New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2011‒08‒15
two papers chosen by



  1. Manipulation of Choice Behavior By Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco; Tyson, Christopher J.
  2. Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment By Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire

  1. By: Manzini, Paola (University of St. Andrews); Mariotti, Marco (University of St. Andrews); Tyson, Christopher J. (Queen Mary, University of London)
    Abstract: We introduce and study the problem of manipulation of choice behavior. In a class of two-stage models of decision making, with the agent's choices determined by three "psychological variables," we imagine that a subset of these variables can be selected by a "manipulator." To what extent does this confer control of the agent's behavior? Within the specified framework, which overlaps with two existing models of choice under cognitive constraints, we provide a complete answer to this question.
    Keywords: attention, choice function, revealed preference, satisficing, threshold
    JEL: D01 D70
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5891&r=neu
  2. By: Rosaz, Julie (University of Lyon 2); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE)
    Abstract: This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor) are almost non-existent. The supervisors' second-order beliefs and their decision to lie are highly correlated, suggesting that guilt aversion plays a role.
    Keywords: evaluation, lie-aversion, guilt aversion, self-image, deception, lies, experiments
    JEL: C91 D82 M52
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884&r=neu

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