nep-neu New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2022‒10‒24
two papers chosen by



  1. Time Pressure Preferences By Buser, Thomas; van Veldhuizen, Roel; Zhong, Yang
  2. Motivated Skepticism By Jeanne Hagenbach; Charlotte Saucet

  1. By: Buser, Thomas (University of Amsterdam); van Veldhuizen, Roel (Department of Economics, Lund University); Zhong, Yang (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Many professional and educational settings require individuals to be willing and able to perform under time pressure. We use a lab experiment to elicit preferences for working under time pressure in an incentivized way by eliciting the minimum additional payment participants require to complete a cognitive task under various levels of time pressure versus completing it without time pressure. We make three main contributions. First, we document that participants are averse to working under time pressure on average. Second, we show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of time pressure aversion across individuals and that these individual preferences can be partially captured by simple survey questions. Third, we include these questions in a survey of bachelor students and show that time pressure preferences correlate with future career plans. Our results indicate that individual differences in time pressure aversion could be an influential factor in determining labor market outcomes.
    Keywords: Time Pressure; Experiment; Gender
    JEL: C90 D91 J22
    Date: 2022–09–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2022_017&r=
  2. By: Jeanne Hagenbach (Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Charlotte Saucet (UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
    Abstract: We experimentally study how individuals read strategically-transmitted information when they have preferences over what they will learn. Subjects play disclosure games in which Receivers should interpret messages skeptically. We vary whether the state that Senders communicate about is ego-relevant or neutral for Receivers, and whether skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with what Receivers prefer believing. Skepticism is lower when skeptical beliefs are self-threatening than in neutral settings. When skeptical beliefs are self-serving, skepticism is not enhanced compared to neutral settings. These results demonstrate that individuals' exercise of skepticism depends on the conclusions of skeptical inferences.
    Keywords: Disclosure games,hard information,unraveling result,skepticism,Motivated beliefs,C91,D82,D91
    Date: 2022–09–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03770685&r=

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