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on Nudge and Boosting |
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Issue of 2025–02–24
three papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Gerard van den Berg; Barbara Hofmann; Gesine Stephan (Active Labor Market Policy - Institute for Employment Research); Arne Uhlendorff (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Abstract Integration agreements (IAs) are contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, nudging the latter to comply with rules on search behavior. We designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial involving thousands of newly unemployed workers, randomizing at the individual level both the timing of the IA and whether it is announced in advance. Administrative records provide outcomes. Novel theoretical and methodological insights provide tools to detect anticipation and suggest estimation by individual baseline employability. The positive effect on entering employment is driven by individuals with adverse prospects. For them, early IA increase reemployment within a year from 53% to 61%. |
| Date: | 2024–11–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04793414 |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Stéphane Luchini; Jason Shogren; Adam Zylbersztejn |
| Abstract: | Under incomplete contracts, the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitates how traders create value through economic exchange. Creating such beliefs among strangers can be challenging even when they are allowed to communicate, because communication is cheap. In this paper, we first extend the literature showing that a truth-telling oath increases honesty to a sequential trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Our results confirm that the oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior thanks to an improvement in communication; but we also show that the oath induces selection into communication -it makes people more wary of using communication, precisely because communication speaks louder under oath. We next designed additional treatments featuring mild and deterrent fines for deception to measure the monetary equivalent of the non-monetary incentives implemented by a truth-telling oath. We find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. Altogether, these results confirm that allowing for interactions under oath within a trust game with communication creates significantly more economic value than the identical exchange institutions without the oath. |
| Keywords: | Trust game, cooperation, communication, commitment, deception, fine, oath |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04722343 |
| By: | Burger, Maximilian Nicolaus; Nilgen, Marco; Vollan, Björn |
| Abstract: | Citizens’ Juries (CJs) are increasingly implemented as a means to engage citizens in deliberation on complex policy challenges, yet their effectiveness can be undermined by cognitive biases and limited value-driven reasoning. This study evaluates the impact of bias alleviation and value activation exercises on deliberative quality and civic engagement in four CJs conducted in Bogotá, Colombia. Two juries incorporated these exercises as treatment interventions, and two served as controls with extended deliberation time. Results reveal that deliberation itself modestly reduced confirmation bias compared to non-participants, while the structured interventions enhanced participants’ awareness of biases and value-based reasoning. However, the interventions did not significantly reduce the occurrence of biases and led to a perceived trade-off with deliberation time. Participation in CJs also showed improved trust in science and political self-efficacy, demonstrating their potential to foster civic engagement. These findings highlight the nuanced benefits and limitations of integrating debiasing interventions into mini-publics to enhance deliberative quality and equity in policymaking. |
| Keywords: | democracy; environmental economics; food systems; participatory research; public participation; sustainability; Americas; South America; Colombia |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:2320 |