nep-nud New Economics Papers
on Nudge and Boosting
Issue of 2026–02–16
four papers chosen by
Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale


  1. Financial and Non-Financial Incentives, and the Crowding-Out Effect: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Residential Electricity Consumption in Switzerland By Valentin Favre-Bulle; Sylvain Weber
  2. The impact of behavioral design and users' choice on smartphone app usage and willingness to pay: A framed field experiment By Timko, Christina; Adena, Maja
  3. Registering to Donate By Matej Lorko; Maros Servatka; Robert Slonim
  4. Statistics and Stories: Experimental Evidence on HIV Testing in Ghana By Salamatu Nanna Adam

  1. By: Valentin Favre-Bulle; Sylvain Weber
    Abstract: We examine the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives, individually and combined, on residential electricity consumption. A field experiment in Switzerland provided all participants with access to a custom-developed app offering feedback on electricity use and energy-saving tips. In addition to the control group, one treatment group received social comparisons based on savings relative to similar households, while a second group additionally received financial rewards linked to their electricity savings. We find no strong evidence of treatment effects. We do not observe crowding-out effect from combining monetary and non-monetary incentives, as the difference between treatments is not significant. Treatment effects appear to differ between PV and non-PV owners, with some indication of greater effectiveness for the latter, though further research is needed. Compared to a non-participant group, participation in the experiment and use of the application marginally reduced electricity consumption.
    Keywords: Household electricity usage; Demand-side management; Smart metering; Randomised control trial; Field experiment; Difference-in-differences; Crowding-out effect; Social incentives; Financial incentives.
    JEL: C93 D12 L94 Q41
    Date: 2026–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irn:wpaper:26-04
  2. By: Timko, Christina; Adena, Maja
    Abstract: Behavioral design in smartphone apps aims at inducing certain, monetizable behavior, mainly increased engagement, measurable by usage time. Such design is rarely transparent and often restricts users' ability to make alternative choices. In a framed field experiment, we document that behavioral design doubles app usage time compared to a version without behavioral elements. Providing users with choices-simply explained and conveniently adjustable design features-reduces usage time and increases their willingness to pay for the app. These findings suggest that offering choice could pave the way for new business models based on more responsible app design.
    Keywords: smartphone app, behavioral control, filtering algorithm, transparency and choice, self-determination, corporate social responsibility, field experiment
    JEL: C93 O33 D83 L86 M14
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbiii:336445
  3. By: Matej Lorko; Maros Servatka; Robert Slonim
    Abstract: Many charitable organizations invite potential donors to first join a registry before soliciting donations from those who have joined. Behavioral theories suggest that the choice architecture of registry enrollment can influence not just participation but also future giving. Some approaches may be relatively more likely to increase the likelihood of joining but reduce the subsequent propensity to donate and the amount donated, while other methods might have the opposite effect. We experimentally test four behavioral theories – overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency – in a two-stage donor engagement model. We find that (1) disclosing registry-related overhead costs decreases donations, (2) changing the default enrollment method (op-in vs. opt-out) does not affect enrollment nor donations, (3) targeting reciprocity by offering a small gift conditional on joining the registry boosts enrollment but not donations, and (4) targeting moral consistency by requesting an upfront contribution does not decrease the likelihood of joining the registry and improves charity returns. Our findings emphasize how subtle differences in early-stage donor approach design can influence longerterm fundraising outcomes.
    Keywords: charitable giving, donor registry, overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, moral consistency, experiment
    Date: 2025–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp809
  4. By: Salamatu Nanna Adam
    Abstract: Understanding what drives people to get tested for HIV is essential for designing effective communication strategies that promote test uptake. In this study, I use a randomized experiment to examine whether and how the format of information affects HIV testing behavior among university students in Ghana. Providing factual information on HIV incidence and the availability of nearby testing services increased actual testing rates by about 1 percentage point from a near-zero baseline. In contrast, adding a story about the testing experience to this statistical information did not generate any additional effect. Financial incentives, introduced non-randomly, raised testing rates to 11 percent. Interestingly, the impact of the original information treatments diminished when a financial incentive became available. Analysis of belief outcomes indicates that the information treatment primarily worked by increasing awareness of local testing services and correcting misperceptions about peer testing behavior, rather than by heightening perceived risk. However, stories did not enhance the treatment effect on beliefs or information recall beyond the impact of simple statistical facts. These results suggest that factual information can effectively address informational barriers to HIV testing in this context, while narrative elements offer no measurable added benefit for influencing this high stakes health behavior.
    Keywords: Beliefs, Recall, Stories/Narratives, Statistics, Information, Incentives
    JEL: D83 D91 I12 J13
    Date: 2025–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp805

This nep-nud issue is ©2026 by Marco Novarese. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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