New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2014‒04‒18
three papers chosen by



  1. Cooperation and Personality By Proto, Eugenio
  2. Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like emotions in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups By Bicskei, Marianna; Lankau, Matthias; Bizer, Kilian
  3. Social environment and forms of governance: Monetary and non-monetary punishment and the role of emotions By Bicskei, Marianna; Lankau, Matthias; Bizer, Kilian

  1. By: Proto, Eugenio (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: Cooperating and trusting behavior may be explained by preferences over social outcomes (people care about others, are unselfish and help- ful), or attitudes to work and social responsibilities (plans have to be carried out, norms have to be followed). If the first hypothesis is true, Agreeable- ness, reporting stated empathy for others, should matter most; if the second, higher score in traits expressing attitude to work, intrinsic motivation (Con- scientiousness) should be correlated with cooperating behavior and trust. We find experimental support for the second hypothesis when subjects provide real mental effort in two treatments with identical task, differing by whether others' payment is affected.
    Keywords: Personality Traits, Cooperation, Effort Provision
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:143&r=neu
  2. By: Bicskei, Marianna; Lankau, Matthias; Bizer, Kilian
    Abstract: Several studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances the willingness to reciprocate cooperative behavior of group members dependent on the social environment. Yet, the question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identityhomogeneous and -heterogeneous groups has received only little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap by examining whether social identity affects individuals' willingness to sanction deviating group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses we employ one-shot public good games in strategy method with induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity homogeneous groups punish much less often and in smaller amounts than of identity heterogeneous groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions influence punishment behavior much stronger when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in identity homogenous groups. These findings contribute to the better understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists ability to predict behavior taking emotions also into consideration. --
    Keywords: social identity,emotions,experiment,public goods,negative reciprocity
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:203&r=neu
  3. By: Bicskei, Marianna; Lankau, Matthias; Bizer, Kilian
    Abstract: The question to what extent social environment affects how individuals govern their groups, has received no special academic attention, yet. Within the framework of a ten-period public goods experi&ment we analyse how social identity affects subjects' choice of punishment: They may either sanction group members by monetary and/or by non-monetary sanctions bearing differentconsequences on welfare. What is more, we are also the first to address how emotions influence the effectiveness of punishment in terms of maintaining contributions. Our results show that under the threat of both punishments identity-heterogeneous (out-) groups tend to contribute more to the public good than identity-homogenous (in-) groups. Nevertheless, subjects of out-groups are more likely to govern their group via monetary, in-group members rather via non-monetary punishment. What is more, we demonstrate that emotions of guilt and anger differently affect subsequent contributions dependent on the social environment. --
    Keywords: public goods,social identity,monetary and non-monetary peer-punishment,emotions
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:202&r=neu

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