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on Nudge and Boosting |
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Issue of 2024‒08‒26
two papers chosen by |
| By: | Jean-François Gajewski (Laboratoire de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon 3 - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon); Marco Heimann; Pierre-Majorique Léger; Prince Teye |
| Abstract: | This article studies whether nudges – that is, gentle alterations of people's behaviour – increase audit quality. Although the utility of nudges is well-established in behavioural sciences, their applicability and efficacy have been less studied in accounting and auditing. To bridge this knowledge gap, the study extends nudge theory to financial audits, offering experimental evidence of the impact of social norms and justification nudges on auditor behaviour. A factorial 2 × 2 between-subject experiment (social norms and justification) shows that nudges amplify professional skepticism, a critical indicator of audit quality. A follow-up eye-tracking experiment involving an audit task identifies the underlying cognitive mechanism of this effect; nudges heighten auditors' visual attention to pertinent information, thereby refining their evaluations of audit evidence and increasing their professional skepticism. |
| Keywords: | eye-tracking, behavioural auditing, nudge, Professional skepticism |
| Date: | 2024–07–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04636343 |
| By: | Felipe Araujo; Alex Imas; Alistair Wilson |
| Abstract: | We demonstrate the pitfalls when extrapolating behavioral findings across different contexts and decision environments. We focus on regret theory and the use of “regret lotteries” for motivating behavior change. Here, findings from one-shot settings have been used to promote regret as a tool to boost incentives in recurrent decisions across many settings. Using theory and experiments, we replicate regret lotteries as the superior one-shot incentive; however, for repeated decisions the comparative static is entirely reversed. Moreover, the effects are extremely sensitive to details of regret implementation. Our results suggest caution should be used when designing incentive schemes that exploit regret. |
| JEL: | D0 D03 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32759 |