| By: |
Zvonimir Bašić (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn, Germany);
Parampreet C. Bindra (University of Innsbruck, Austria);
Daniela Glätzle-Rützler (University of Innsbruck, Austria);
Angelo Romano (Leiden University, Netherlands);
Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn, University of Cologne, Germany, University of Innsbruck, Austria, IZA Bonn, and CESifo Munich, Germany);
Claudia Zoller (Management Center Innsbruck, Austria) |
| Abstract: |
Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great
importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in
human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young
children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which
of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect
reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an
effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on
cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It
promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied.
Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity
strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and
indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as
young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also
show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of
parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation. |
| Keywords: |
Cooperation, reciprocity, third-party punishment, reputation, children, parents, cognitive abilities, socioeconomic status, prisoner’s dilemma game, experiment |
| JEL: |
C91 C93 D01 D91 H41 |
| Date: |
2021–06 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:097&r= |