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on Nudge and Boosting |
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Issue of 2026–06–15
five papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Lorko, Matej; Servátka, Maroš; Slonim, Robert |
| Abstract: | Many charitable organizations invite potential donors to first join a registry before soliciting donations from those who have joined. Behavioral theories suggest that the choice architecture of registry enrollment can influence not just participation but also future giving. Some approaches may be relatively more likely to increase the likelihood of joining but reduce the subsequent propensity to donate and the amount donated, while other methods might have the opposite effect. We experimentally test four behavioral theories – overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, and moral consistency – in a two-stage donor engagement model. We find that (1) disclosing registry-related overhead costs decreases donations, (2) changing the default enrollment method (op-in vs. opt-out) does not affect enrollment nor donations, (3) targeting reciprocity by offering a small gift conditional on joining the registry boosts enrollment but not donations, and (4) targeting moral consistency by requesting an upfront contribution does not decrease the likelihood of joining the registry and can improve charity returns. Our findings emphasize how subtle differences in the design of early-stage donor approaches can influence longer-term fundraising outcomes. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving, donor registry, overhead aversion, status quo bias, reciprocity, moral consistency, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D47 D64 D8 |
| Date: | 2026–05–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:129222 |
| By: | Jakob Moeller (Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria); Martin Halla (Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) at LISER; Rockwool Foundation, Berlin; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Vienna); Tobias Thomas (Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Vienna; Graz Schumpeter Centre (GSC), University of Graz; Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-University) |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of pre-booked COVID-19 vaccination appointments using a nationwide campaign in Austria. Leveraging administrative microdata on more than 450000 initially unvaccinated adults, we exploit cross-state variation in program participation and staggered appointment timing in a difference-in-differences design. Pre-booked appointments increase vaccination on the appointment day by 0.8 percentage points (8 per 1000), with no evidence of intertemporal substitution. Effects are larger for socio-economically disadvantaged individuals and substantially weaker in areas with stronger vaccine skepticism. The findings suggest that behavioral interventions are effective when low uptake reflects frictions, but have limited impact when driven by entrenched skepticism. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral public policy, behavioral frictions, vaccine hesitancy, nudges, pre-booked appointments, COVID-19, administrative data |
| JEL: | I12 D91 H51 C21 D83 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2026-10 |
| By: | Pol Campos Mercade (Department of Economics, Lund University); Armando N. Meier (Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel); Stephan Meier (Columbia Business School, Columbia University); Devin G. Pope (Booth School of Business, University of Chicago); Florian H. Schneider (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Erik Wengstroem (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | Can monetary incentives improve health behaviors in the long run, and do commonly used surrogate outcomes capture these effects? We study these questions in the context of vaccination using a large-scale eld experiment. The experiment combines commonly used surrogates|vaccination intentions, intermediate behavioral proxies, and short-run vaccination|with long-run administrative vaccination records. We first document that incentives increase vaccination rates in the long run: guaranteed $20 incentives raise COVID-19 booster uptake by 9 percentage points. Lottery-based incentives also increase long-run uptake, while prosocial incentives primarily accelerate vaccination. Second, using surrogacy methods, we study whether surrogates can predict long-run impacts. Although the surrogates are strongly correlated with eventual vaccination, the assumptions required for surrogacy methods are often violated, and they do not accurately predict long-run impacts. Our ndings highlight both the ability of incentives to change behavior and the importance of measuring long-run outcomes rather than relying solely on surrogates. |
| Keywords: | incentives, health behavior, vaccination, surrogates |
| JEL: | C93 D01 D62 I12 I18 |
| Date: | 2026–06–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kucebi:2613 |
| By: | Patrick Agte; Daniel R. Morales; Christopher Neilson; Sebastián Otero; Gautam Rao |
| Abstract: | Scaling up effective policies often requires the attention of frontline bureaucrats with many competing responsibilities. Even when policymakers adopt effective programs, implementation may not follow. In a nationwide experiment in the Dominican Republic, we test interventions to increase school principals' implementation of an educational program proven effective in a previous RCT. Only 37% of control schools verifiably implemented the intervention when ordered to by the Ministry of Education, compared with 83% in the original trial. Implementation was no higher among schools that previously implemented the program in the RCT, suggesting that fixed costs of adoption do not explain non-adoption. We find precise null effects of sharing research evidence, providing modest financial incentives, or offering implementation assistance to principals. In contrast, additional reminder calls increased implementation by 20 percentage points. A second experiment targeting a different mandated program yields the same pattern: reminders produce large effects, while monitoring messages have smaller effects. Our findings point to limited attention among bureaucrats as an important barrier to scaling policies. |
| JEL: | D9 O1 O15 O20 |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35291 |
| By: | Moustapha Mounmemi (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, Chaire REEL.i, Réseau EDEN.i, F-25000 Besançon, France); Vincent Bertrand (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, Chaire REEL.i, Réseau EDEN.i, F-25000 Besançon, France); Philippe Canalda (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, FEMTO-ST UMR6174, F-25000 Besançon, France) |
| Abstract: | Decarbonizing transport requires scalable alternatives to private vehicles, yet carpooling adoption remains limited due to coordination failures and weak network density. This paper develops a micro-founded framework of multimodal carpooling adoption under carbon pricing, behavioral nudges, and endogenous network effects. Agents choose between private transport and platform-based carpooling based on generalized costs and a participation-dependent matching probability. This generates nonlinear adoption dynamics, multiple equilibria, and tipping points driven by network externalities and matching efficiency. The model is calibrated using French mobility evidence and simulation-based methods. Results show that carbon pricing increases adoption but is constrained by coordination thresholds. Behavioral nudges significantly reduce these thresholds and amplify pricing effects. Platform efficiency critically determines whether the system converges to high or low adoption equilibria. Mu-CAR digital platform, currently under deployment, will provide future high-frequency mobility data enabling structural estimation and empirical validation. Overall, the framework highlights strong policy complementarities and network effects. |
| Keywords: | Carbon Pricing, Behavioral Nudges, Network Effects, Carpooling, Matching friction, Micro-founded Framework. |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2026-02 |