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on Neuroeconomics |
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Issue of 2014‒11‒07
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Rosy Wediawaty (Directorate of State Finance and Monetary Analysis (BAPPENAS)) |
| Abstract: | Shocks, such as economic crisis, that occur in the critical periods of children development are believed to have lasting effects. Using data from Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), this study investigates the timing issue and whether Asian Financial 1997/1998 crisis has impacts on child health and cognitive development in Indonesia. By running pooled cross-section model, this study finds that generally crisis has not had negative impacts on child health and cognitive development for those who were poor. Yet, in urban areas, crisis struck harder and negatively affected the cognitive score of specific age groups. This study also finds that the critical periods of children development might be in the first two years of early life. Expenditure levels and mothers’ education are strong predictors for child health and cognitive development. |
| Keywords: | Crisis, Child Health, Cognitive Development, Indonesia |
| JEL: | I15 O15 O53 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unp:wpaper:201413&r=neu |
| By: | Ioannou, Christos A.; Golshirazi, Farnoush |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the impact of cognitive and affective empathy on behavior. A novelty of the study is that we do so directly without invoking responses to questionnaires, but by manipulating the state of hunger of participants in the single-shot Dictator game during the holy month of Ramadan. Our sample consists of male workers in the Sepaahaan (car battery) manufacturing factory in the city of Isfahan in Iran. We find that, only, affective empathy amplifies altruistic behavior. More specifically, hungry dictators transfer more money to hungry recipients than fed dictators. The difference is statistically as well as economically significant. |
| Date: | 2014–09–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:1421&r=neu |
| By: | Giovanni Ponti (Universidad de Alicante); Ismael Rodríguez Lara (Universidad de Alicante); Daniela Di Cagno (School of Government) |
| Abstract: | We report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. To this aim, we set up an intertemporal Dictator Game and investigate whether (and how) subjects change theirchoices, compared with those they had taken in absence of any payoff externality in a previous stage of the experiment. We run two treatments -INFO and BELIEF, respectively- depending on whether Dictators know -or are asked to elicit- their assigned Recipients' risk and time preferences. We find that high (own) risk aversion is associated with low (own) discounting. We also find that (heterogeneous) socialtime preferences are significant determinants of choices, in that Dictators display a marked propensityto account for the Recipients' intertemporal concerns. |
| Keywords: | intertemporal decisions, time preferences, social preferences. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2014-05&r=neu |