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on Nudge and Boosting |
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Issue of 2023‒06‒19
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Koch, Alexander K. (Aarhus University); Monster, Dan (Aarhus University); Nafziger, Julia (Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | To study the effects of reminder nudges in complex environments, we apply a novel experimental approach based on a computer game in which decision makers have to pay attention to and perform multiple actions within a short period of time. The set-up allows us, first, to test the effect of reminders both on reminded and non-reminded actions and thus to observe whether reminders have (positive or negative) spillovers. Second, we investigate spillovers between multiple nudges by testing the effect of scaling up the number of reminded actions. Third, we study intertemporal spillovers by investigating whether the effects of having been exposed to reminders persist after reminders are withdrawn. We observe that reminders have positive effects in the short run – multiple reminders more so than single reminders: while reminders lead to crowding-out of non-reminded actions, the positive effect on the reminded actions dominates. Yet, after withdrawal of the reminders, the negative spillover effect persists, while the positive effect partially fades out so that, overall, reminders have no effect. |
| Keywords: | nudging, spillover effects, attention, reminders, persistence, game-based experiments |
| JEL: | C9 D91 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16137&r=cbe |
| By: | Andrés Ham; Juanita Ruiz; Oscar Iván Pineda-Diaz; Natalia Iriarte-Tovar; Juan Sebastián Cifuentes; María Fernanda Rodríguez-Camacho; Laura Feliza Vélez |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether text messages can encourage caregivers of young children to increase their intention to use in-person early childhood services and subsequently, actual attendance. We randomly assign 15, 100 beneficiaries in 719 educational centers into one control and two treatment groups, the first in which caregivers receive four text messages designed to target risk and loss aversion for three weeks, while the second group receives the same number of messages reinforcing social norms that early childhood education is a civic duty. Results show greater reported intent from caregivers who receive text messages for their children to attend but no significant differences by the type of message. However, this increased willingness to attend does not translate into greater effective attendance. These findings suggest that while text messages may be useful to provide information to caregivers, these nudges require additional and complementary efforts to turn their reported intentions into actions. ****** This paper investigates whether text messages can encourage caregivers of young children to increase their intention to use in-person early childhood services and subsequently, actual attendance. We randomly assign 15, 100 beneficiaries in 719 educational centers into one control and two treatment groups, the first in which caregivers receive four text messages designed to target risk and loss aversion for three weeks, while the second group receives the same number of messages reinforcing social norms that early childhood education is a civic duty. Results show greater reported intent from caregivers who receive text messages for their children to attend but no significant differences by the type of message. However, this increased willingness to attend does not translate into greater effective attendance. These findings suggest that while text messages may be useful to provide information to caregivers, these nudges require additional and complementary efforts to turn their reported intentions into actions. |
| Keywords: | Early childhood education, text messages, intention to attend, attendance, nudges. |
| JEL: | C93 D90 E70 I12 I20 |
| Date: | 2022–10–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000547:020773&r=cbe |
| By: | Björn Bartling; Alexander W. Cappelen; Henning Hermes; Marit Skivenes; Bertil Tungodden |
| Abstract: | We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders’ own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators’ willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder’s freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder’s responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set – whether the source of mistake is internal or external – and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types – libertarian paternalists and welfarists – and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions. |
| Keywords: | Paternalism, libertarian paternalism, welfarism, freedom to choose |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D69 D91 |
| Date: | 2023–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:436&r=cbe |
| By: | John A. List; Matthias Rodemeier; Sutanuka Roy; Gregory K. Sun |
| Abstract: | While behavioral non-price interventions (“nudges”) have grown from academic curiosity to a bona fide policy tool, their relative economic efficiency remains under-researched. We develop a unified framework to estimate welfare effects of both nudges and taxes. We showcase our approach by creating a database of more than 300 carefully hand-coded point estimates of non-price and price interventions in the markets for cigarettes, influenza vaccinations, and household energy. While nudges are effective in changing behavior in all three markets, they are not necessarily the most efficient policy. We find that nudges are more efficient in the market for cigarettes, while taxes are more efficient in the energy market. For influenza vaccinations, optimal subsidies likely outperform nudges. Importantly, two key factors govern the difference in results across markets: i) an elasticity-weighted standard deviation of the behavioral bias, and ii) the magnitude of the average externality. Nudges dominate taxes whenever i) exceeds ii). Combining nudges and taxes does not always provide quantitatively significant improvements to implementing one policy tool alone. |
| JEL: | C93 D61 D83 |
| Date: | 2023–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31152&r=cbe |