New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2010‒10‒02
four papers chosen by

  1. Chidl height, health and human capital: evidence using genetic markers By Stephanie von Hinke Kessler Scholder; George Davey Smith; Debbie A. Lawlor; Carol Propper; Frank Windmeijer
  2. The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play By Martin Dufwenberg; Simon Gaechter; Heike Hennig-Schmidt
  3. Servir les clients avec le sourire : un cadre motivationnel pour mieux prédire les stratégies de régulation émotionnelle By Marie-Claude Lépine; Michel Cossette
  4. Psychology for Economists By Piet Keizer

  1. By: Stephanie von Hinke Kessler Scholder; George Davey Smith; Debbie A. Lawlor; Carol Propper; Frank Windmeijer
    Abstract: Height has long been recognised as associated with better outcomes: the question is whether this association is causal. We use children’s genetic variants as instrumental variables (IV) to deal with possible unobserved confounders and examine the effect of child and adolescent height on a wide range of outcomes: academic performance, IQ, self-esteem, symptoms related to depression and behavioural problems, including hyperactivity, emotional, conduct and peer problems. OLS findings show that taller children have higher IQ scores, perform better in school tests, and are less likely to have emotional or peer problems. The IV results differ. They show that taller children have better cognitive performance but, in contrast to the OLS, indicate that taller children are more likely to have behavioural problems. The magnitude of these IV estimates is large. For example, the effect of one standard deviation increase in height on IQ is comparable to the IQ difference for children born approximately 6 months apart within the same school year, while the increase in hyperactivity is comparable to the raw difference in hyperactivity between boys and girls.
    Keywords: Child and adolescent height; human capital; mental health; behavioural outcomes; instrumental variables; Mendelian randomization; genetic variants; ALSPAC
    JEL: I1 J24
    Date: 2010–09
  2. By: Martin Dufwenberg; Simon Gaechter; Heike Hennig-Schmidt
    Abstract: Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject’s first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a psychological gametheoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either.
    Keywords: framing, psychological game theory, guilt aversion, reciprocity, public good games, voluntary cooperation
    JEL: C91 C72 D64 Z13
    Date: 2010–09
  3. By: Marie-Claude Lépine; Michel Cossette
    Abstract: Emotional labour, a requirement imposed on employees to express or suppress their emotions in their job, is an important occupational demand in customer service jobs. Emotion regulation strategies has important impacts on individuals (job attitudes, intention to quit and psychological health), but also on their organization (personnel turnover, service performance, customers’ loyalty, etc.). Although motivation was proposed as an emotional labour predictor, measurement issues of this concept must be resolved. Consequently, the present study proposes and tests among employees working in interaction with customers (n = 223) a scale measuring motivation to regulate emotions at work. Confirmatory Factor Analyses supported globally the presence of the different types of motivation postulated by the Self-determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Moreover, deep acting strategy was linked with the controlled motivation and to autonomous motivation, whereas surface acting was linked solely with controlled motivation. <P>Le travail émotionnel, soit le fait pour les employés d’avoir à afficher ou à supprimer certaines émotions dans le cadre de leur travail, constitue une demande occupationnelle importante dans les emplois de service à la clientèle. Les stratégies de régulation émotionnelle ont des effets importants non seulement pour l’individu (attitudes au travail, intention de quitter son emploi et santé psychologique), mais aussi pour son organisation (roulement du personnel, performance de service, fidélisation de la clientèle, etc.). Bien que la motivation ait été proposée comme prédicteur du travail émotionnel, des enjeux de mesure de ce concept doivent être surmontés. Conséquemment, la présente étude propose et teste auprès d’employés travaillant avec des clients (n = 223) une échelle mesurant la motivation à réguler les émotions au travail. Des analyses factorielles confirmatoires soutiennent globalement la présence des types de motivation postulés par la théorie de l’autodétermination (Deci & Ryan, 1985). De plus, la régulation émotionnelle de profondeur est liée à la motivation dite « contrôlante » et à la motivation « autonome », alors que la régulation de surface est seulement associée à la motivation « contrôlante ».
    Keywords: Emotional Labour, Motivation, Emotion regulation , Travail émotionnel, Motivation, Régulation émotionnelle
    Date: 2010–09–01
  4. By: Piet Keizer
    Abstract: Orthodox economics focuses on the analysis of the way the economic force or motivation operates, thereby abstracting from the functioning of other primary forces or motivations, such as the social and the psychic motivation. By assuming perfect rationality psychic problems are ignored. This text discusses six approaches in psychology . cognitive, behaviourist, biological, psychodynamic, humanistic and social psychology - to find out what orthodox economics needs in order to extend its analysis with the more realistic idea of imperfect rationality. In this discussion the state of the art of behavioural economics in included.
    Keywords: orthodox economics, psychology, behavioural economics, imperfect rationality
    JEL: A11 A12 B13 B41
    Date: 2010–09

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