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on Neuroeconomics |
| By: | Massimo Egidi |
| Abstract: | Despite the great effort that has been dedicated to the attempt to redefine expected utility theory on the grounds of new assumptions, modifying or moderating some axioms, none of the alternative theories propounded so far had a statistical confirmation over the full domain of applicability. Moreover, the discrepancy between prescriptions and behaviors is not limited to expected utility theory. In two other fundamental fields, probability and logic, substantial evidence shows that human activities deviate from the prescriptions of the theoretical models. The paper suggests that the discrepancy cannot be ascribed to an imperfect axiomatic description of human choice, but to some more general features of human reasoning and assumes the “dual-process account of reasoning” as a promising explanatory key. This line of thought is based on the distinction between the process of deliberate reasoning and that of intuition; where in a first approximation, “intuition” denotes a mental activity largely automatized and inaccessible from conscious mental activity. The analysis of the interactions between these two processes provides the basis for explaining the persistence of the gap between normative and behavioral patterns. This view will be explored in the following pages: central consideration will be given to the problem of the interactions between rationality and intuition, and the correlated “modularity” of the thought. |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:0706&r=neu |
| By: | Nathalie Lazaric |
| Abstract: | The aim of this article is to understand permanence and changes inside organizational routines. For this purpose, it seems important to explain how individual and collective memorisation occurs, so as to grasp how knowledge can be converted into routines. Although memorisation mechanisms imply a degree of durability, our procedural and declarative knowledge, and our memorisation processes, evolve so that individuals and organisations can project themselves into the future and innovate. Some authors highlight the necessity of dreaming and forgetting (Bergson 1896); others believe that emotions play a role in our memorisation processes (Damasio 1994). These dimensions are not only important at the individual level but also in an organisational context (Lazaric and Denis 2005; Reynaud 2005; Pentland and Feldman 2005).I review the individual dimension of these memorisation processes, with the Anderson’s distinction between procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge. I discuss the notion of cognitive automatisms in order to show why routines should be investigated beyond their first literal assumption (Bargh, 1997). This leads to a clear understanding of the micro level that underpins organisational flexibility and adaptation (notably the motivational triggers). Within organisations, the memorisation mechanisms are at once similar and diverse. Indeed, organisations use their own filters and mechanisms to generate organisational coordination. Organizational memory has its own dimension as it does not merely consist of the sum of individual knowledge and must be able to survive when individuals leave. Routines depend on the organisational memory implemented and on the procedural knowledge and representations of it (individual and collective representations). |
| Keywords: | Knowledge; memorisation; organizations; individuals |
| JEL: | D83 O31 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:07-13&r=neu |
| By: | Isabelle Brocas; Juan D Carrillo |
| Date: | 2007–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001594&r=neu |