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on Nudge and Boosting |
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Issue of 2024‒05‒20
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Matej Lorko; Tomas Miklanek; Maros Servatka |
| Abstract: | While nudges have recently gained popularity, many nudging interventions fail, and the effects of successful ones are often short-lived. We conjecture that the success of a nudge depends on how it interacts with the underlying economic incentives that determine the payoffmaximizing behavior of the decision-maker. For example, in the domain of tax compliance, a nudge is likely to be effective only if it is financially optimal for the taxpayer to pay the tax. To test our conjecture, we run a multi-period experiment in which we manipulate tax audit probability, and nudge participants to report their income. In addition, we vary how often the nudge appears, to test whether more frequent nudging increases long-run compliance. We observe that the first application of a nudge has a positive immediate effect on income reporting irrespective of whether it is optimal to comply or not. However, subsequent nudges increase income reporting only if the nudge is aligned with the taxpayer’s incentives. More frequent nudging in the direction opposite to incentives yields no effects on long-run compliance. Policy implications are discussed. |
| Keywords: | nudge, incentives, tax compliance, experiment |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp777&r=nud |
| By: | Stanislao Maldonado; Deborah Martinez; Lina Diaz |
| Abstract: | We present the results of a large-scale field experiment designed to measure the effect of social norms on parents' decisions to vaccinate their daughters against the human papillomavirus (HPV) in Bogota, Colombia. Because low rates of HPV vaccine adoption are an issue in developed and underdeveloped countries alike, the use of standard social norm marketing strategies to foster vaccination can have the undesirable effect of reinforcing the status quo. In our experiment, parents were exposed to text messages that incorporated variations of static and dynamic social norms. We demonstrate that dynamic social norms and injunctive norms increased the vaccination rate by 23%. Interestingly, we also find that a version of static social norms that uses a loss frame is also effective in fostering vaccination, implying that policy-makers can also benefit from them. Against a common view among academics and practitioners, we found no evidence that static norms reinforce the status quo. Our results highlight the importance of crafting social norms interventions using dynamic and injunctive elements to foster vaccination in settings where the majority has not yet adopted the desired behavior. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, vaccines, human papillomavirus, field experiments |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:202&r=nud |
| By: | Janis Zickfeld (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Karolina Scigala (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Christian Elbaek (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); John Michael; Mathilde Tønning Tønnesen (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Gabriel Levy; Shahar Ayal; Isabel Thielmann; Laila Nockur; Eyal Peer; Valerio Capraro; Rachel Barkan; Simen Bø; Štěpán Bahník; Daniele Nosenzo (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Ralph Hertwig; Nina Mazar; Alexa Weiss; Ann-Kathrin Koessler; Ronit Montal-Rosenberg; Sebastian Hafenbrädl; Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Patricia Kanngiesser; Simon Schindler; Philipp Gerlach; Nils Köbis; Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marek Albert Vranka; Dan Ariely; Jareef Martuza; Yuval Feldman; Michal Bialek; Jan Kristian Woike; Zoe Rahwan; Alicia Seidl; Eileen Chou; Agne Kajackaite; Simeon Schudy; Ulrich Glogowsky; Anna Czarna; Stefan Pfattheicher (Aarhus University [Aarhus]); Panagiotis Mitkidis (Aarhus University [Aarhus]) |
| Abstract: | Dishonest behaviors such as tax evasion impose significant societal costs. Ex-ante honesty oaths—commitments to honesty before action—have been proposed as useful interventions to counteract dishonest behavior, but the heterogeneity in findings across operationalizations calls their effectiveness into question. We tested 21 honesty oaths (including a baseline oath)—proposed, evaluated, and selected by 44 expert researchers—and a no-oath condition in a megastudy in which 21, 506 UK and US participants played an incentivized tax evasion game. Of the 21 interventions, 10 significantly improved tax compliance by 4.5 to 8.5 percentage points, with the most successful nearly halving tax evasion. Limited evidence for moderators was found. Experts and laypeople failed to predict the most effective interventions, but experts' predictions were more accurate. In conclusion, honesty oaths can be effective in curbing dishonesty but their effectiveness varies depending on content. These findings can help design impactful interventions to curb dishonesty. |
| Keywords: | honesty oath, dishonesty, tax compliance, nudging, unethical behavior |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04555561&r=nud |