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on Neuroeconomics |
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Issue of 2010‒05‒29
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Shaul Almakias (Finance Ministry, Israel); Avi Weiss (Bar-Ilan University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we import a mainstream psycholgical theory, known as attachment theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic behavior by individuals in the ultimatum bargaining game. Attachment theory examines the psychological tendency to seek proximity to another person, to feel secure when that person is present, and to feel anxious when that person is absent. An individual's attachment style can be classified along two-dimensional axes, one representing attachment "avoidance" and one representing attachment "anxiety". Avoidant people generally feel discomfort when being close to others, have trouble trusting people and distance themselves from intimate or revealing situations. Anxious people have a fear of abandonment and of not being loved. Utilizing attachment theory, we evaluate the connection between attachment types and economic decision making, and find that in an Ultimatum Game both proposers' and responders' behavior can be explained by their attachment styles, as explained by the theory. We believe this theory has implications for economic behavior in different settings, such as negotiations, in general, and more specifically, may help explain behavior, and perhaps even anomalies, in other experimental settings. |
| Keywords: | Attachment Theory, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Ultimatum Game, Psychology and Economics |
| JEL: | C91 C78 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2010-01&r=neu |
| By: | Schade, Christian; Schroeder, Andreas; Krause, Kai Oliver |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effects of prior gain and loss experiences on individualsâ behavior in two coordination games: battle of the sexes and simultaneous market entry. We propose subjectively transformed games that integrate elements of prospect theory, aggregation of prior and subsequent payoffs, and social projection. Mathematical predictions of behavior are derived based on equilibrium selection concepts. Malesâ behavior in our experimental studies is largely consistent with our predictions. However, the behavior of many female respondents appears to be rather consistent with interpreting the initial random lottery outcomes used to manipulate prior experiences as a signal for the playersâ abilities to compete. This could be related to femalesâ known uneasiness of competing against counterparts that might be male and thus, a generally higher salience of rivalry in our incentivized experiments. Females also chose to play far more mixed strategies than males indicating some uncertainty about what type of behavior is appropriate. |
| Keywords: | Prospect Game Theory, Prior Outcomes, Coordination, Equilibrium Selection, Economic Experiment, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Financial Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty, |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:huscpw:59524&r=neu |
| By: | Driesen, Bram (Maastricht University) |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-22806&r=neu |