New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2014‒05‒09
three papers chosen by

  1. Strategic Sophistication and Attention in Games: an Eye-Tracking Study By Luca Polonio; Sibilla Di Guida; Giorgio Coricelli
  2. Cooperation and Personality By Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo
  3. Welfare and Work Participation of Single Mothers and Children’s Cognitive Development By Orgul Demet Ozturk; Hau Chyi

  1. By: Luca Polonio; Sibilla Di Guida; Giorgio Coricelli
    Abstract: We used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in twoplayers normal form games. Participants played one-shot games in which either, neither, or only oneof the players had a dominant strategy. First, we performed a mixture models cluster analysis to groupparticipants into types according to the pattern of visual information acquisition observed in a singleclass of games. Then, we predicted agents’ choices in different classes of games, and observed thatpatterns of visual information acquisition were game invariant. Our method allowed us to predictwhether the decision process would lead to equilibrium choices or not, and to attribute out-ofequilibriumresponses to limited cognitive capacities or social motives. Our results suggest theexistence of individually heterogeneous-but stable-patterns of visual information acquisition basedon subjective levels of strategic sophistication and social preferences.
    Keywords: game theory; strategic sophistication; social preferences; attention; eye-tracking
    Date: 2014–04
  2. By: Proto, Eugenio (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Rustichini, Aldo (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota)
    Abstract: Cooperating behavior may be fostered by personality traits reflecting either favorable inclination to others or willingness to comply with norms and rules. We test the relative importance of these two factors in an experiment where subjects provide real mental effort in two treatments with identical task, differing only by whether others' payment is affected. If the first hypothesis is true, subjects reporting high Agreeableness score should put more effort; if the second is true, reporting higher Conscientiousness should predict more effort. We find experimental support for the second hypothesis but not for the first, as subjects reporting high Altruism do not behave consistently with this statement. Key words: Personality Traits ; Cooperation ; Effort Provision JEL classification: C90 ; D03 ; D82
    Date: 2014
  3. By: Orgul Demet Ozturk; Hau Chyi
    Abstract: The effects of single mothers’ welfare participation and work decisions on children’s outcomes are important. First, theories and empirical studies regarding the effects of mothers’ work on children’s attainments yield ambiguous findings. Second, participating in AFDC also exhibits a negative statistical relationship with the participating children’s possible outcomes of all sorts in the data. We develop a dynamic structural model of a single mother’s work and welfare participation decisions while their children are young. This model is used to measure the effects of mothers’ decisions on children’s attainments in the short run. Using NLSY79 children’s PIAT Math test scores as a measure of attainment, we find that single mother’s work and welfare use in the first five years of her child’s life both have positive effect on her child’s outcome, but this effect declines by the initial ability. The higher the potential ability of child, the lower the positive impact work and welfare have. In fact, in case of welfare the effect is negative if child has more than about median initial ability.. Furthermore, we find that work requirement reduces a single mother’s use of welfare. However, the net effect of work requirement on a child’s test score depends on whether mother’s work brings in enough labor income to compensate for the loss of welfare benefits. We also look at the implications of welfare eligibility time limit, child bonus, and maternal leave, on child’s outcome.
    Date: 2013–10–14

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