New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2011‒06‒04
two papers chosen by



  1. More than outcomes: A cognitive dissonance-based explanation of other-regarding behavior By Astrid Matthey; Tobias Regner
  2. Eudaimonia and the Economics of Happiness By Santiago Melo

  1. By: Astrid Matthey (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); Tobias Regner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)
    Abstract: Recent research has cast some doubt on the general validity of outcome-based models of social preferences. We develop a model based on cognitive dissonance that focuses on the importance of self-image. An experiment (a dictator game variant) tests the model. First, we find that subjects whose choices involve two psychologically inconsistent cognitions indeed report higher levels of experienced conflict and take more time for their decisions (our proxies for cognitive dissonance). Second, we find support for the main model components. An individual's self-image, the sensitivity to cognitive dissonance, and expected behavior of others have a positive effect on other-regarding behavior.
    Keywords: social preferences, other-regarding behavior, self-image, experiments,,cognitive dissonance, social norms, normative beliefs, expectations
    JEL: C72 C91 D80
    Date: 2011–05–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-024&r=neu
  2. By: Santiago Melo
    Abstract: In this paper I discuss the major approaches to happiness in the economics of happiness: hedonism and life-satisfaction approaches. It is possible to identify a tension between two important principles in this literature: 1) individuals are the best judges of their own happiness, and 2) the purpose of economics should be the direct endorsement of happiness. I argue that hedonism conflicts with the first principle. In the case of life-satisfaction theories, the restricted approach conflicts with both principles while the unrestricted approach only with the second. I also argue that the field presents difficulties establishing happiness as a consistent normative concept. In order to show this, I return to the theories of Aristotle and Seneca because: 1) both the ancients and these economists consider happiness as the overarching good; 2) even though these economists recognize the importance of eudaimonistic theories, their interpretation and use has not been satisfactory; 3) the debate between Aristotle and Seneca has implications both on the quantitative character of happiness and on the role of public policy regarding its promotion. The main lesson of the ancients is methodological: what made the discussion so rich among them was their awareness that happiness was principally a normative concept whose content had to adjust in order to meet its normative demands; a point contemporary literature seems to have missed.
    Date: 2011–02–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:008730&r=neu

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