de 2009 à 2026, les auteurs estiment des règles de politique monétaire dynamiques de type Taylor, adaptées à une économie ouverte, qui intègrent l’inflation, l’activité économique, le taux de change ainsi que des termes d’interaction liés aux différents régimes. Les résultats révèlent une forte persistance du taux directeur, tandis que la réaction estimée de la politique monétaire à l’inflation varie selon les régimes et atteint son niveau le plus élevé durant la guerre à grande échelle. Les écarts les plus importants par rapport aux règles sont observés lors de la crise de change de 2015, du gel initial du taux directeur en 2022 et du resserrement monétaire de juin 2022. Une analyse descriptive des événements permet de mettre ces épisodes en relation avec les contraintes institutionnelles et géopolitiques. Les résultats sont compatibles avec une adaptation de la politique monétaire aux circonstances plutôt qu’avec un abandon généralisé des règles, ce qui soulève des enjeux importants pour la crédibilité de la politique monétaire et les perspectives d’intégration européenne de l’Ukraine. |
| Keywords: | Taylor-type rules, Ukraine, exchange-rate stabilization, inflation targeting, geopolitical risk, wartime monetary policy, National Bank of Ukraine, règles de type Taylor, Ukraine, stabilisation du taux de change, ciblage de l’inflation, risque géopolitique, politique monétaire en temps de guerre, Banque nationale d’Ukraine |
| JEL: | E52 E58 F31 F41 O52 P34 |
| Date: | 2026–10–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2026s-19 |
| By: | Ernest Liu; Stephen J. Redding; Bennett Smith-Worthington; David Y. Yang |
| Abstract: | We develop a tractable framework for analyzing geopolitics as a network of coordination and strategic influence. Countries choose geopolitical actions that trade off domestic interests against incentives to align with connected countries. They can exert costly bilateral influence to affect one another’s actions. We characterize equilibrium actions and bilateral influence in closed form. Cross-country differences in domestic interests decompose into latent geopolitical cleavages, each of which the network transmits into geopolitical actions independently of the others. The cross-country covariance matrices of domestic interests and of geopolitical actions identify the cleavages and their importance, from which we recover the network. We implement the framework using data on United Nations voting and democratic orientation. The inferred network is well approximated by a few dimensions, aligns with external measures of geopolitical ties, and recovers well-known historical cleavages. We undertake counterfactuals for domestic interests and network connections and quantify three notions of geopolitical power |
| JEL: | C72 D85 F15 F52 F68 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35951 |
| By: | Yiru Chen; Muhammad Ali Nasir; Xingjie Wei |
| Abstract: | Given the important role of the Federal Reserve Chair, their communications may generate substantial cross-border effects on international financial markets. Building on this perspective, this article investigates whether emotional signals conveyed by the Fed Chair during FOMC post-meeting press conferences generate emotional spillovers to global financial markets. Using press conferences held between 2011 and 2025, we construct multimodal emotional indices from textual, vocal, and facial cues using machine learning techniques, and examine their high-frequency effects on exchange rates and equity markets across six major economies. Using local projection methods with minute-level event windows, the results show that Fed Chair emotional signals have immediate and economically significant impacts on global financial markets. Among different modalities, facial and textual emotions exhibit stronger and more robust effects than vocal signals. In particular, positive emotional cues are generally associated with increases in equity ETF returns, while exchange rate responses display substantial cross-country heterogeneity, with emerging market currencies tending to appreciate. We also provide evidence that the effects of emotional cues are non-additive and depend on cross-modal interactions, with vocal signals conditioning the impact of textual and facial emotions. Moreover, the findings show that the transmission of emotional spillovers is shaped by macro-financial vulnerability and global risk conditions. On the one hand, economies with higher vulnerability exhibit stronger responses to emotional shocks, indicating that macro-financial vulnerability acts as a moderating mechanism. However, the effects of emotional signals, especially facial and textual emotion, are amplified during periods of higher global uncertainty. Our main findings remain robust across several robustness checks. In particular, for vocal and facial emotions, coefficient equality is not rejected in 85.8% and 78.3% of the market horizon comparisons, respectively, indicating that the main findings are not systematically driven by the choice of emotion extraction algorithms. |
| Keywords: | central bank communication, multimodal signals, emotional spillover, high-frequency identification, machine learning, facial emotion analysis |
| JEL: | E44 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2026-86 |
| By: | Christopher Clayton; Matteo Maggiori; Jesse Schreger |
| Abstract: | We build a model of two hegemons that have valuable trading relationships with each other and at the same time compete in exerting geoeconomic power over countries in the rest of the world. When the hegemons trade with each other, their optimal policy is shaped both by classic economic considerations - the profitability of that specific trade - and by geoeconomic competition - how the trade affects the power of each hegemon vis-a-vis the rest of the world. We show that containment, a policy mix in which a hegemon limits sales of its inputs to the rival hegemon and uses its power to demand that the rest of the world shift away from sourcing from the rival, arises when the two hegemons offer relatively substitutable exports, are less interdependent with each other, and have more direct geopolitical rivalry. Countries in the rest of the world benefit, all else equal, from hegemons containing each other since they partially squander their power with offsetting demands. However, containment policy can also worsen the efficiency of global production, leaving the rest of the world worse off. |
| JEL: | E0 F0 L0 N0 P0 F10 F30 F40 F50 N40 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35952 |
| By: | Jonathan Federle; Robin Greenwood; Josefin Meyer; Carmen Reinhart; Christoph Trebesch |
| Abstract: | We study how wars and military threats affect financial markets. Leveraging more than 300, 000 monthly price observations since 1822, we create an external currency bond index for more than 90 countries—the EXBI. Using the EXBI, we document large effects of wars on returns and borrowing costs. In a global external bond portfolio, a one-standard-deviation war shock lowers returns by five percentage points. At the country level, wars at home generate sharp losses and increase default risk. Military threats depress bond prices in threatened states, but not in threatening ones, highlighting their role as a channel for geoeconomic coercion. |
| Keywords: | sovereign bond returns; war risk; geopolitical risk; militarized disputes; sovereign default; global financial history; conflict and finance; international capital markets |
| JEL: | F34 G15 H56 N20 E44 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2186 |
| By: | Márquez-Velázquez, Alejandro |
| Abstract: | Although many believe competitive currencies or real exchange rate undervaluation boost growth, recent research shows that the magnitude of this impact varies across countries. Since their integration into global value chains (GVCs) in the 1980s, a group of peripheral countries has transformed their export patterns. GVCs involve splitting production across several firms and countries. Many peripheral countries highly integrated into GVCs tend to present high backward-GVC participation. This means that imported inputs account for a significant share of the country's exports. This paper thus examines whether different levels of backward participation in GVCs alter the nexus between growth and competitive currencies within peripheral countries. The paper argues that in peripheral countries with high backward participation in GVCs, the growth impact of real exchange rate undervaluation will be lower. This is because higher backward-GVC participation implies less domestic value-added in a country's exports. Therefore, a lower share of domestic value-added is impacted by the competitiveness boost of real exchange rate undervaluation. Panel data regressions with annual data from up to 92 peripheral countries between 1950 and 2017 back the paper's argument. |
| Keywords: | competitive exchange rate, economic growth, global value chains, new developmentalism, peripheral countries |
| JEL: | F31 F43 O11 O14 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:344211 |
| By: | Silvia Sgherri |
| Abstract: | A global digital liability is a contract with three clauses that can be written separately at issuance: denomination, which governs what the liability pays and how well it insures its holders; the unit of account, which governs pass-through into prices; and backing, the government bonds held against it, which governs the yield privilege and the issuer’s currency exposure. Dollar stablecoins set all three to the dollar; multilateral proposals would move them to a basket. In a three-country New Keynesian model with currency-disaster risk in the periphery, a convenience yield on reserve assets, and original sin, we show that, however it is written, the contract cannot remove peripheral currency risk, only decide who bears it. Insuring against the peripherys currency creates an open position for the issuer. With fixed capital, that exposure places a limit on the scale at which the liability can be supplied credibly: a new Triffin dilemma that can be overcome by capital that grows with the open position. The mechanism behind the old dilemma reappears in general equilibrium: the country whose bonds back the liability runs a permanent trade deficit financed by the world’s demand for them, and the yield privilege it draws exceeds the interest it saves, as its terms of trade improve. |
| Keywords: | stablecoins, digital dollarization, unit of account, convenience yield, original sin, portfolio balance, international monetary system, Triffin dilemma |
| JEL: | F31 F33 F41 E42 E44 G23 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwc:wpaper:2026-015 |
| By: | Bruno Feunou; Rishi Vala; Andreas Uthemann; Jean-Sébastien Fontaine |
| Abstract: | Canada has been spending more than its national income for much of the period since the Global Financial Crisis, relying for this on net financing from rest of the world. Yet Canada’s foreign asset position has grown substantially than its foreign liabilities despite these deficits. This improvement reflects favorable changes in asset prices and exchange rates. From 1990Q1 to 2026Q2, estimated cumulative valuation gains were about 3 times as large as the cumulative current-account deficit. These gains also reflect a favorable portfolio composition. Canada increasingly holds foreign equity and direct investment, much of it denominated in U.S. dollars, while issuing relatively safer Canadian-dollar debt. Hence, higher returns on foreign equities, together with an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, raised the value of Canada’s net foreign assets. Larger gross positions over time amplified these valuation effects. Overall, valuation gains have relaxed the current-account adjustment needed to stabilize Canada’s external position, permitting a higher level of national expenditure than would otherwise have been feasible. |
| Keywords: | Financial markets and funds management; International markets and currencies; Structural challenges; International trade, finance and competitiveness |
| JEL: | F F2 F21 F3 F31 F32 F4 F41 G G1 G15 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocsap:26-54 |
| By: | Bohou Cai; Liugang Sheng; Hongyan Zhao |
| Abstract: | We study how news shocks affect inflation in open economies, using large oil and gas discoveries with realized production lags of at least five years as observable news about future output. Panel local projections show that discoveries raise core consumer prices over the subsequent decade, with about half the increase occurring prior to extraction. The response is driven by nontradables, while tradable and producer prices barely respond. The real exchange rate appreciates persistently and real activity expands ahead of extraction, while the current account first deteriorates and then improves as new oil comes online. The inflationary response is concentrated under inflexible exchange-rate regimes but muted under flexible ones. A three-sector New Keynesian small open economy model rationalizes these findings through competing demand and exchange rate channels, with exchange-rate policy determining which force dominates. |
| Keywords: | news shocks, inflation, oil discoveries, New Keynesian model, small open economy, exchange-rate regimes |
| JEL: | E31 E32 E52 F41 Q32 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bis:biswps:1389 |
| By: | Petracchi, Cosimo (Central Bank of Ireland); Riva, Luca (Central Bank of Ireland); Petterson, Marco S. (Central Bank of Ireland) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a firm-level mechanism that explains why exchange-rate regimes are largely neutral with respect to real macro variables: exporters actively adjust marginal costs and markups to absorb nominal exchange-rate fluctuations. We quantify this mechanism using micro-level data from the European car market (1970–99). We show that floating regimes are associated with limited adjustment in destination-currency prices and limited response in quantities sold. We then estimate a structural demand-and-supply system to recover product-level markups and marginal costs. At breaks from pegged to floating regimes, producer-currency markups fall on impact by around 11% and marginal costs by 10%. A two-country real business cycle model with segmented financial markets, incorporating pricing-to-market and operational hedging, rationalises these patterns. Our model underscores the role of real micro rigidities, rather than nominal rigidities, in the weak transmission of exchange-rate fluctuations to real macro variables. |
| Keywords: | European car market, exchange-rate regimes, demand estimation, pricing-to-market, variable markups, real rigidities. |
| JEL: | D22 F31 F41 F44 L11 L62 N14 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbi:wpaper:11/rt/26 |