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on Neuroeconomics |
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Issue of 2015‒01‒26
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Alexander Morell (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different minimal group identities in participants and randomly assign participants to one of two treatments. Senders either play a dictator game with a receiver from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). I let senders condition their amount sent on second-order beliefs. I find that, in the realm of realistic beliefs (i.e., the sender expects the receiver to expect the sender to send no more than half of the pie), the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much the sender sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment. In both treatments, about half of the senders remain unaffected by second-order beliefs. In the ingroup treatment, unaffected senders identify less with their group than affected senders do. This is not true for the outgroup treatment. |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_19&r=neu |
| By: | Ivo Bischoff (University of Kassel); Özcan Ihtiyar (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment on the impact of feedback in the Trust Game. In our treatment group, the Trustee has the opportunity to give feedback to the Investor (free in choice of wording and contents). The feedback option is found to reduce the share of Investors who sent no resources to the Trustee, while the impact on average behavior is less pronounced. The notion proposed by Xiao and Houser (2005, PNAS) according to which verbal feedback and monetary sanctions are substitutes is not supported. We use the PANAS-scale (Mackinnon et al., 1999) to capture change in subjects’ short-run affective state during the experiment. Receiving feedback has an impact on the Investors’ short-run affective state but giving feedback is not found to have an effect on Trustees’ short-run affective state. |
| Keywords: | Trust Game, Feedback, Short-run affect, Emotions |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D63 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201503&r=neu |
| By: | Rita Pető; Balázs Reizer |
| Abstract: | It is well-known that men and women segregate by occupation, but less is known about how they segregate by task within occupation. We show that the tasks performed by women are less skill intensive on the average than those performed by men having the same occupation. Neither demographic composition nor differences in cognitive and social skills can explain this pattern. In contrast, the fact that women use cognitive skills less often at home can explain one third of the differences in skill use at the workplace. As we control for work environment and the ability to use cognitive skills the remaining females' penalty in skill use suggest the possibility of labor market discrimination against women. Although skill use at the workplace has a significant wage premium, females' penalty in skill use cannot explain the gender wage gap. |
| Date: | 2015–01–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ceu:econwp:2015_1&r=neu |