Abstract: |
Our experimental study investigates the impact of information about others'
tax behaviour on the subjects' subsequent tax decisions. A novel framework
allows us to test the taste for social conformity and behavioural convergence
hypothesis. Two kinds of individual information are introduced, namely
information about the income reported on average, within the whole subject's
group and within a subgroup, made of either peers or non peers and chosen by
the subject. Our main results are fourfold. First, we replicate usual results
as regards the influence of tax morale, probability of audit and
redistribution on tax compliance. Second, our data show that many subjects are
more interested in non-peers' than peers' tax behaviour. Third, with regard to
our main point, our data display a huge variety of behavioural responses at
the individual level. Roughly 50% of the subjects, most of whom are full tax
compliers, are insensitive to others' tax behaviour, thereby exhibiting strong
intrinsic preferences towards taxes. At the same time, our data provide strong
evidence of behavioural convergence towards others' average behaviour, and a
taste for social anti-conformity is also found for a minority of subjects.
Finally, the kind of information appears to matter, and we find some asymmetry
in upward and downward behavioural variations. |
Keywords: |
Tax compliance, Information, Tax morale, Peer effects, Social norms, Behavioral contagion, Social conformity, Artefactual field experiment |