nep-neu New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2021‒11‒15
five papers chosen by

  1. Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: Experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games By Tetsuya Kawamura; Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse
  2. Cognitive ability, financial literacy, and narrow bracketing in time-preference elicitation By Oberrauch, Luis; Kaiser, Tim
  3. Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions By Marco Lambrecht; Eugenio Proto; Aldo Rustichini; Andis Sofianos
  4. Adapting to Climate Change: Threat Experience, Cognition and Protection Motivation By Adloff, Susann
  5. Personality and Ethics on Online Labor Markets: How mood influences ethical perceptions By Mourelatos, Evangelos

  1. By: Tetsuya Kawamura; Tiffany Tsz Kwan Tse
    Abstract: A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an infinitely repeated public goods game. We designed four treatments with different continuation probability under two conditions: whether cooperation can be sustained as risk dominance or not. We asked participants to decide whether to cooperate in every period in the first five rounds. They were further asked to decide if they should elicit their strategy at the beginning of each super game using the strategy method in the last five rounds. We found that participants with greater cognitive abilities cooperated more (less) when cooperation could(not) be sustained as risk dominance. A similar trend was observed in the frequency of fully cooperative strategies. We also found that participants with greater cognitive abilities employed lenient and forgiving strategies more frequently when the continuation probability was far higher than the risk dominant threshold level.
    Date: 2021–10
  2. By: Oberrauch, Luis; Kaiser, Tim
    Abstract: We study the role of cognitive ability and financial literacy for inter-temporal decision-making using an adapted version of the Convex Time Budget Protocol. We document substantial heterogeneity in choice-patterns and estimated parameters at the individual-level: We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability and domain specific-knowledge are more likely to make patient inter-temporal choices, to allocate the entire budget to a single payment-date, and to allocate the entire budget to corner choices as interest rates increase. At the same time, domain specific knowledge is uncorrelated with choice consistency and estimated individual error parameters, suggesting these results are not driven by a reduction in random noise among high ability respondents. These results serve as suggestive evidence for inter-temporal arbitrage among high ability respondents, thereby revealing a potential confound in time-preference elicitation tasks relying on time-dated monetary rewards.
    Keywords: Intertemporal choice,cognitive ability,financial literacy,narrow bracketing,arbitrage
    JEL: G53 D15 D91
    Date: 2021
  3. By: Marco Lambrecht; Eugenio Proto; Aldo Rustichini; Andis Sofianos
    Abstract: We investigate in a laboratory setting whether revealing information on intelligence affects behavior in games with repeated interactions. In our experimental design we communicate information on the cognitive ability of both players. We use three stage games: Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) and two versions of Battle of Sexes (BoS), with high and low payoff inequality. We find that the information affects strategic behavior significantly in two distinct ways. In PD, disclosure markedly hampers cooperation, as higher intelligence players are less cooperative once they are made aware that they play against someone of lower ability than themselves in the disclosure treatment. Similarly, in BoS with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination on outcomes with positive payoffs, as higher intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome onto the less intelligent. However, in BoS with high payoff inequality, this pattern of behavior dramatically changes. Disclosure does not significantly affect coordination rates. Differently from the low payoff inequality game, coordination is achieved more often on outcomes that favour less intelligent players. We conjecture that when coordination becomes more difficult, because of the high inequality between payoffs, intelligence and inequality together form a coordination device.
    Keywords: repeated prisoners dilemma, cooperation, intelligence, IQ
    JEL: C73 C91 C92 D83
    Date: 2021
  4. By: Adloff, Susann
    JEL: Q54 D91
    Date: 2021
  5. By: Mourelatos, Evangelos
    Abstract: This research explores whether there is a link between mood and ethical perceptions in online labor markets. The experimental design allows to track the determinants of the underlying mechanism of individuals’ behavior within and without the treatment context. By using OLS estimation methods the paper also provides empirical evidence for several statistically significant effects of personality traits on ethical perceptions, value co-creation and relationship quality. In general, the positive mood manipulation lead to an increase of individuals’ ethical perceptions, value co-creation and relationship quality. These findings suggest that mainly the effect of positive mood on the outcomes operates through the trait of agreeableness. Contributions to the ethical perception, mood research and online-economy literature are discussed
    Keywords: ethical perception,value co-creation,mood,personality,online labor markets
    JEL: D91 D87 D53 D23 D01
    Date: 2021

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