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on Neuroeconomics |
| By: | Jonas Jessen; Lavinia Kinne; Michele Battisti |
| Abstract: | Child penalties in labour market outcomes are well-documented: after childbirth, employment and earnings of mothers drop persistently compared to fathers. Beyond gender norms, a potential driver could be the loss in labour market skills due to mothers' longer employment interruptions. This paper estimates child penalties in adult cognitive skills by adapting the pseudo-panel approach to a single cross-section of 29 countries in the PIAAC dataset. We find a long-term drop in numeracy skills after childbirth of 0.12 standard deviations for fathers and a 0.06 standard deviations larger drop for mothers with the difference being marginally significant. Estimates of child penalties in skills strongly depend on controlling for pre-determined characteristics, especially education. Additionally, there is no evidence for worse occupational skill matches for mothers after childbirth. Our findings suggest that changes in general labour market skills can at best explain a small fraction of child penalties in labour market outcomes, and that a cross-sectional estimation of child penalties can be sensitive to characteristics of the outcome variable. |
| Keywords: | child penalty, cognitive skills, gender inequality, PIAAC |
| JEL: | I20 J13 J16 J24 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11874 |
| By: | Gerardo Sabater-Grande (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Maite Alguacil (IIE and Departament of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Noemí Herranz-Zarzoso (Department of Economic Analysis, Universitat de València, Spain) |
| Abstract: | We implemented a two-phase experiment to investigate economic dishonest behavior in the field. In the first phase, we conducted a laboratory experiment in which subjects completed four questionnaires in exchange for being rewarded with €10 via bank transfer. In the second phase, subjects were randomly assigned to three treatment groups. One-third of the subjects were intentionally underpaid by €5, another third was overpaid with an extra of €5 and the final third received an additional €15 beyond the stipulated reward. To assess subjects’ awareness of these payments, we emailed upon their receipt data of the bank transfer. We found that overpaid participants overwhelmingly underreported the discrepancy compared to those who were underpaid, revealing a strong dishonesty pattern. After controlling for potential covariates, including socio-economics demographics, self-reported personality traits, cognitive ability, and measures of altruism and trustworthiness revealed in experimental games, it was observed that participants who received a larger overpayment exhibited greater honesty compared to those who were overpaid in a lesser extent. This finding suggests that as the level of temptation increases, the psychological costs of being dishonest may outweigh its monetary benefits. |
| Keywords: | randomized field experiment; economic dishonesty; trustworthiness; altruism; cognitive ability, dark triad; HEXACO honesty-humility |
| JEL: | C93 D03 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2025/05 |
| By: | Orazio Attanasio; Gabriella Conti; Pamela Jervis; Costas Meghir; Aysu Okbay |
| Abstract: | We evaluate impacts heterogeneity of an Early Childhood Intervention, with respect to the Educational Attainment Polygenic Score (EA4 PGS) constructed from DNA data based on GWAS weights from a European population. We find that the EA4 PGS is predictive of several measures of child development, mother’s IQ and, to some extent, educational attainment. We also show that the impacts of the intervention are significantly greater in children with low PGS, to the point that the intervention eliminates the initial genetic disadvantage. Lastly, we find that children with high PGS attract more parental stimulation; however, the latter increases more strongly in children with low PGS. |
| JEL: | I24 I26 I3 I38 O15 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33781 |
| By: | Jonathan Benchimol (Bank of Israel, Jerusalem, Israel); Lahcen Bounader (World Bank, Rabat, Morocco); Mario Dotta (Getulia Vargas Foundation, Sao Paulo School of Business Administration, Sao Paulo, Brazil) |
| Abstract: | Bounded rationality and limited attention significantly influence expectation formation and macroeconomic dynamics, yet empirical quantification of these behavioral phenomena remains challenging. This paper provides the first cross-country estimation of both micro- and macro-level attention parameters using a structurally identified behavioral New Keynesian model. Employing Bayesian techniques on harmonized data from 22 OECD countries (1996-2019) and ensuring robust parameter identification, we document substantial heterogeneity in behavioral inattention across countries. Our cognitive discounting estimates range from 0.76 to 0.98, with higher values indicating greater attention. We establish three key empirical regularities: (1) attention parameters are positively associated with macroeconomic volatility, supporting rational inattention theory; (2) surprise movements in key macroeconomic variables and online information-seeking behavior significantly influence attention allocation; and (3) institutional quality, particularly government effectiveness, is correlated with attention levels. These findings reveal that attention is both a behavioral and a structural phenomenon, responding to institutional factors and economic conditions. Our results provide an empirical foundation for calibrating country-specific models and yield important implications for the design and transmission of monetary policy under bounded rationality, showing that policy effectiveness may systematically vary with the macroeconomic environment. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive discounting, Myopia, Attention, Bayesian estimation, Behavioral macroeconomics |
| JEL: | E37 E52 E58 E70 E71 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fds:dpaper:202501 |